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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study provides a history of commercial aviation in Las Vegas, focusing on the 
powerful influence commercial air travel had with the financial help of the federal 
government on Las Vegas‟s growth and development as a world-class travel destination. It 
especially emphasizes how the airline industry was the catalyst for Las Vegas‟s 
transformation from an isolated desert town into a world-famous tourist city. Such a study is 
important to show while Las Vegas‟s story is unique it is a microcosm of a broader regional 
and national story where airlines played an influential role in the economic growth and 
development of other western and national cities. Through the use of primary and secondary 
sources, my dissertation proves that in order to properly understand the history of 
transportation in the American West, commercial aviation must be included in the story. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The airlines of America are the vital core of the world‟s biggest industry - - travel 
and tourism.” Thomas Petzinger Jr. 
 
 Evening rush hour at McCarran International Airport in the heart of Las 
Vegas, Nevada is an impressive sight. Air traffic control is busy sequencing 
incoming Delta, Alaska, Southwest, American, Frontier, United, Virgin Atlantic, 
Northwest and Allegiant airliners for landing on runways twenty-five left and nineteen 
right.  Nearby, more than two dozen passenger jets patiently wait for clearance to 
take off on runways twenty-five right and nineteen left. Terminals and concourses 
are teeming with thousands enplaning and deplaning passengers. In the distance, 
more of the world‟s finest passenger planes slowly approach the nation‟s seventh 
busiest and sixth largest mega-port. The big birds have landed in the desert bringing 
travelers from all parts of the globe to a world-class travel destination.  
Manned flight has intrigued Americans from the day the Wright brothers 
successfully flew their experimental powered-glider Kitty Hawk in North Carolina on 
December 17, 1903, right up to the landing of the six-hundred passenger Emirates 
Airbus A380 jumbo jet at John F. Kennedy Airport on August 1, 2008. Numerous 
books, articles, and stories have been written about the phenomenon of man leaving 
the ground to enter a new frontier in the sky through passenger travel. Few of them 
however, have addressed the history of what happened when the sky frontier met 
the ground frontier in the American East and rapidly moved to the American West.  
As the airplane came west to Denver, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Salt Lake 
City, Phoenix, and Tucson, these growing cities eagerly reached out to this new 
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transportation phenomenon by building airports with graded runways, small terminal 
buildings, and hotels, working diligently to become part of the prestigious, 
government-funded transcontinental air mail and passenger transportation system. 
As this system began to grow, smaller connecting towns were needed for fuel stops, 
one of which was Las Vegas. An interesting and unexamined part of this story is the 
meeting of the airplane with this small desert frontier town in the 1920s where the 
two formed a symbiotic relationship that over eight decades, transformed the tiny 
oasis into a leading global tourist destination by the end of the twentieth century. 
Why an unexamined story? Commercial air travel often is taken for granted simply 
as a faster and more convenient form of transportation, and Las Vegas has been 
dismissed as an aberration, a bastion of vice and gambling.  
 As a new and unseasoned form of transportation and part of the Civil Air Mail 
Route 4 (CAM-4), commercial air travel came to a sparsely populated Las Vegas in 
1926 when the town was little more than a watering hole, an isolated train stop in the 
desert. During the Great Depression years when only the wealthy could afford to fly, 
the airlines struggled while Las Vegas, with construction of the Hoover Dam, 
experienced a tourism boom. During the war years, civilian passenger travel was put 
on hold so the airlines could provide planes and personnel for the war effort. But the 
post-war boom and beginning of the consumer age prompted larger and faster 
planes to bring more tourists to Las Vegas. McCarran Field expanded its runways 
and terminal, new casino-resorts appeared downtown, and the city grew. During this 
time, commercial aviation became a more important source of transportation for 
tourists, business travelers, and conventioneers wanting to come to the Strip‟s most 
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recent, luxurious casino-resorts. The coming of jets in the 1960s revolutionized 
commercial air travel for the next four decades, offering affordability, comfort, and 
speed to domestic and global travelers. By century‟s end, the airlines delivered more 
than 33 million passengers to McCarran International Airport, with the airlines and 
airport together pumping more than $30 billion into the southern Nevada economy.1 
Las Vegas reached its zenith as the fastest growing city in the nation, which in 
partnership with the largest airline industry in the world and a cutting-edge modern 
mega-port, formed a world-class travel destination.   
 This dissertation argues that commercial air passenger transportation, 
prodded by progressive government aeronautical policies and aviation technology 
from 1926-2009, served as a vital catalyst for Las Vegas‟s development of a 
lucrative tourism industry and for the city‟s rapid growth. The focus is on the close 
and complex relations between airline technology, airline management, tourism, 
airport management, and the casino-resorts. It also highlights the relationship 
between politics, economics, technology, and how these forces combined to help 
shape and reshape Las Vegas‟s physicality and urban spaces. 
 Frontier myth and the idea of rugged individualism notwithstanding, the 
historiography is replete with examples of how government and private interests 
working together forged the future of the American West.2 The Las Vegas story, 
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 Las Vegas McCarran International Airport News Release, “Terminal 3 more than 50% complete,” 12 January 
2010 
 
2
 For an example of the federal, state, and local government working with private organizations in Las Vegas 
see Eugene P. Moehring Resort City in the Sunbelt: Las Vegas 1930-2000 (Reno and Las Vegas: University of 
Nevada Press, 1989, 1995, with new epilogue 2000); Hal K. Rothman Devil’s Bargains: Tourism in the 
Twentieth-Century American West (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998; Hal K. Rothman, Neon 
xi 
 
moreover, is a microcosm of a broader regional and national story where airlines 
and government played an influential role in the economic growth and development 
of urban tourism. My dissertation shows the close historic ties between commercial 
passenger travel and the economic growth and vitality of Las Vegas within the 
broader context of aviation history and history of the American West. 
To explore the complex relationships between private interests, especially in 
the air transportation industry and local, state, and federal governments, I draw on 
scholars who have emphasized the role played by organized corporations and 
groupings within the United States liberal capitalist system.3 Rationality and 
efficiency do not come about merely through the market place or by political fiat. It is 
the influence of business groups, labor unions, and other interests together with 
government action that have made modern capitalism functional. This was certainly 
true of the airline industry in the United States. Historian Ellis Hawley observed the 
importance of government involvement in the aviation industry claiming,  
“Rapid development of the [aviation] industry was vital to 
national defense; yet because it was in a pioneer stage, risky, 
speculative, and unable to offer assured returns, the industry on its 
own could never attempt the large capital outlays that were necessary 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Metropolis: How Las Vegas Started the Twenty-First Century (New York and London: Routledge, 2003); For Las 
Vegas and the West see John M. Findlay Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1992); Earl Pomeroy, The American Far West 
in the 20
th
 Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008); For federal, state, and local 
government working with private organizations in aviation see Carl Solberg, Conquest of the Skies: A History of 
Commercial Aviation (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1979); Roger E. Bilstein, Flight in America: From 
the Wrights to the Astronauts, 3
rd
 Edition, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, 1994, 
2001); T. A. Heppenheimer, Turbulent Skies: The History of Commercial Aviation (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1995); Thomas Petzinger Jr., Hard Landing: The Epic Contest for Power and Profits That Plunged the Airlines 
into Chaos (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1995);  Kenneth B. Ragsdale, Austin: Cleared for Takeoff: Aviators, 
Businessmen, and the Growth of an American City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004). 
 
3
 Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism” (M.E. Sharp, 1996), 33. 
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for rapid expansion. The answer was government support. Under 
aviation acts of 1925 and 1926, the government had to step in to 
provide safety controls, generous mail subsidies, and a wide variety of 
promotional and navigation aids.”4  
 
These new regulations made air travel much safer and more accessible to the 
public. Among cities that would benefit from these new federal regulations was Las 
Vegas.  
Las Vegas is an ideal case study for my dissertation because it is an example 
of federal, state, and local governments and private monies working together to 
create unique partnerships that enabled a modern twentieth-century city to rise from 
the desert floor and become a global tourist mecca. As a small desert town with a 
limited economy, Las Vegas financially benefited from private southern California 
investment, government funding for an airport meeting strict regulatory standards, 
revenue from a mushrooming tourism industry, and eventually, an image 
transformation into a modern metropolis designed to attract domestic and 
international air travelers.  
 The first chapter provides the early history of commercial aviation, the airport, 
casino-resorts, and the city of Las Vegas from 1925-1940. Its central theme focuses 
on the city‟s efforts to prepare for and be connected to the powerful, growing infant 
airline industry by building an airport, which initiated the symbiotic relationship 
between the airlines, airport, and casino-resorts. A major sub-theme is the federal 
government‟s financial and political involvement in the airline industry, serving as a 
financial backstop to an industry that was too expensive for private funding alone. 
                                                          
4
 Ellis Hawley, The New Deal & Problem of Monopoly (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), 240. 
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The government also established a strong set of regulations, mandating pilot 
certification, proper aircraft maintenance, and flying rules for safer air travel. A 
second subtheme explores the challenges the city faced in its effort to be awarded a 
civil air mail route to attract airlines, and the establishment of a fledgling tourism 
industry in Las Vegas.  
Chapter 2 discusses commercial air travel during and after World War II from 
1940-1958, the relocation and expansion of McCarran Field, and the influence of the 
larger and more luxurious resorts to accommodate high-volume fly-in and drive-in 
visitors. The chapter‟s central theme explores the unique relationships between 
federal, state, and local governments, and private business through government 
funding for the airline industry and airport development. The chapter also discusses 
and analyzes the importance of junkets that brought hundreds of thousands of 
tourists and gamblers to Las Vegas, their unique marketing modus operandi, and the 
package deal which became the blueprint of marketing techniques adopted by the 
commercial airlines and casino-resorts years later.  
Chapter 3 examines the revolutionary role jets played in the growth and 
development of the airline industry itself, the expansion of McCarran Field to 
McCarran International Airport, and of Las Vegas entering the early mega-resort era. 
From the arrival of the first jet in 1960, a United Airlines Boeing 720-B, up to the 
appearance of the wide-bodied 350-passenger Boeing 747 in 1970, jets transformed 
travel to Las Vegas by linking it to other national and international cities through 
direct, non-stop flights. In response to the explosive passenger volume growth at 
McCarran that followed and a simultaneous bump in drive-in visitors, casino owners 
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Jay Sarno (Caesars Palace), and Kirk Kerkorian (Landmark) built high-rise mega-
resorts to accommodate the new flood of tourists.     
 Chapter 4 argues that deregulation of the United States airline industry, which 
opened the air travel market to wider national and international competition, 
profoundly affected the airlines, McCarran International Airport, and Las Vegas by 
elevating the tourist economy to a global level on a larger scale. MGM Grand, 
Mirage, Excalibur, Luxor, and other themed mega-resorts with a combined 130,000 
rooms, appeared on the Strip to accommodate the more than 30 million air travelers 
who annually came to visit. The chapter also examines the airport officials‟ and 
contractors‟ ambitious expansion plans for McCarran Airport for future needs of 
anticipated 40 million passengers annually passing through the airport‟s gates.    
 Chapter 5 explores the on-going transformational impact of the airline 
industry on Las Vegas through the first decade of the economically tumultuous 
twenty-first century. It shows how 9/11 represented only a temporary setback for the 
airlines, airport, and casino-resorts because in the following years leading up to 
2008, the airlines enjoyed the highest load factor of 85%-90% seat occupancy in 
aviation history. McCarran Airport‟s passenger volume increased from 43 million to 
nearly 48 million, and the casino-resorts combined enjoyed their largest annual 
profits of all time: $20 billion. The growth occurred in spite of underlying structural 
deficiencies in the airline business - - high fuel prices, mismanagement, labor unrest, 
and mounting debt, and the casino industry‟s practice of overbuilding and over-
borrowing from leveraged Wall Street banks. To add to the problems, the onset of 
the 2008 national recession slowed leisure travel, but never brought Las Vegas‟s 
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one-dimension tourist economy to a halt. The relationship between the airlines, 
airport, and casino-resorts remained strong, though with the global recession, 
dependency of the airport and casino-resorts on the airlines to bring in much needed 
passengers was deeper than ever. Despite the airline industry‟s many financial 
difficulties, the federal government continued to subsidize carriers which transported 
the U.S. mail and encouraged greater city participation in the Open Skies 
Agreement, a brokered arrangement allowing U.S. airlines to fly to more global 
countries, and more international airlines to serve the United States.     
The conclusion offers a new way to study Las Vegas, Nevada, and Southwest 
history through the role commercial aviation played in their economic growth and the 
development of tourism, and how passenger planes connected southwestern cities 
to the nation and the world. It also emphasizes the role of airports in the geographic, 
political, social, and cultural growth of southwestern cities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE AIRLINES COME TO LAS VEGAS 
 
 The First Airline Arrives 
April 17, 1926 was a landmark day for the dusty little desert town of Las Vegas.  At 
10:05 a.m., after a two hour, twenty-nine minute flight from Los Angeles, Western Air 
Express World War I pilot Maury Graham landed his single-engine Douglas M-2 bi-plane on 
the freshly-graded dirt airstrip at the new, officially designated Rockwell Field.1 Having 
completed the first leg of the inaugural airmail flight from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City, he 
stopped in Las Vegas just long enough to refuel, deliver and pick up mail bags before taking 
off to complete the last leg of his trip. Three hours later, fellow Western Air Express pilot 
Jimmie James landed at Rockwell Field after a bumpy five-hour, forty-minute flight from Salt 
Lake City.2  As planned, he also stopped to refuel, deliver and pick up mail bags, and 
continue on to Los Angeles to finish the history-making eight hour trip. Scheduled 
commercial aviation had finally come to Las Vegas.   
Mayor Fred Hess and more than two hundred automobiles filled with excited 
townspeople turned out to greet each of the pilots as their M-2s arrived.3  Since 1918, Las 
Vegans had watched World War I pilots Randall Henderson and Emery Rogers arrive from 
Southern California in their small Curtiss JN-4 “Jennies” doing fly-bys and touch-and-goes to 
                                                          
1
 Jay D. Evensen, “Vegas Air History Flies by,” Las Vegas Review- Journal, 4 October 1985, p. 12. 
 
2
 Elizabeth Harrington, “History of Aviation in Las Vegas Valley,” The Nevadan, 22 August 1976, p.5. Note that 
Graham and James, along with fellow Western Air Express pilots Al DeGarmo and C.C. Moseley were given the 
nickname “the four horsemen” by Las Vegans as the pioneer airmail pilots for Las Vegas. See Frank Wright, 
Desert Airways: A Short History of Clark County Aviation, 1920-1948 (Las Vegas: Clark County Heritage 
Museum Press, 1993), 8. 
 
3
 Evensen, “Vegas Air History Flies by,” p.12. 
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impress their desert onlookers with the wonders of this new machine called the aeroplane.4 
According to the Las Vegas Age newspaper, Henderson, Rogers, and other pilots “just 
dropped in as if it were an everyday occurrence to hop across 300 miles of desert to call on 
friends.”5  
          Of course, an essential part of the promotion of aviation in Las Vegas was landing 
and parking the planes for public inspection, and offering flights to the daring of which there 
always were a few. Most Las Vegans were left with “dislocated necks and sunburned 
tonsils” from watching the planes circle the valley.6  Army Air Corps pilots also frequently 
performed aerial maneuvers over the little town in their DeHavilland DH-4s while scouting 
airmail routes. Being able to get a first-hand look at the M-2 bi-planes with mail bag 
compartments in the front, and pilot seating in the back, was a big deal on this special 
occasion. Robert Griffith, then Postmaster of Las Vegas, recalled “the great day of April 17, 
1926 when Jimmie James landed at Las Vegas. Several hundred people watched as „Wild 
Bill‟ Morgan, former Pony Express rider, delivered the first bag of mail on horseback ever to 
be sent from Las Vegas by air. Jimmie was a well-loved hero and the plane was the finest. 
The Douglas M-2 had a 450 hp engine, metal prop, droppable gas tanks, 145 mile per hour 
speed, many other up to the minute features, and cost a fabulous $18,000 dollars.  Las 
Vegas, for sure was on the map now.”7   
This level of excitement for a pair of airmail pilots delivering a few bags of letters may 
seem overblown, but Postmaster Griffith was correct, Las Vegas was literally on the national 
                                                          
4
 Ibid. 
 
5
 Ibid. 
 
6
 Ibid. 
 
7
 Robert Griffith, Former Post Master General to Arthur F. Kelly, Delta Airlines Vice-President of Sales, 10 
September 1962, Delta Airlines Collection, Atlanta, GA. 
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aviation map.8 As a fuel stop on the Los Angeles to Salt Lake City feeder route, Las Vegas 
became a part of the highly coveted San Francisco to New York transcontinental airmail 
system, which opened the door to passenger travel and tourism. And with the guidance and 
financial support of the federal government, during the next eight decades, commercial 
airlines enabled Las Vegas to become a world-class travel and tourism destination.      
 
The United States Airmail Comes First    
Using aviation to transform Las Vegas was a massive undertaking, but it started 
simply enough with the airmail. At the end of World War I, many Americans wondered about 
the complex shift from combat to peace. Questions about the shape of the American 
economy, the role of the federal government in private life, and the place of the military in a 
non-wartime society headlined contemporary debates.  Several of these concerns 
telescoped into the issue of aviation. 
Near the conclusion of WWI, the federal government began experimenting with 
transporting mail by air because of the speed of delivery. Army Air Corps pilots were the 
best trained, most experienced at flying, and readily available airmen after the war. So, the 
Post Office hired them to transport the mail. On May 15, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson 
ordered the allocation of $100,000 for pilots, airplanes, maintenance personnel, and facilities 
for the Post Office to transport part of the nation‟s mail by air from New York to Washington 
D.C. via Philadelphia.9 To save money, the Post Office purchased the cheapest and most 
available of the WWI surplus planes, the JN-4 “Jennies,” but their airframes proved too 
                                                          
8
 Ibid. Note that both M-2s delivered a total of 671 letters to Las Vegas and 2,246 letters to Los Angeles and 
Salt Lake City. 
 
9
 Nick A. Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation Policy under the Air Commerce Act 1926-1938 
(Washington D.C.: United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1978), 86. 
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fragile and their engines failed during flight.10 The Post Office changed to the larger 
DeHavilland DH-4s, which could carry 400 pounds of mail and travel 250 miles before 
refueling. But they proved to be fuel inefficient for long-distance flight. Needing more durable 
planes, the Post Office switched to the workhorse, the Douglas M-2s that could carry more 
than 1,000 pounds of mail, travel 600 miles without refueling, and had more reliable 
engines.11  
For the airmail industry to be successful, flight safety was paramount. Even with 
better planes and highly skilled pilots, the Army Air Corps from 1918-1927 suffered more 
than 200 crashes, causing 43 deaths and 25 serious injuries.12 The reasons for the crashes 
were many. With an increasingly heavy business mail volume demanding time-saving 
delivery, there was immense pressure for round-the-clock mail service.  To meet deadlines, 
pilots had to fly day and night often in adverse weather conditions. Airplane cockpits lacked 
proper navigation instruments forcing pilots to practice “iron navigation,” pilot jargon for 
following the railroad tracks, and keeping to the right unless another plane was traveling in 
the opposite direction on the left. Night flying was especially precarious because in most 
places there was no safe ground lighting. Pioneer pilots literally had to “fly by the seat of 
their pants,” a reality that caused the most daring among them to be chosen to fly the mail 
routes. A crash report from well known pioneer mail pilot Dean Smith is informative: “On Trip 
4 westbound. Flying low. Engine quit. Only place to land on cow. Killed cow. Wrecked plane. 
Scared me. Smith.”13  
                                                          
10
 David T. Courtwright, Sky as Frontier: Adventure, Aviation, and Empire (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2005), 58.  
 
11
 Frank Wright, Desert Airways, 6. 
 
12
 Courtwright, Sky as Frontier, 65. 
 
13
 Ibid., 59. 
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By 1924, there was marginal improvement in flight safety when the Army Air Corps 
installed turn indicators in airplane cockpits, gyroscopic instruments that enabled pilots to 
see when and how much they were turning in low visibility flying conditions. That same year, 
the federal government began installing flashing beacons on hilltops so that by 1927 airmail 
pilots could fly 4,121 miles of lit airways nationwide at night, visibility depending on weather 
conditions.14 Though these changes provided some measures of safety, pioneer airmail 
flying remained a very dangerous occupation. 
The 1920s mail planes were built of light wood and fabric, often incapable of 
handling turbulent flying conditions. Many a wing or tail blew off with strong winds and 
storms. Lightning caused fires, and flocks of birds damaged engines. With weak regulatory 
oversight, airplane maintenance was poor. An added problem was that the now-
underfunded Army Air Corps tried to save money by delaying airplane overhauls as long as 
possible.15  
All of these problems hampered the effort to create a viable airmail delivery 
infrastructure giving the airmail division of the Post Office a bad reputation among the public 
as both unreliable and unsafe. Additionally, railroad executives complained to Congress that 
the Post Office‟s airmail division was cutting into their profits. They approached 
Representative M. Clyde Kelly (R- Pennsylvania), a strong supporter of the railroads and 
Chairman of the Post Office Committee, asking him to convince his congressional 
colleagues to privatize air mail transportation to force the Post Office‟s aviation division out 
                                                          
14
 Roger E. Bilstein, Flight in America: From the Wrights to the Astronauts, 3
rd
 Edition (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984 with new editions in 1994, and 2001), 50. Also see T.A. Heppenheimer, 
Turbulent Skies: The History of Commercial Aviation (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 10. 
 
15
 Ibid. Budget cuts and  political squabbles significantly slowed the Army Air Corps from acquiring better 
planes. 
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of business.16 The railroads could then try to control the airlines through majority stock 
ownership. With mounting pressure from railroad executives and the public‟s concern about 
lack of aviation safety, in 1924, Postmaster General Harry New terminated the Post Office‟s 
contract with the Army Air Corps.17    
The Army Air Corps out, powerful private commercial airline businessmen such as 
Juan Trippe, a Yale University graduate, co-founder of New York Airways, and later CEO of 
Pan American Airways (Pan Am), and Harris M. “Pop” Hanshue, a former automobile 
dealership owner, and President of Western Air Express Airlines, used their influence to 
further pressure Congress to privatize air mail transportation. Trippe especially pushed for 
privatization so he could build a globally competitive commercial airline mail and passenger 
service from the East Coast of the United States to Central and South America.18 At the 
same time, both men recognized even if Congress approved privatizing the air mail industry, 
the airline industry still would need some government financial backing because it was too 
expensive to sustain with private funding alone. With the help of Alan Scaife, a fellow Yale 
graduate, and son of the prominent Scaife family that owned several ore mining businesses 
in Pittsburg, Trippe petitioned Representative Kelly to craft legislation allowing private 
companies to contract with the Post Office to transport the mail.19  
Embracing his party‟s free market, laissez-faire political ideology, Kelly responded by 
presenting to Congress a proposal that authorized the postmaster general to contract with 
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 Robert J. Serling, The Only Way to Fly: The Story of Western Airlines, America’s Senior Airline (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1976), 7. 
 
17
 U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Government_Role/1925-
29_airmail/POL5.htm  
 
18
 Marylin Bender and Selig Altschul, The Chosen Instrument: Pan Am, Juan Trippe, The Rise and Fall of an 
American Entrepreneur (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 65. 
 
19
 Ibid. 
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private carriers, set airmail rates, and decide how much to subsidize the airlines.20 On 
February 2, 1925, Congress passed the Kelly Act.21 Immediately, more than twenty private 
air carriers placed bids for contracts with the Post Office, including Las Vegas‟s first airline, 
Western Air Express. 
 
The Airmail Comes to Las Vegas 
As far back as October 1920, talk arose in southern Nevada of a possible airmail 
route passing through Las Vegas. An editorial in the Clark County Review pointed out how 
the original postal air route from San Francisco to Salt Lake City via Reno was too 
dangerous because of the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range‟s high elevation, blinding winter 
blizzards, and severe up and downdrafts during the hot summer. The paper claimed that 
Las Vegas, located away from the mountains in the flat Mojave Desert, would provide a 
much safer and suitable stopping point for aircraft to refuel.22 Robert Hausler, a Las Vegan 
and former Army pilot scouting air mail routes in the Southwest, echoed those sentiments as 
the Clark County Review. In November 1920, he prepared tiny Anderson Field with a 
leveled L-shaped runway for takeoffs and landings and built a small terminal, and a fuel 
station.23   
The Clark County Review praised Hausler, claiming, “With the establishing of 
Anderson Field, which is due principally to the efforts of Bob Hausler, and the reputed price 
of these machines [airplanes], which is not more than a good auto, it is not unreasonable to 
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suppose that one or more machines will soon be located here for commercial purposes and 
possibly some privately owned.”24 The new airfield drew praise from the Southern California 
Aero Club, an organization comprised of wealthy businessmen and former World War I 
pilots interested in promoting and increasing aviation in southern California.25  
The Club believed that promoting Las Vegas as a fuel stop for eastern travelers 
heading west would increase air travel in Los Angeles, and enable southern California to 
compete with northern California for aviation business (San Francisco was the West Coast 
terminus on the Transcontinental Airmail Route).26 Establishing a Post Office airmail route 
through Las Vegas would assist this endeavor by increasing air traffic and bringing greater 
publicity through airmail advertising to the region. Hausler and the Aero Club published an 
article in the Aviation and Aircraft Journal explaining why the Post Office should select Las 
Vegas to be part of the Los Angeles to Salt Lake City Civil Airmail Route-4 (CAM-4). They 
wrote “Las Vegas has the best laid out and properly marked [air] field between Salt Lake 
and Los Angeles.”27  
To drum up local support for the Civil Air Mail Route-4 bid, the editor of the Clark 
County Review released a statement claiming, “The value of the airmail to Las Vegas 
cannot be overestimated: aside from the convenience of the service, the inauguration of this 
new route will bring a vast amount of publicity for this city, which could not be purchased at 
any price. It is in the interest of every businessman of this city that he avail himself of the 
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new means of communication at every opportunity.”28 No effort seemed too large to attract 
airmail delivery to the city. The Clark County Review asked Las Vegans to “write their 
friends and send them a letter on the first plane out of here, for the continuance of the 
service will depend on the amount of business done.”29  
Essentially, the Post Office needed “feeder routes” to pick up and deliver mail and 
promote aviation in smaller towns off the main transcontinental route from San Francisco to 
New York, one of which was the CAM-4 Los Angeles to Salt Lake City Route. Feeder routes 
also served as fuel stops because mail planes often did not have the fuel range to make 
non-stop flights. In Nevada, pilots repeatedly complained to Postmaster Robert Griffith about 
not being able to complete their flights because their airplanes kept running out of gas. 
Clearly, a series of connected stopover cities was required. Although other Nevada towns 
such as Caliente, Pioche, and Ely also wanted to be on the route, they could not compete 
with Las Vegas‟ natural advantages of long, wide valleys for airplanes to safely takeoff and 
land. Mayor Fred Hess and Postmaster Robert Griffith tried to convince United States 
Postmaster General Harry New that since they were farther south than their competitors, 
Las Vegas would be a wise choice as a fuel stop for a southern transcontinental air mail 
route.30 The country had a northern and a central transcontinental air mail route, but not a 
southern one. A southern route would facilitate expansion of the air mail volume, allow faster 
delivery to southern towns, and generate more revenue from increased business for the 
Post Office, private air carriers, and towns being served.31 After five years of waiting, the 
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newspaper editorials, political support, and pressure from the Southern California Aero Club 
finally worked because on November 7, 1925, Griffith announced Las Vegas would be an 
official stopping point on the CAM-4 Route.32 
Soon after Griffith made the announcement, it made headlines in the Clark County 
Review, and the entire town went crazy with excitement. The City Council rejoiced and was 
overwhelmed by the deluge of positive responses from the public in the form of phone calls 
and letters. The Clark County Review even claimed, “Over one hundred letters have already 
been received at the post office to be mailed out on the first mail plane leaving here, some 
of them being sent long distances.”33 Las Vegans eagerly awaited the arrival of a 
commercial plane to transport their letters, but to a public accustomed to the rickety planes 
of the Army Air Corps, they never imagined it would be such an impressive airplane as the 
Douglas M-2, part of Harris M. “Pop” Hanshue‟s Western Air Express fleet.      
Hanshue, a former race car driver from southern California, along with William 
Garland, a wealthy realtor, Harry Chandler, owner and publisher of the Los Angeles Times, 
and James A. Talbot of Richfield Oil, saw a lucrative opportunity offered by the federal 
government to start a feeder airline service to the central transcontinental air mail route.34 
With Chandler, Garland, and Talbot as primary financiers, and Hanshue as president, they 
started a feeder airline company called Western Air Express. It was based in Glendale, Los 
Angeles, and began on 4,283 shares of stock valued at $100 per share, as an initial public 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
32
 Wright, Desert Airways, 5. 
 
33
 Clark County Review, 19 March 1926, p.1. 
 
34
 Tom D. Crouch, Wings: A History of Aviation from the Kite to the Space Age (New York and London: W.W. 
Norton, 2003), 251. 
 
11 
 
offering.35 The revenue from the stock was used to purchase flying equipment, build 
hangars, and terminal facilities. Western Air Express‟s fleet consisted of six Douglas M-2s, 
and three Fokker 10s.36 The airline flew mail from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City with a stop 
in Las Vegas, Cheyenne to Pueblo, Amarillo to Dallas, and Los Angeles to Kansas City.37 It 
made a profit of $1,140 per flight hauling mail, which was considerable for that time, but 
slowly diminished as insurance and operating costs later increased.38 Originally, the interest 
of Western Air Express was hauling mail, but, Hanshue had a different goal – he wanted to 
transport people.  
In 1926, his opportunity came with a grant of $180,000 from the Guggenheim Fund 
for the Advancement of Aeronautics to establish a route between San Francisco and Los 
Angeles.39 Using three Fokker 10s with seating for twelve passengers, business began 
slowly with the transportation of six hundred passengers that year.40 Two years later, more 
than five thousand passengers had traveled the route confirming Hanshue‟s vision that there 
was growing demand for airplanes to haul mail and people. In a reminiscence, W.W. Hawes, 
Second Assistant Postmaster General in Washington D.C. remembered how, “Although no 
mail contract was obtained for this route, and Western Air Express‟s operation [initially] 
resulted in considerable loss, nevertheless the Los Angeles to San Francisco route was 
warranted by the development of additional air transportation service which gained for 
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Western Air Express an unexcelled reputation for service, and which further provided 
experience and data necessary for the future expansion of passenger and air mail 
operations.”41 With financial support from the government, the commercial air travel industry 
could not fail. As Hawes noted, “The Post Office Department, in its role of sponsor of 
commercial air transportation development, established the policy of desiring and aiding the 
expansion of efficient, safe, and economical air passenger transportation.”42 Though the 
airlines got their start by transporting mail, Trippe, Hanshue, and other airline executives 
always had the broader vision of transporting people.43   
 
Delivering Airmail and Passengers 
Although the intent of the Kelly Act was to allow private air carriers to transport mail, 
it soon gave way to the Air Commerce Act of 1926 which permitted air carriers to transport 
passengers.44 While the Post Office had been building the air mail system, the government 
had begun experimenting immediately after World War I with the idea of expanding aviation 
to carry people. Government officials did not have to look far. Most European states had 
already begun passenger air travel. This was not the first time the United States fell behind 
Europe in air travel and aviation technology. According to aviation historian Roger Bilstein, 
“As early as 1911, many thoughtful figures in American aviation circles believed that the 
United States had begun to fall behind in comparison to European aeronautics. France, 
Russia, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain all had active aeronautical laboratories with 
varying degrees of government support, and many of their designs were beginning to show 
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clear evidence of superiority over American aircraft.”45 A scathing report conducted by Dr. 
Albert F. Zahm, Chief of the Smithsonian Aviation Laboratory confirmed this, claims Bilstein, 
who wrote that the 1914 report “emphasized the galling disparity between European 
progress and American inertia.”46 This disparity meant that Europe became the leader in 
aviation technology, and had the ability to dominate global markets. The Air Commerce Act 
sought to improve commercial aviation by creating a regulatory aviation framework to better 
organize it, make air travel safer, establish an agency to supervise it, and enable the United 
States commercial aviation industry to globally compete with the European air carriers. But, 
which government agency would oversee the airlines?   
The logical United States government agency to address the need seemed to be the 
Department of Commerce. While the Republican administrations of the 1920s are popularly 
associated with free market economics, numerous historians have shown that the 
government structures established during the Progressive Era endured through the “roaring 
twenties” and in some cases underwent expansion. The historian Joan Hoff Wilson has in 
fact identified Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover as a “forgotten progressive” who used 
his regulatory powers to streamline domestic commerce and greatly expand United States 
foreign trade. He used the same approach to reorganizing the airline industry. 47 
 Hoover understood aviation‟s economic value to the United States and his newly 
established Bureau of Aeronautics in the Department of Commerce established a basic and 
badly-needed aviation regulatory framework.48 Its laws were based on the Secretary‟s 
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seven-prong vision of creating a system of national airways, government subsidization for 
private companies to transport the mail, making the commercial aviation industry an auxiliary 
to national defense, regulating pilots and planes to increase safety, getting government 
completely out of transporting mail by plane, allocating funding for scientific research into 
aviation problems, and creating a separate governmental agency to supervise the aviation 
industry.49 Hoover‟s plan resulted from the findings of a panel of representatives of airplane 
manufacturing companies, aeronautical engineers, and public officials who urged the 
establishment of a strong regulatory system for planes and pilots as a result of too many 
crashes from poorly constructed and maintained planes, and insufficiently experienced 
pilots.50  
Hoover was not the only government official envisioning a profitable commercial 
aviation industry operating under a strong governmental regulatory framework. President 
Calvin Coolidge also envisioned the beginning of an industry that would be a major stimulus 
to national, state, and local economies, while also recognizing the importance of air safety.51 
Following the Kelly Act of 1925, he appointed a task force led by Dwight Morrow, a former 
college classmate, Senior Partner at J.P. Morgan, and later a United States Senator, to 
investigate the feasibility of safe mail and passenger transportation.52 The Morrow Report 
concluded that the airline industry would provide an important service to the nation, but 
needed government subsidizing through mail contracts to make commercial air travel 
profitable and safe. Similar to Hoover‟s plan, the Morrow Report recommended government 
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provision for air routes, a weather warning system, airway charts, partial funding for landing 
fields and airports, lit airways for night flying, and a systematic inspection of planes and 
personnel to ensure safe and reliable transportation, and contract air mail carriage not to 
exceed 80% of postal receipts.53  
Essentially, the Morrow Report implied that a private airline industry funded by the 
federal government would create the foundation for what the government and airlines hoped 
would be a growing, thriving, modern mass transportation industry. Based on the Morrow 
Commission‟s findings, the new agency would mandate that the Department of Commerce 
certify airplanes for airworthiness, require pilots to pass flight tests and written examinations, 
and provide funding for adequate navigation aids including color-coded flashing beacons so 
planes could fly at night.54 It would also regulate air fares. On May 20, 1926, United States 
President Calvin Coolidge made that happen by signing into law the Air Commerce Act.55  
Equally important, the Air Commerce Act ensured the preservation of government-private 
business relations in the aviation industry.  
 
Delivering Airmail and Passengers to Las Vegas 
On May 23, 1926, just five weeks after the arrival of the first mail plane, and just days 
after the passage of the Air Commerce Act, a Western Air Express Douglas M-2 coming 
from Los Angeles, delivered its first passengers A.B. DeNault, Vice-President of the Piggly-
Wiggly grocery chain, and Charles Kerr, President of the Los Angeles Automobile Insurance 
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Company, to Las Vegas.56 That same day, a south-bound Western Air Express M-2 arrived 
from Salt Lake City with passengers Benjamin F. Redman, Chairman of the Aviation 
Committee of the Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce, and John A. Tomlinson, a 
businessman from Salt Lake City. Redman and Tomlinson were honorary guests celebrating 
the inauguration of Western Air Express‟s first passenger flights from Salt Lake City to Las 
Vegas. 57 When they deplaned, they were met by Harris M. “Pop” Hanshue, President of 
Western Air Express, Las Vegas Mayor Fred Hess, Las Vegas townspeople, and even a few 
dogs. They were also greeted by eager local news reporters for the Clark County Review 
who asked them about their flight experience. Redman and Tomlinson enjoyed the 
adventure of the five hour forty minute flight, bumps and all on board the faithful M-2, a 
single-engine, open-cockpit biplane flying at a speed of 135 miles per hour at an altitude of 
6,000 feet.58 As they spoke to the reporters, they removed their primitive flight gear-- 
coveralls, leather helmets, goggles, and a parachute.59  
The publicity of Redman‟s and Tomlinson‟s arrival attracted the attention of many 
others present who wanted to fly on the Western Air Express plane. Hollywood celebrity and 
nationally recognized aviation supporter Will Rogers, who happened to be shooting part of a 
film in Las Vegas at the time, and never turned down a chance to fly and promote aviation, 
begged to be the first passenger to fly with Jimmy James on to Los Angeles. With such a 
large volume of mail that day, there was no room for a passenger, so James politely 
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refused. Rogers offered to buy as many postage stamps as necessary to pay for his weight, 
but he never got his ride.60 
Maude Campbell, a telephone supervisor and public relations clerk from Salt Lake 
City, became the first female passenger to fly to Los Angeles on Western Air Express. 
Wanting to enjoy the warm weather in southern California, on June 10, 1926, Campbell paid 
$90 to fly round trip from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles with an overnight stop in Las Vegas. 
The entire flight took six hours and fifty minutes each way in the M-2. Campbell, who 
donned a flight suit, golf knickers, and a parachute, sat on mailbags for the entire flight. If 
anything catastrophic happened to the plane en route, she was told to jump, count to three, 
and pull the chord.61 Upon her arrival in Los Angeles, Campbell was greeted by 
photographers, journalists, and “Pop” Hanshue, who gave her a bouquet of flowers. 
Campbell made national news and her picture appeared on the front page of the New York 
Times as the first female in the United States to travel on an airline.62 Her response to news 
journalists‟ questions about her flight was that she was thrilled to fly, but found the seat 
uncomfortable and the engine noisy.63  
The arrival of DeNault, Kerr, Redman, Tomlinson, Campbell, and later other 
customers interested in the many business and leisure possibilities of air travel signified to 
the Las Vegas community that the airline industry had great potential in their city as an 
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important transportation source for a future business and desert tourist industry. 
Undoubtedly, some travelers would only pass through Las Vegas and, like the planes they 
traveled in, get replenished and move on. But as R.W. Martin, S.R. Whitehead, S.J. Lawson, 
A.S. Henderson, and other members of the Board of Directors of the Las Vegas Chamber of 
Commerce correctly predicted, many others would come and want to stay.64 Those 
passengers who stayed would eventually transform the economic livelihood of the city. 
Thus, Chamber of Commerce officials and commercial airline promoters began to build a 
plan for Las Vegas as a resort destination vitally linked to commercial passenger aviation. 
While these events might seem like a series of publicity stunts advertising a new mode of 
transportation unaffordable to most people, the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce saw 
them as business opportunities for the future development of Las Vegas as a tourist city.  
Tom Grimshaw, a Los Angeles newspaper reporter, foresaw aviation‟s bright future 
in Las Vegas and the West after his first ride in an M-2 with Western Air Express pioneer 
mail pilot Al DiGarmo in September of that year. He wrote,  
“The Pony Express and the hero riders who carried the mail 
for the West are far in the dim past. The stagecoach and its 
swash-buckling drivers are only a memory in the minds of the 
oldest, but today their successors, as daring a crew as ever 
gathered, are hurtling through the air with their cargoes of mail 
[and passengers] sailing high over mountains, deserts, and 
buffeting storms…. They are pioneers in their field, blazing the 
way for what will tomorrow be a great air transportation system 
of the West.”65  
  
Western Air Express was ready to transport more travelers to Las Vegas, but was 
Anderson Field adequate? 
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A New Airport is Born in Las Vegas 
Before Las Vegas was chosen for the CAM-4 route, the townspeople were happy to 
have Anderson Field with its general aviation activity, but Mayor Fred Hess and Airport 
Manager Robert Hausler became concerned about its insufficient runway length and lack of 
proper facilities for larger airmail and passenger planes. A letter from the Southern California 
Aero Club to the Clark County Review predicted that “there would be a very rapid advance 
in aerial transportation. Communities may need large air terminals or be passed up entirely 
because they are not prepared. This is just as important to Las Vegas as [it is] to Los 
Angeles or San Francisco, for [commercial] aviation will bring Nevada and Arizona towns as 
close to other commercial centers as the railroad now connects New York and Washington 
or Philadelphia.”66 Even Colonel Swen Laetsew of the Southwest Region of the Post Office 
had warned Robert Hausler of the need for a more appropriate airfield if Las Vegas were to 
be chosen for the Civil Air Mail Route-4. He claimed it would be up to Las Vegas to “prepare 
the airplane mail route by having a landing field and by building a hangar. It is impossible to 
consider any city as a landing place that does not offer adequate facilities.”67 Both funds and 
a new field were needed.   
Like other small Nevada towns such as Ely, Elko, and Reno, Las Vegas could not 
rely on the federal and state governments to provide much funding for airport expansion 
because larger, established commercial airports like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and 
Seattle received the bulk of any funding. Since many of these cities‟ airports were hubs (the 
primary base) for the airlines, and the busiest in terms of air traffic and passenger volume, 
they received most of any federal monies. The federal government believed that cities 
should provide most of the funding for airport construction and expansion. Historians Ellis 
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Armstrong, Michael Robinson, and Suellen Hoy have written, “The 1926 Air Commerce Act 
had authorized the Secretary of Commerce to establish, operate, and maintain civil airways, 
but left the airports to be provided for on a local basis. Until the mid 1930s, airport 
development remained, for the most part, the responsibility of private investors and local 
government units.”68 Las Vegas had another challenge: finding adequate land upon which to 
build newer and better airports. This became a thorny issue, especially with the Federal 
Bureau of Land Management, which was known for its parsimony in land distribution and 
development in southern Nevada. 
In early April 1926, the city approached Leon and Earl Rockwell, two local 
businessmen and land owners. The brothers initially were reluctant to lease their property to 
the city because they believed building an airport on it would decrease its value. This not 
only would have left the city in a tenuous situation, but also would have deprived Harris 
Hanshue, President of Western Air Express an airport. It also directly threatened the Civil Air 
Mail Route-4 deal with the Post Office. Newspaper headlines dramatized the volatile 
situation. One article claimed, “Not having an airport was among the most pressing 
problems the City Council faced.”69 Without airmail, Las Vegans would have had to depend 
on the old Post Office mail delivery system by train, which took much longer than delivery by 
plane. More important, it would mean losing out on becoming an important participant in this 
new and exciting mode of transportation. Postmaster Griffith, Hausler, and the Las Vegas 
Chamber of Commerce convinced the Rockwell brothers that their property would not 
decline in value, but in fact, increase because the city would pay them above market value 
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for their land and charge takeoff and landing fees to Western Air Express to cover airport 
expenses.70 Western Air Express was guaranteed an airport.  
The Chamber of Commerce immediately set up a committee to raise funds to clear 
and properly equip the field, and offered Hanshue use of the field rent free for one year. In a 
letter, Post Master Griffith reminisced how “Leon and Earl Rockwell were very generous to 
let us use some of their land. The property had been the site of a former „road house‟ which 
had failed and burned to the ground, but the operator had built a power line and dug a well. 
These proved to be most valuable assets – the beacon light was a Westinghouse and had a 
windmill tower. The County provided a tractor and the Union Pacific Railroad Company „lent‟ 
a length of steel rail which was pulled over the surface to knock down the sagebrush and fill 
small holes. A radio shack, ten by twelve, wood siding, and a pump and small tank were 
furnished by Western Air Express and we were in business.”71 Chamber of Commerce 
President R.W. Martin, and Board of Directors members K.O. Knudson, L.J. Oakes, O.A. 
Kimball, and W.J. Hooper sent a letter to the County and City Commissions urging them to 
purchase the land from the Rockwell brothers.72 They did. In 1927, Las Vegas now had an 
airline and airport, but was the city ready to be a destination? 
 
From Railroad Town to Tourist City  
Las Vegas, meaning “the meadows,” historically was green with grasses, willows, 
and cottonwoods growing from its many aquifers. Located in a southwest Nevada desert 
valley surrounded by mountains and hills, in the nineteenth century, it served as an oasis for 
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the Paiute Indians, early Spanish explorers, fur trappers, mountain men, and frontiersmen. 
Wagon trains followed the well-used cutoff from the Old Spanish Trail through the southwest 
desert to replenish themselves with Las Vegas Creek water before continuing to California. 
Because of its abundance of water, in 1901, U.S. Senator William A. Clark, wealthy 
copper king from Montana and western railroad baron, saw to it that the last link of the 
Union Pacific Transcontinental Railroad Line from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles passed 
through Las Vegas.73  Hundreds of men from all parts of the country came to build Clark‟s 
railroad and his desert town, a passenger and freight train center, and a railhead for nearby 
mines.  The town‟s population consisted of rugged, hardworking railroad workers and miners 
who made sure they had saloons well-stocked with free flowing liquor, gambling, and 
brothels. There were attempts by some newcomers to build a fancy hotel or two, and the 
railroad built California bungalow-style cottages for its workers and a large depot, which 
functioned as the center of the town‟s economic and social life.  In June 1911, with a 
population of 1500, Las Vegas was incorporated into a city with full electrical and telephone 
service.74   
When the U.S. entered World War I, the town became a busy depot for the transport 
of much needed metals for defense use.  But after the war, when the need for ores declined, 
many businesses went bankrupt. Traveling motorists venturing west, needing supplies and 
water, stopped in Las Vegas for a short time before continuing to California or other 
destinations. Some travelers stayed overnight in the town‟s few small hotels and patronized 
its local downtown businesses, which included a handful of dry goods stores, cafes, dance 
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halls, saloons, and sawdust-floored casinos.75 Historian Hal Rothman described Las Vegas 
at the time as “a simple western [railroad] town. The railroad provided a capital regime; it 
was the only consistent source of funding for the town, and its goals determined those of the 
city.”76 But, the town‟s goals were not always consistent with the railroad‟s goals. 
In 1922, Las Vegas suffered a severe economic crisis when the railroad workers 
joined the national railroad strike against reduced wages. Vengeful Union Pacific executives 
moved the company‟s repair yard, by then the economic life of the city, thirty miles north to 
Caliente, taking three hundred jobs with them.77 When the strike ended, the Union Pacific 
closed the Las Vegas repair shops. The economy suffered another blow when the output of 
gold, silver, copper, ryholite, and magnesium ores diminished, slowing mining. Hundreds of 
the town‟s residents left to find work elsewhere. With just 2,300 residents and no solid 
economic base, the town‟s future looked bleak. And yet very unexpectedly, all this was 
about to change.  
With California agriculture pushing for water use of the Colorado River, seven 
western states including Nevada, signed the Colorado River Compact in the fall of 1922 to 
divide the water equally.78 But the federal government had bigger plans. It wanted to dam 
the Colorado River for better irrigation, to provide better water supplies for southwestern 
cities like San Diego, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, and to produce hydroelectricity for the 
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region.79 Las Vegas‟s Black Canyon was chosen as the place to dam the river because of its 
easy accessibility for the movement of supplies by rail.80 Six years later, the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act, the first of a series of bills calling for the building of a high dam and canal, 
passed in the United States House and Senate.81 Once again, a federal government 
initiative promised a better future for Las Vegas. Town residents were ecstatic when they 
learned that the government was going to build the biggest dam in the world in their 
backyard, and they celebrated in wild Las Vegas style with the whole town turning out to 
parade in full force. Despite the passage of the Volstead Act in 1919, initially Prohibition, 
bootleg liquor flowed like water. 
With the federal government appropriating $165 million for the entire project, Las 
Vegas stood to benefit financially from dam construction as more than $23 million was 
pumped into the city‟s economy. Construction required the labor of 5,000 workers who 
brought their families with them to southern Nevada, many moving to Las Vegas only 30 
miles away from the dam site.82 The city presumed that its town would be the permanent 
headquarters for the project, but its lawless reputation had gotten back to Washington D.C.  
When Herbert Hoover, elected President in 1928, sent his Secretary of the Interior 
Wilbur Lyman to scout out nearby services for workers at the dam site the sober city fathers 
ordered all saloons, gambling clubs, and brothels closed for the visit. Las Vegans put on 
their best behavior to impress the Secretary with a peaceful tour of their town in respectful 
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observance of the 18th Amendment.83 It might have worked if local newspaper reporters 
hadn‟t invited a friendly member of the Secretary‟s entourage into the wild Arizona Club for a 
few drinks. The visitor‟s words of praise to his superiors for such a hospitable town were 
overshadowed by the strong odor of alcohol on his breath. Las Vegas, it was decided, was 
too far from the dam site for a commute which could waste precious building time.84  
A tent city, later called Boulder City, would be constructed near the dam site for the 
workers and their families who would be allowed to visit and spend their money in Las 
Vegas on condition they didn‟t imbibe its liquor.85 Las Vegas‟s economy got a boost from 
workers buying food and other necessities as well as patronizing the saloons and brothels, 
and an even greater boost from tourists arriving from different parts of the country eager to 
see the Hoover Dam.   
When construction of the Dam began in 1931, it drew nearly 100,000 tourists from all 
over the West, the majority of whom arrived by automobile and contributed to the Las Vegas 
economy with the purchase of goods, gambling, and hospitality in the downtown motels.86 
Three years later, the number of tourists – arriving from the world over – increased to more 
than 300,000.87 Las Vegas‟s economy was booming, but short lived. In 1935, Dam 
construction ended and most of the workers and their families left the area to find new jobs. 
Tourism declined and the Las Vegas economy became so weak it was time for the city to 
reinvent itself. Local casinos and hotels had profited so handsomely from the influx of 
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Hoover Dam tourists that city officials and business leaders took the logical leap. They 
pulled together to find ways to promote tourism and recapture much needed revenues.  
The City promoted golf tournaments, boat races on Lake Mead, rodeos, and 
parades, marketing the city as a vacation spot in the Old West, but these events interested 
only a few visitors. The single attraction that brought in the most tourists and the biggest 
revenue was gambling.  Most of the workers and tourists during the Hoover Dam 
construction years came to Las Vegas bars and hotel/casinos to gamble. Because Nevada 
was one of the poorest states in the country, hard hit by both the Great Depression and a 
steady depletion of its ores, it needed a unique industry that would steadily attract tourists 
for revenue enhancement.  
Legalized gambling finally provided the answer. Gambling had been part of Las 
Vegas since 1911, but by the early 1930s it enjoyed the support of powerful regional 
interests. In the 1920s and 30s, Los Angeles, with its successful movie industry and ever 
growing influx of worldwide residents, emerged as the western center of entertainment and 
underground and offshore gambling. The city boasted some of the finest night clubs and 
hotels in the country with international cuisines and first class services. Gambling was 
lucrative and widespread, though never legalized. Property owners and operators Tony 
Cornero, Guy McAfee, and John Grayson attracted enormous crowds of visitors to Los 
Angeles by building extravagant off-shore casinos with luxurious carpeting, chandeliers, fine 
dining restaurants, and top entertainment. When the states cracked down on gambling in 
Los Angeles, Cornero, McAfee, and Grayson set their sights to Las Vegas where they could 
build their lavish casinos, and offer legal gambling.88 They sent representatives Johnny 
Roselli, Murray Humphreys, and Frank Detra to spread mob money throughout the state to 
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persuade legislators to legalize the lucrative vice. Irv Owen, an attorney from Oklahoma and 
life-long friend of Murray Humphreys remembered, “In the 1930s, Humphreys and his 
protégé Johnny Roselli bribed the Nevada legislature into legalizing gambling.”89 Journalist 
Gus Russo wrote, “During the 1930 debate over gambling legalization [sic], young John (son 
of Frank Detra) began accompanying his father as he made deliveries of cash-stuffed 
briefcases and envelopes to influential Nevadans across the state. Frank Detra admitted to 
his son that the money was being spent to ensure the passage of the Wide-Open Gambling 
Bill.”90   
But legislators and the governor wanted tighter government regulation of gambling. 
Then Assemblyman Phil Tobin stated, “I was just plumb sick and tired of seeing gambling 
going on all over the state and payoffs being made everywhere. Some of these tinhorn cops 
were collecting 50 bucks [sic] a month for allowing it. Also, the damn state was broke and 
we needed the money.”91 An editorialist for the Reese River Reveille wrote, “If we are going 
to have gambling… let‟s have it in the open and be honest with ourselves. Regulate the 
thing and use the revenue for some good purpose.”92 On March 19, 1931, the Nevada 
Legislature passed the Gaming Act, which contained a provision mandating all counties to 
regulate gaming, collect fees, and give the state its share.93 But, regulated gaming did not 
stop the mob from expanding its presence and wealth through the construction of Bel-Air 
like luxurious resorts and casinos in southern Nevada. 
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After seeing the small, dated sawdust-floored casinos in Las Vegas, Cornero, 
McAfee, Grayson, and others built newer, swankier casinos -- the $300,000 Meadows Club, 
the Pair-O-Dice, and the Pioneer Club.94 These properties boasted swamp coolers (an early 
form of air conditioning, which made the desert heat more bearable), carpeting, new gaming 
tables, slot machines, restaurants, and live music which drew large crowds of gamblers from 
California, northern Nevada, and Arizona.95  
This new generation of casinos constituted a major improvement over the old ones, 
but driving to them was time consuming, taking hours, even days. Additionally, driving on 
unpaved highways was uncomfortable. Even after road workers graded, widened, and oiled 
Highway 91 connecting Los Angeles with Las Vegas, the ruts and bumps still drew 
complaints from motorists, especially because automobiles lacked shock absorbers.96 Also, 
automobiles had no air conditioning and their engines easily overheated, which made 
driving through triple digit desert temperatures dangerous and physically unbearable. There 
were no roadside services and few repair stations along the route. Nevada Historian 
Elizabeth Harrington notes “to go by automobile was almost prohibitive, since to travel from 
Las Vegas to Los Angeles by this means one had to drive by way of Searchlight and 
Needles with a complete absence of paving of any kind after leaving Las Vegas until 
reaching the El Cajon Pass. The trip over this rough road took at least two days and one 
night of travel. The automobile had much to be desired as far as riding comfort goes.”97 The 
combination of frustrated motorists and an isolated desert city desperately needing visitors 
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for revenue all underscored an urgent need for a better source of mass public 
transportation, and all answers pointed to the passenger plane.   
 
New Airliners and Tourist Growth  
While Las Vegas is associated in popular culture with legalized gambling, show- 
girls, and booze, none of those attractions made the western city boom. In the end, it was 
convenient, affordable air transportation, privately owned and federally funded that 
catapulted Las Vegas to nationwide fame. Commercial airplanes traveled more than double 
the speed of the train, and three times the speed of the automobile. They in essence 
collapsed geographical distance between the one isolated Las Vegas and its western 
counterparts Los Angeles, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and Denver. In 1926, Western Air 
Express transported 209 passengers nationwide. In 1928, the tally rose to 6,000.98 By 1936 
more than 20,000 passengers had flown on Western Air Express.99  
Commercial air travel was becoming increasingly popular but it was expensive and 
quite uncomfortable. Because Ford Tri-Motors, Douglas M-2s, and Fokker 10s were non-
pressurized, noisy, and lacked cabin heat, they often made passengers airsick especially in 
turbulent conditions. The latter often was the case on hot, windy days, with some flights 
briefly delayed because ground crews had to hose out the cabins and stock new barf bags. 
Still, the airplane ranked as the fastest mode of transportation, significantly reducing travel 
time, and offering a new, exciting experience.  
Air travel proved so popular that by the late 1920s airline reservation systems were 
backlogged three to four weeks. On a United Airlines flight from Chicago to San Francisco, 
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with several intermediary stops including Iowa City, Jane Eads, a writer for the Chicago 
Herald and Examiner wrote, “Before landing in Iowa City, I was too frightened to write. The 
plane tipped, tilted, and dropped. I just threw down my pencil and hung on.… It was the 
most exhilarating feeling I‟ve ever experienced in all my life.”100 Marcia Davenport, a writer 
for the New Yorker described her flying experience from Los Angeles to New York with an 
unscheduled stop at an airfield near Cheyenne, Wyoming. She wrote, “An automobile trip 
held to the conveniences of the moment by red-and-white filling stations and hard white 
roads edged by tourist camps, [aviation] would not have brought [me] this adventure. It is 
possible. You can have adventure.”101 As the airline industry grew, and more than 173,000 
passengers took to the skies in 1929, the airlines experienced continued steady growth, but 
not without growing pains.102  
As the Great Depression gripped the United States, many planes flew with empty 
seats, and tried to survive by carrying mail. Some air carriers could prevail though a majority 
of the others could not. North American Aviation and United Aviation went out of 
business.103 In 1930, forty-four airlines provided air service in the country. In 1933, only five 
(including mergers) remained in business, one of which was Western Air Express, a pioneer 
of the modern airline industry, and Las Vegas‟s first airline.104 The problem arose partially 
from the impact of the McNary-Watres Act of 1930, legislation which authorized the 
Republican Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown to reduce the number of air carriers in 
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the transcontinental air service to four: United, American, Western Air Express, and Eastern. 
The legislation‟s main purpose was to ensure that cargo bays were filled with airmail, enable 
the Post Master General to contract with qualified operators, change the basis of 
compensation from poundage to mileage and cubic space, and make negotiation instead of 
competitive bidding the medium of awarding contracts. Yet it also gave the Post Master 
General considerable power to select which airlines would receive contracts.105 While Brown 
denied any wrongdoing, many air carriers like National Parks Airlines and Colonial Airlines 
protested the unfairness of his policies.  
The less favored airlines complained that the government‟s selection process for 
awarding air mail contracts was unfair. Others charged that Brown had operated in collusion 
with United, American, and Western Air Express.106 The allegations and suspicion of 
collusion prompted a congressional investigation spearheaded by Alabama Democrat 
Senator Hugo Black. Black appointed C.E. McCoy to lead the investigation under Senate 
Resolution 349.107 
 Accusations about obstruction of the investigation also arose with the mysterious 
disappearance of subpoenaed documents. In a letter to the accused, Brown‟s Democratic 
successor Post Master General James A. Farley expressed his surprise to find two files 
labeled “Air Mail” and “Merchant Marine” in a box containing his personal belongings. After 
dismissing the theory they were placed in his box by a careless staff member, he claimed, 
“There remains only one theory that these official files were surreptitiously placed among my 
personal papers at the instigation of someone who was engaged in a conspiracy of 
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character assassination.”108 The files in the box were to be destroyed. Farley ended his 
letter by stating, “I am delighted to be able to return the official files relating to air mail and 
ocean mail unscathed by their fantastic experience in the fiery furnace.”109 The Senator‟s 
findings from the investigation concluded that the Postmaster General had engaged in 
collusion.110 
Partisan fury notwithstanding, the Postmaster General maintained his innocence and 
articulated the case of government-business collaboration. Brown, a former attorney, was in 
fact a staunch opponent of unrestricted competition because he was bitterly disappointed 
with the corruption and disorganization of what he considered to be an inadequately 
regulated railroad system replete with unnecessary spending and waste.111 He feared that a 
similar reckless configuration would plague the airline industry. In a letter to renowned 
newspaper publicist William Randolph Hearst, Brown wrote, “During the period of my service 
in the Post Office Department, the Hearst Papers quite consistently approved my policies 
and methods in building up an economically independent air transport industry, as an aid to 
business as well as an auxiliary to National [sic] defense.”112 Brown ultimately resigned from 
his position. Before he stepped down however, he praised the progress the commercial 
aviation industry made. In a letter to Republican Senator Simeon D. Fess of Ohio, he wrote, 
 “The air transport industry, which has been fostered by 
generous government aid throughout the administrations of 
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Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, is still dependent for 
its very existence upon the airmail service. Much progress 
toward the goal of economic independence has been made, 
particularly during the last few years. The revenues of airmail 
carriers derived from passenger and express services have 
increased from practically zero in 1929 to the rate of $10 
million per year at the end of 1933. To you I need not point out 
its incalculable value in time of national emergency or the 
essential service which the airmail performs for the business of 
the country.”113  
 
Despite Brown‟s progress in bringing order to the airline industry, his career in 
politics was over. After reading Senator Black‟s findings, an outraged President Franklin 
Roosevelt ordered the cancellation of all air mail contracts and commanded the Army Air 
Corps to once again transport the mail.114 This slashed a significant portion of the airline 
industry‟s business and sent airlines, including those in Las Vegas, scrambling for funding.  
In 1930, Las Vegas-based Transcontinental Air Transport, more than $2.7 million in 
the red due to poor management and provisions of the McNary-Watres Act, had to merge 
with Western Air Express just to stay in business. Each carrier remained separate, but they 
operated under one parent company, Trans Western Airlines.115 Western Air Express had 
no choice but to agree to the merger or lose 65% of its routes and business, the result of a 
testy meeting between Pop Hanshue and Walter Folger Brown.116 The two airlines 
continued operating out of Las Vegas and Boulder City. In 1932, 1,229 passengers traveled 
from Los Angeles to Washington D.C. via Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, Denver, Chicago, and 
                                                          
113
 Post Master General Walter Folger Brown to Senator Simeon D. Fess, 10 February 1934, Walter Folger 
Brown Papers, Historical Society of Ohio, Columbus. 
  
114
 Wright, Desert Airways, 10. 
 
115
 Solberg, Conquest of the Skies, 113. 
 
116
 Serling, The Only Way to Fly, 112. 
 
34 
 
New York. One year later, that number increased to 1,596.117 Second Assistant Postmaster 
General Hawes noted: 
“CAM-4 fills a very vital and economic need of the Southwest and the west 
slope of the Rocky Mountains. In the beginning of air mail service, the Post 
Office Department recognized the importance of a service connecting Los 
Angeles with the Rocky Mountain region and the industrial centers of Chicago 
and the East. The intermediate stop at Las Vegas, Nevada permits an outlet 
for the vast amount of government and private business correspondence and 
traffic originating from the huge construction work at Boulder Dam, at the 
same time furnishing rapid air passenger transportation between Los Angeles 
and Boulder Dam and east to Denver, Chicago, New York, and Washington 
D.C. There can be no doubt as to the vital need of this service, not only to 
Los Angeles, Las Vegas and all of the southwestern territory, but also to Salt 
Lake and eastern business and banking houses.”118    
 
 
Despite relatively robust business on the CAM-4 Route, the airline still was losing 
money. In 1934, Western Air Express had to reduce its fleet to six airplanes and a staff of 
four pilots.119 Transcontinental Air Transport experienced the same problem. The airlines 
were on the ropes. This did not bode well for Las Vegas because it faced losing its airmail 
and passenger service. Western Air Express needed a shakeup, so it turned to Alvin 
Adams, former Vice-President of National Aviation, a stock brokerage firm, who through a 
restructuring of management, and better marketing, brought the airline to profitability.120   
Western Air Express also received a financial boost from FDR‟s Air Mail Act of 1934. 
This legislation resulted from FDR‟s disastrous cancelation of private mail carrying contracts. 
The Army Air Corps under Roosevelt transported the mail for one month after experiencing 
66 airplane crashes and 12 fatalities because of substandard planes, inexperienced pilots, 
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and bad weather.121 As a result, the Post Office lost money, and its tarnished reputation of 
poor management of flight safety resurfaced. This tenuous state of the airline industry drew 
the attention of a young Senator named Patrick McCarran (D-Nevada) who saw the 
industry‟s potential to become a major source of military and public transportation and 
recognized the need to reform it.  
A staunch supporter of aviation long before being elected to the United States 
Senate in 1933, Democrat McCarran opposed many elements of FDR‟s New Deal that he 
believed concentrated too much initiative within the federal government and had been overly 
generous to the unemployed and indigent. Yet, like the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco 
who he admired, McCarran advocated government-corporate partnerships to bring order 
and prosperity to an increasing technology-driven modern society. In a Message to the 
National Aviation Forum, McCarran explained this ideology claiming, “Policy calls for the 
encouragement and development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the 
present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the 
Postal Service, and of the national defense, and the regulation of air transportation in such a 
manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree 
of safety in, and foster sounds economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve 
relations between and coordinate transportation by air carriers.”122 He drafted Senate Bill 
3187 which called for the removal of Post Office supervision of the airmail industry and 
instead, prescribed a federal aviation commission that would supervise it, serve as an 
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arbiter between the airlines and employees, issue certificates of public convenience (instead 
of bidding), and essentially remove the industry from politics.123  
McCarran, questioning President Roosevelt‟s power to cancel airmail contracts, and 
defending wrongfully accused Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown, asked the Senate 
to remove the airlines from the Department of Commerce and place them under the 
supervision of a private agency such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. He wrote, 
“The whole policy of the legislation, the whole spirit of the law initiated by myself in 1934, 
carried on until it became a law, was that the Civil Aeronautics Authority should be an 
independent agency.”124 After protracted debate, McCarran‟s bill was defeated by filibuster 
due to questions about intrastate and interstate commerce laws.125  
Congress passed the Air Mail Act of 1934, which President Roosevelt signed into law 
giving the Postmaster General the power to award mail contracts through competitive 
bidding, set air routes, and flight schedules, revise and improve flight regulations, and pilot 
standards.126 The Act also gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to review 
contracts, examine accounting books, and regulate the cost of service.127 With no other 
government sponsored agency to transport the mail, Roosevelt called on private air carriers 
to do it.128   
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But, the Act forbade bidding by any airlines that originally participated in air mail 
transportation prior to the Watres Act. Undeterred, Western Air Express, United, Eastern, 
and TWA simply changed their names and then bid for the same air mail routes along with 
new airlines also applying for the routes.129 Western Air Express, renamed General Airlines, 
resumed transporting mail on the Civil Air Mail Route-4. Brown‟s and McCarran‟s vision of 
government-business partnership was redeemed.  
Though the restoration of airmail contracts allowed the old and new airlines to keep 
their routes, the airlines still lost money because of the depressed economy. To make up for 
lost revenue, Western Air Express and Transcontinental Air Transport had to invent new 
marketing techniques, one of which was offering scenic air tours of Hoover Dam and the 
Grand Canyon.130 The Las Vegas City Council even allowed the airlines to install slot 
machines in the Western Air Express Field air terminal.131 Looking for other ways to 
increase profitability in its air route structure, in 1937, TWA received approval from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to add Los Angeles to its San Francisco to Newark route, 
with Las Vegas as a stopping point.132 That same year, the city bought out Western Air 
Express‟s lease on Western Air Express Field, saving the airline money.  With new air tour 
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promotions, slot machine revenues, and added savings from the lease buyout, the airline 
decided to slowly upgrade its carrier fleet to ensure needed revenue for meeting operating 
expenses. 
Despite the economic hard times, technological imperatives during the 1930s led 
most airlines nationwide including Western Air Express to replace their aging fleets of 
Douglas M-2s, Ford Tri-Motors, and Fokker 10s with larger, faster, and eventually 
pressurized airplanes. Gone were the days of noisy, cramped passenger cabins on 
airplanes made of wood and fabric. While this first generation of passenger planes got 
passengers to their destinations, the new generation of planes was much better. They were 
sleeker, more luxurious, and far outperformed their predecessors in passenger seating 
capacity, speed, and comfort.  
In 1933, the Douglas DC-1, the first all-metal twin-engine plane had appeared on 
airline flight lines. This passenger plane had a cabin seating capacity for 12 passengers and 
claimed a cruise speed of 196 miles per hour by engines each capable of producing 710 
horsepower with variable pitch propellers to allow pilots to set the propeller angles to 
maximize flight efficiency.133 Compared to its predecessor, the Fokker 10, which flew at a 
claimed speed of 103 miles per hour and had to make several stops to refuel, the DC-1 
revolutionized air transportation because it was made of durable material, flew longer 
distances without refueling, and hauled more passengers in a shorter time period. 
Essentially, it symbolized the beginning of a new generation of passenger planes, 
remarkable because the development and manufacturing of these newer planes happened 
within less than a decade, and in the traveling public‟s mind, restored their confidence in air 
travel safety.  With new aircraft design and production moving so rapidly, the DC-1 was soon 
replaced by its successor the DC-2, which became the workhorse of the airline industry.  
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The new DC-2, which flew faster than its predecessor and carried up to 21 
passengers, had a different design than the DC-1. According to William Douglas of Douglas 
Aircraft, “The original plan called for a bigger fuselage but essentially the same old DC-1 
and DC-2 wing. We added five feet to each wing… and soon found out that just putting on 
more wing didn‟t give us the lift and stability we needed. It was a case of redesigning the 
wing.”134 When the plane made its debut, airlines including Western Air Express placed 
dozens of orders. This plane was significant to the airlines and passenger travel because it 
not only could function well in the short-haul market, but the long-haul one as well. Airlines 
used the DC-2 to fly passengers from Los Angeles to St. Louis, or Seattle to Phoenix. While 
this airplane admirably performed regular flight duties, the aircraft that especially won the 
passengers‟ hearts was the DC-3 “Sky Sleeper.”  
With a soundproof fuselage, two 1000 horsepower engines, and seating for 21 
passengers, the DC-3 showcased commercial aviation‟s future.135 Introduced to commercial 
flight by American Airlines in 1936, and entirely constructed of metal, the DC-3 epitomized 
the new modern passenger plane, impressive to observers and passengers.  Historian 
Roger Bilstein states how, “The DC-3 unquestionably set new standards of passenger 
comfort. Its greater speed and higher ceilings (top altitude) permitted smoother flying for 
passengers.”136 Western Air Express, Las Vegas‟s premier airline, bought two DC-3s with 
“Sky Lounges,” fourteen large, comfortable swivel chairs with plenty of legroom for use on its 
Los Angeles - Las Vegas - Salt Lake City routes.137 In addition to its comfort, the DC-3 was 
much more fuel efficient than its predecessors and could travel longer distances without 
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refueling. Including fuel stops, a passenger now could travel from coast to coast in fewer 
than 16 hours.  
In its advertisements, Western Air Express touted its “Main Liner” service, a DC-3 
from Las Vegas to New York. This new generation of passenger planes significantly 
impacted the Southwest, especially Las Vegas. Historian Roger Launius noted, “The 
aeronautical technology revolution of the 1930s – especially manifest in the Boeing 247 and 
Douglas DC-3, all-metal, multi-engine transports – allowed a much more rapid and 
sustained expansion of aviation in the [Southwest] region along essentially the same course 
that had been started by the early aviation promoters of the Southwest.”138 With DC-2s, DC-
3s, and Boeing 247s bringing more passengers to Las Vegas, and construction of the 
Hoover Dam attracting as many as 300,000 tourists annually, the city‟s future seemed 
destined to boom.  
To increase its clientele of tourists and gamblers, the Chamber of Commerce 
launched an aggressive marketing campaign to advertise the city as one of the world‟s 
premier resort cities. With a $75,000 annual budget (“publicity fund”), the Chamber hired 
outside public relations agencies to design advertising layouts. The advertising yielded 
impressive results. In August 1936, Chamber of Commerce Secretary Oliver Goerman 
reported 52,357 visitors came to Las Vegas by airplane and automobile, a nine percent 
increase over the previous year (47,946).139 With more flights and larger passenger planes 
bringing more tourists and gamblers to Las Vegas, all of this underscored the need for a 
larger airport.   
As the airline industry steadily grew, especially in Las Vegas, airport officials realized 
that Rockwell Field with its short runways and small passenger terminal was becoming 
                                                          
138
 Launius and Embry, “Fledgling Wings: Aviation Comes to the Southwest, 1910-1930,” 21. 
 
139
 Las Vegas Review-Journal, 30 October 1936, p.1. 
 
41 
 
inadequate to handle larger planes and more passengers. This was a common problem 
nationwide, as a 1936 Works Progress Administration report pointed out, “The airport 
program looks to the needs of the future. With air travel growing by leaps and bounds in the 
United States, the fields of today will be inadequate tomorrow.”140 In Las Vegas, Mayor L.L. 
Arnett and the local Chamber of Commerce began searching for another location. 
Arnett and Chamber of Commerce members R.W. Martin and K.O. Knudson met 
with Peter Albert Simon, a Texaco fuel distributor and local entrepreneur who coincidentally 
at the time had been constructing an airport eight miles northeast of Las Vegas to serve as 
the base for Nevada Air Lines, a regional company that failed to garner investment of 
finance.141 In November 1929, Simon struck a deal with Hanshue, agreeing to lease the 
airfield for twenty years, and rename it Western Air Express Field.142 The Mayor, Chamber 
of Commerce members, and Hanshue breathed a major sigh of relief because had Simon 
not agreed to lease his airfield to Western Air Express, Las Vegas would have lost its major 
airline, which would have been a significant blow to the town‟s economy. Western Air 
Express Field emerged during the next decade as the city‟s airport.143 But, with Western Air 
Express Field annually handling more than 30,000 passengers, and the nation‟s airports 
more than two million total, air traffic and airport congestion raised concerns as far as 
Capitol Hill about the adequacy of the air travel and traffic system, and ensuring passenger 
safety. 
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Reforming the Air Travel System 
With an increasing growth of the airline industry in the late 1930s, the extra workload 
and pressure of overseeing it proved to be too much for the Department of Commerce. 
Concerns of airline system inefficiency and safety surfaced, fostering government 
consensus that the growing aviation industry needed its own regulatory supervision under a 
single newly designated government agency specially equipped to handle the task instead 
of agencies such as the Department of Commerce, the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
and the Post Office. In 1937, President Roosevelt appointed a committee headed by 
Senator Patrick McCarran and Democratic Representative Clarence Lea to investigate 
placing the airline industry under the complete control of the Civil Aeronautics Authority 
entirely housed in the Interstate Commerce Commission.144  In 1938, Congress passed the 
McCarran-Lea Bill, also known as the Civil Aeronautics Act, and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt signed it into law. The bill created a five-member panel headed by an 
administrator whose task was to regulate air mail rates, airline fares, and routes.145 The Civil 
Aeronautics Board also was required to establish civil airways, provide better and more 
efficient navigation facilities, and establish air traffic control in locales where air traffic was 
heaviest. Finally, the bill mandated inspection and improvement of the nation‟s airports to 
meet the needs of both commercial and general aviation traffic.146  
The Civil Aeronautics Act proved to be a remarkable success. Senator McCarran 
noted in a memorandum, “There was not a single accident this winter, in spite of an increase 
in service. In December 1939, the scheduled airlines flew more miles than ever before in 
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their history – a ten percent increase, and December is usually their worst month. The 
industry‟s service to the country was better than ever before, thanks to the C.A.A. and the 
Congress who made it possible.”147 Unlike the Air Mail Act of 1934 which allowed 
competitive bidding, the Civil Aeronautics Act awarded certificates to airlines through non-
competitive negotiation.148  With the help of the federal government, McCarran hoped the 
airlines would make a profit and become self-sustaining.  He noted, “Present indications 
show that they [the airlines] will probably make a profit of about three to three-and-a-half 
millions in the calendar year of 1939. It is the hope of the C.A.A. that they will soon become 
self-supporting, that the Government can reduce airmail subsidies and make a profit of the 
airmail service.”149 In the same message to the National Aviation Forum, McCarran directly 
criticized the Watres Act of 1930 and the Air Mail Act of 1934, stating, “In properly regulating 
the airlines as to rates, issuance of certificates, and its other economy regulatory functions, 
by supervising all activities of the airlines, thus prevented the use of unfair business 
practices and unfair methods of competition. Thus it became apparent to the industry that it 
had protection, that it could expect justice from the government, and that therefore it could 
make long-range plans.”150 
The Air Commerce Act gave the government the basic tools it needed to regulate the 
commercial aviation industry, but the Civil Aeronautics Act was more comprehensive, far-
reaching, and rigorous in maintaining air safety standards. In a speech to the National 
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Aeronautics Association at a National Convention in New Orleans, McCarran claimed, “If 
commerce by air in America was to keep pace with other countries, nothing short of an 
independent agency, untrammeled by bureaucratic ties of any kind, should come into 
existence with Federal sanction, so that the industry and science of aviation would grow and 
prosper under regulation by which that industry and that science would be fostered, 
promoted, and encouraged.”151 This regulation also applied to airlines serving Las Vegas. 
 
Air Travel and the Airport Grow in Las Vegas 
With Western Air Express offering four daily flights between Los Angeles and Salt 
Lake City, and other commercial airlines such as Transcontinental Air Transport entering the 
market flying larger passenger planes like the Douglas DC-3, airport expansion became 
more critical to Las Vegas‟s future. Senator McCarran especially recognized this, claiming, 
“Don‟t let anyone tell you we are not going to have an airport in Las Vegas of a high 
standard. Airports are just as much a part of aviation as the planes themselves. Air travel 
and commerce are here [in Las Vegas] to stay and only are in their infancy.”152  
In 1938, using New Deal funding Clark County officials offered to buy out the 
remainder of Western Air Express‟s lease on Western Air Express Field located eight miles 
out of town. Fearing it would lose its dominance as the major airline serving Las Vegas 
because the county would move the airport closer to town, Western Air Express blocked the 
deal.153 This left airport officials in a dilemma with few options. They needed a new airfield 
and the county did not have enough funds to purchase new land to build an airfield with 
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runways, taxiways, and a terminal closer to town. Its only option was to purchase an already 
existing air field, which presented a challenge, because the county had only enough funds to 
purchase the remainder of the lease for Western Air Express Field. Desperate for funding, 
county officials looked to Washington for help. Western Air Express Field literally sat on the 
verge of closing, posing a potential disaster for the airlines and city. But once again, the 
federal government stepped into the breach, this time in order to advance the nation‟s 
participation for global war. Aerial combat had made its debut in World War I, but had not 
ranked at the time as a strategic priority. Once war broke out for a second time, the United 
States Army surveyed the country for suitable aviation training grounds.154 
The Army Air Corps quickly honed its sights on the United States Southwest. The 
Southwest was sparsely populated, geographically expansive, and far enough inland to 
avoid a foreign attack. Also it had better weather than many other regions where the Air 
Corps could train its pilots to safely take off and land, and practice bombing runs in 
unpopulated desert areas. Las Vegas was on the list of potential candidates.155  
An outspoken critic of the liberal welfare state, Senator Patrick McCarran embraced 
the military-industrial complex. Seeing an ideal opportunity to provide defense for city 
residents, boost the city‟s economy through population expansion and increased 
consumption of goods, and most important, upgrade the airport using military funds, 
McCarran used his political power to convince the Army to build a base in Las Vegas. On 
October 5, 1940, the Army decided that Las Vegas would be a suitable location to build an 
airport and train gunnery pilots. 156 Meeting with city officials, on January 25, 1941 the Corps 
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signed a lease to make Western Air Express Field its base and share the airport with the 
commercial airlines.157 Part of the agreement allocated $340,000 from the Civil Aeronautics 
Board for airport improvements that included one 4,000 foot-long, east-west runway, a 5,900 
foot-long north-south runway, as well as a third landing strip, grading, drainage, and 
hangars.158 Less than two weeks later, Senator McCarran procured $404,223 in WPA 
funding for “clearing, grading, surfacing, fences, installation of a water system, electrical 
facilities, and landscaping.”159 The addition of military airplanes meant more air traffic 
congestion, never a desirable situation, but airport officials were willing to temporarily put up 
with the increased air traffic because they badly needed funds just to maintain the airport. 
By war‟s end, the infusion of more than $1 million helped airport officials reinforce 
and lengthen their runways to accommodate larger planes. They were also able to build 
better taxiways and a proper drainage system on the airport apron. With larger and faster 
passenger planes such as the Douglas DC-4, Lockheed Constellation, and Lockheed 
Electra transporting thousands of people to resort cities throughout the Southwest including 
Las Vegas, the Air Corps funds played a decisive role in determining “Sin City‟s” future.  
Numerous obstacles still stood in the way of Las Vegas‟s development. Air traffic 
control towers in their infancy state had only visual control of airplanes in airport traffic 
patterns. They lacked radar equipment to control planes in other phases of flight. 
Essentially, Western Air Express Field still was under-funded, and under-equipped to safely 
handle a large volume of air traffic. And while the Civil Aeronautics Act provided greater 
regulatory supervision over the commercial air travel industry, and mandated proper facilities 
for safe aircraft navigation and airport operations, it faced challenges in handling the 
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growing numbers of the air traveling public boarding more passenger planes than ever 
before, including flights to Las Vegas, whose  newer, lavish resorts such as the El Rancho 
and Hotel Last Frontier, Western Air Express and TWA brought thousands of passengers 
from distances as far as Chicago and New York to Las Vegas.  
Finally, private airlines struggled to offer available flights as airplane fleets and pilots 
went to assist with the war effort. In order to lure people from the East Coast, the airlines 
had to ensure that the public felt air travel was safe. The airlines accomplished this by flying 
new airplanes made of better materials and hiring pilots with more experience. Just as the 
airlines began financially recovering from the tumultuous 1930s, they faced a new challenge 
with the nation preparing for war. The Department of Defense needed pilots and airplanes to 
deliver military personnel to various posts in the United States before they went overseas. 
Military leaders turned to the airlines for assistance. 
Despite these challenges nearly two decades of technological innovation in the 
aviation industry and government-business partnerships assured Las Vegas a bright future. 
Second Lieutenant Postmaster General W.W. Hawes‟s explanation about the government-
business relationship aptly applies to the airline industry in later years, and even decades. 
He noted how, “Western Air Express has played an exceedingly vital part in American 
business and industry to the point it has increased its tempo in the rapid transportation 
furnished by air transport operators as a necessary part of life…. American business and the 
American people cannot do without the advantages of air transportation, both from a 
passenger standpoint and from a mail and express angle.”160 His observation not only 
accurately characterized how important air travel was to Las Vegas‟s economic survival at 
that time, but foreshadowed how vital it would become in the post-war years when more 
people traveled nationwide on larger and faster airplanes. The passenger plane would play 
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a major role in the transformation of Las Vegas into a world-class tourist resort city in the 
desert. The transformation visibly would reveal itself during the post-war years when larger 
resort casinos were built, and the jet airplane appeared, and the passenger volume at 
Western Field soon, to be rechristened McCarran Airport, surpassed 1 million. The tourist 
growth came so fast and furious that it caught airport and city officials unprepared. But first, 
the city, its airlines, and the federal government had to prepare for the coming global war. 
49 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP FORMS 
 
 
World War II Air Travel and Tourism 
World War II brought dramatic changes to the government-aviation 
partnership. During the war, government intervention in the U.S. economy reached 
unprecedented heights. While production remained in the hands of private 
companies, the government‟s Office of War Mobilization set prices and ambitious 
production quotas. Consequently, as historian David Kennedy notes, in 1943, the 
Allied Powers‟ aircraft production outnumbered Axis Powers production by a ratio of 
nearly four to one (151,761 to 43,100).1 “Such figures,” Kennedy adds, “disguise the 
fact that the Anglo-American totals include a large number of heavy four-engine 
bombers, so that Allied superiority is even more marked when the number of 
engines or the structure weight of the aircraft is compared with Axis totals.”2  
The government‟s policies sustained a profound impact on commercial air 
travel. With President Roosevelt‟s call for the annual production of 50,000 military 
planes, the production of commercial airline passenger planes by Boeing, Douglas, 
and other aircraft manufacturers came to a halt. Assembly lines turned out B-17 and 
B-29 bombers in mass quantities, leaving DC-2 and DC-3 assemblies idle.3 The War 
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Department requisitioned 183 of the country‟s 359 airliners and two-thirds of the 
airline pilot work force to transport military personnel and equipment for the war.4  
With the remaining passenger planes, the airlines managed to fly on reduced 
schedules, transporting mostly war personnel. In 1942, the War Department formed 
the Air Transport Command to coordinate all air, cargo, and personnel travel 
throughout the country and abroad, enforcing strict priorities for all air travel.5 First 
priority went to anyone traveling on White House business, military pilots ferrying 
planes to the war front were given second priority, military personnel and civilians 
traveling on war business third, and military cargo fourth. Civilians had to wait on 
standby with VIPs such as ambassadors, corporate businessmen, and war 
correspondents taking precedence. Even in a primarily tourist city such as Las 
Vegas, travelers had to be ready to be bumped at any time to give space to 
someone of higher priority.6    
After Japan‟s attack on Pearl Harbor, Western Air Express Field in Las Vegas 
was immediately activated as a full-fledged military air base with a name change to 
Las Vegas Army Air Field.7 As a joint military and civilian airfield housing fighter 
planes, small gunnery pilot training planes, and commercial airline passenger 
planes, as well as being a destination for civilian crews delivering Boeing B-17 
bombers to the United States Army Air Corps, the airfield‟s civil and military 
                                                          
4
 Carlos A. Schwantes, Going Places: Transportation Redefines the Twentieth Century West (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 261. 
 
5
 Solberg, Conquest of the Skies, 262. 
 
6
 Ibid., 274. 
 
7
 Ralph Roske, Las Vegas: A Desert Paradise (Tulsa: Continental Heritage Press, 1986), 89. 
51 
 
operations fell under strict war- time travel priorities.8 According to Vern Willis, Las 
Vegas Station Manager for Western Air Express, “These B-17 bomber ferry crews 
had the second highest priority for transportation and regularly bumped our 
passengers off the Western flights to return to their bases…. Passengers were 
patriotic but sometimes felt this was overdoing it. We had to make arrangements to 
send our passengers on their way by either train or bus.”9  
The country became well-aware of the sacrifices needed to support the war. 
Leisure travel by car, train, or plane was strongly discouraged, but heavy military 
passenger volume kept the airlines in business with filled flights. Airlines reported 
eighty to ninety percent of their seats filled, and nationwide, they transported more 
than 4,000,000 passengers.10 Americans were on the move with the war effort, 
crossing the continent to work in the hundreds of defense plants, to train at the many 
new and old military bases, and to take to the skies for transport to new theaters of 
military combat around the world. Never to that time in the nation‟s history had so 
many planes transported so many people. In 1945, the end of the War opened the 
skies for new airlines, more than 500 passenger planes, and 6.7 million Americans 
were eager to fly.11  
Las Vegas became a wartime city though it was different in size from the 
giant military and industrial centers of Los Angeles and San Diego. It was home to 
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an active military base, and to the biggest magnesium factory in the nation. Basic 
Magnesium Incorporated (BMI), built near the Hoover Dam with an ample supply of 
water and electrical power for production, with a workforce of 6,500 people and a 
peak payroll of $1 million per week, by 1945, had shipped 166,322,685 pounds of 
magnesium ingots to west coast defense plants to manufacture airplane cockpits 
and bombs.12 The 13,000 BMI construction workers, and the 6,500 factory workers 
along with their families, brought much needed new business to Las Vegas with the 
purchase of goods and homes and the payment of taxes.13 The more than 8,000 
military personnel and their families stationed at the air base also increased local 
business.14 As a result, the combination of factory workers, military personnel, and 
federal wartime spending brought the city an economic boom. Las Vegas historian 
Eugene Moehring observed, “The effects of wartime spending were magical. Within 
four years, the town‟s physical plant and housing supply had expanded enormously, 
laying a powerful base for the postwar years when a vibrant resort economy would 
team with Cold War spending to produce a substantial metropolis.”15 All of this 
growth along with a rapidly expanding wartime tourism industry underscored the 
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city‟s need for more houses, better water, sewage, telephone, and electrical 
systems.16 The city also needed larger hotels and casinos. 
 
The Next Generation of Casinos in Las Vegas  
Even before the end of the war, Mayor L.L. Arnett, Chamber of Commerce 
President Bob Kaltenborn, Chamber of Commerce Secretary Robert Griffith, and 
automobile dealership owner James Cashman looked to wealthy southern California 
real estate developers and businesspeople seeking to buy cheap land and build 
resort hotels. As a major defense, tourism, and hotel industry center in the West, 
southern California served as home to many businessmen looking to expand their 
wealth by taking advantage of the rapidly growing wartime tourism industry in 
southern Nevada.17 One such businessman was Thomas Hull, an affluent, 
successful, and widely respected southern California motel chain owner who was 
invited to survey Las Vegas land and consider building a new property there. To 
avoid paying higher taxes, he chose 33 acres of property for $150 per acre outside 
of the city limits near busy Los Angeles Highway 91.  He hired a prestigious Los 
Angeles architectural firm to design a spacious, sprawling hotel with a Spanish 
mission style popular in Los Angeles to attract southern California tourists.18 The El 
Rancho Vegas opened in April 1941 as the first high-class hotel of the new 
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generation of resorts on the Strip. The desert resort advertised fine dining, air 
conditioning, and a cool swimming pool on its giant road sign to catch the attention 
of overheated travelers. Selling service and convenience, it offered lodging, parking, 
restaurants, horseback riding, several shops, an opera house showroom for top-
notch entertainment to attract large crowds and wealthy gamblers. The casino was 
small by today‟s Las Vegas standards, but completely furnished for gambling, a 
model for future casinos.19 
 That same year, southern California contractors Marion Hicks and John 
Grayson built the Mexican-themed El Cortez casino resort on downtown Fremont 
Street. This new hotel contained a large gambling casino, fifty-nine rooms, a 
restaurant, a showroom, and nicely maintained grounds.20 While the El Cortez was a 
smaller property than the El Rancho Vegas, it was the first major resort on 
downtown Fremont Street.21 
In October 1942, theatre chain owner R.E. Griffith and his architect nephew 
William J. Moore opened the Last Frontier, located south of the El Rancho. Styled in 
western frontier design, the property contained a large main building with a casino, 
showroom, restaurant, and a few bars. Several low-rise buildings consisting of 107 
rooms were attached to the main building surrounded by beautifully landscaped 
grounds. Front sundecks and a large pool attracted passing visitors. The inside was 
extravagant – walls covered with stuffed animals, lighting fixtures in the shape of 
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large wagon wheels, and a banquet room for six hundred guests. Visitors were 
offered horseback and stagecoach rides. With a showroom seating six hundred, a 
parking lot for four hundred automobiles, a whole frontier village filled with authentic 
historic Nevada ghost town buildings, and original western artifacts for viewing, 
everything was bigger and better than the El Rancho Vegas.22  
These new properties certainly were larger and more luxurious than their 
predecessors, and indicators of a growing casino-hospitality industry for the city. But, 
there was an ever-present worry – the war was ending and just as business and 
tourism declined with the completion of the Hoover Dam, and workers left, would 
business and tourism drop again with the closing of military bases and defense 
plants? The city fathers wondered how they would bring the tourists back. “Las 
Vegas could have dried up and blown away,” claims Mark Hall Patton, Howard 
Cannon Aviation Museum Curator. “There was nothing here. The Hoover Dam was 
built, and the Army Air Corps Gunnery School was being phased out. They had to do 
something. Tourism and flights to get people here were the answers.”23  
 
Air Travel and Tourism in the Post War Years 
After the war ended, and planes and flight crews were fully restored to 
commercial airline passenger service, the airlines faced a problem: a growing 
number of Americans wanted to fly and the airlines were woefully unprepared. 
Historian Carlos Schwantes explains, “After more than fifteen years of deprivation 
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during both the Great Depression and World War II, more Americans than ever 
before had money to spend and a pent up desire to spend it on travel.”24 During the 
Depression, only leisure and business travelers could afford to fly on airliners. 
Historian Roger Bilstein noted, “A large number of Americans in the 1930s continued 
to view air travel as a risky business. At the same time, they enjoyed the prestige of 
air travel and boasted to business friends about flying in order to keep up business 
appointments.”25 Working class Americans with less money still preferred to travel by 
train or automobile.  
When the country went to war and the government spent billions of dollars 
setting up military bases and war defense plants, the situation changed. Jobs and 
money became readily available for working families. People left their homes, 
traveling across much of the country to answer the government‟s call for workers. 
But, the War Department demanded sacrifice from everyone. Food, gasoline, tires, 
and other goods were strictly rationed. People were urged to save their money and 
buy war bonds. When the war ended, and the government lifted its wartime travel 
restrictions, a consumer society emerged where people not only purchased new 
automobiles and appliances with the money they had saved during the war from 
rationed spending, but now also had more vacation time which they used traveling 
longer distances across the country, including by plane. Aviation Historian Carl 
Solberg observed “A month after V-J Day, the War Department abolished its priority 
travel rules and a horde of civilian passengers descended on the airlines. It seemed 
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as if all of those who had been denied the chance to travel by air suddenly flocked to 
fly - - and the airlines were not ready for them.”26 As a result, hordes of air travelers 
packed air terminals nationwide, and airlines increased their flight schedules as 
much as the nation‟s airports would permit. In 1946, more than 12.5 million 
passengers took to the skies. By 1950, that number increased to 17 million the result 
of advertising, larger hotels, better customer service for hotel and airline 
reservations, cheaper airfares, and improved passenger planes.27  
Feeding this frenzy in air travel was the proliferation of advertisements in 
magazines such as Travel, Holiday, Travel News, the New Yorker, and newspaper 
advertisements in the New York Times. Airlines such as Pan Am bought magazine 
and newspaper space showing bikini clad women and muscular men in bathing suits 
on some of the world‟s nicest beaches, pictures of the luxurious passenger planes, a 
description of recommended recreational activities, and of course, attractive 
airfares.28 Other airlines including Western sent letters to Chambers of Commerce.  
Advertising its 2nd Annual Operation Sun Country, Western “joined with the 
Chambers of Commerce of San Diego, Palm Springs, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Los 
Angeles to invite winter-bound residents of 36 northern cities served by Western Air 
Lines including Seattle, Yakima, Spokane, Coeur D‟Alene, Lewiston, Idaho Falls, 
Helena, Salt Lake City, Billings, Casper, and Rapid City, to fly south for a second 
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summer in these cities.”29 The airline formed a promotions committee consisting of a 
Hollywood actress and five civic leaders from the Chambers of Commerce who 
“visited 36 cities, making 69 personal appearances, 38 radio broadcasts, and 14 
television shows, reaching an audience of more than six million people. Each of the 
„ambassadors,‟ had the opportunity to tell this huge audience about the attractions 
and accommodations offered to the winter tourist in this particular area.”30 While 
direct advertising helped, so did travel agents who assisted customers with their 
travel needs. Organizations such as the American Society of Travel Agents helped 
customers find deals on airline tickets while charging a nominal fee. Aviation 
Journalist Thomas Petzinger Jr. observed, “Entrepreneurs, retired couples, wives of 
the wealthy - - almost anyone could start a travel agency by stocking the Official 
Airline Guide and leasing some store-front space or a cubbyhole in a suburban 
shopping strip.”31 He added, “Having identified the most appropriate flight for a 
customer, the agent would then telephone the airline, or multiple airlines, perhaps, in 
the case of connecting flights – and make the appropriate reservation.”32 
 The air travel boom in turn, fostered the proliferation of large, urban-based 
hotels, often owned by well-known chains such as Hilton, Holiday Inn, and Howard 
Johnson appeared everywhere in cities. Some hotel companies including Hilton 
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partnered with airlines, offering air travelers reduced room rates through package 
deals.  Acting on an idea first proposed by President Roosevelt, Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller gained Pan Am‟s agreement to create the 
Intercontinental Hotel Corporation, a conglomeration of national and international 
hotels serving passengers and flight crews on six continents.33 To pay for airfare and 
hotel stays, customers had the option of using credit cards issued by companies like 
American Express, which advertised “travel now, pay later.”34 According to historian 
Peter Grossman, “In the 1950s, Americans fell in love with credit cards. There were 
two kinds: charge cards for specific stores and companies, and the universal travel 
and entertainment charge card.”35 The combination of travel advertisements, the 
hotel industry boom, and the increased demand for air travel presented the airlines 
with a challenge to quickly develop faster, more comfortable, more affordable modes 
of air travel.  
Their first step was to phase out older planes like the DC-2 and DC-3, and 
replace them with newer, faster, and larger planes like the seventy passenger seat 
Boeing 377 Stratocruiser and Douglas DC-6, luxurious pressurized airliners capable 
of flying at a speed of 300 miles per hour and altitude of 30,000 feet.36 Using money 
from the sale of their DC-2s and DC-3s to smaller companies, United, TWA, and 
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Western, the three major airlines serving Las Vegas leased Boeing 377s and 
Douglas DC-6s with the option of buying them. Passengers flying on these planes 
enjoyed comfortable seats, ample leg room, and hot meals and beverages served by 
flight attendants. Airline executives used these new planes especially for long-haul, 
transcontinental flights from New York and Chicago to Las Vegas not only to 
showcase their luxury, but also demonstrate their speed and fuel efficiency to a 
growing air traveling public.  
With stronger and more durable engines, aerodynamically efficient wings to 
reduce drag, and the ability to travel longer distances with fewer fuel stops, 
passengers now could travel on a Boeing 377 or DC-6 from Coast to Coast in fewer 
than twelve hours.37 United Airlines advertised flying “fastest and finest” on its DC-6 
Mainliner 300 from Las Vegas to Chicago in seven hours and Las Vegas to New 
York in ten hours.38 While airlines replaced their older fleets with these newer 
planes, Western and TWA kept some DC-3s on their flight lines for short-haul flights 
from San Francisco and Los Angeles to Las Vegas to save money burning less fuel. 
 To meet the overwhelming passenger demand, airlines also added more 
flights and new routes to their schedules. On January 12, 1950, Western Air Lines 
inaugurated “excursion flights” between Los Angeles and Las Vegas where 
passengers traveled on the spacious and luxurious seventy-three passenger seat 
Douglas DC-6 “Coachmaster.”39 That same year, United Airlines advertised two daily 
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eastbound flights from Los Angeles to New York via Las Vegas, and westbound 
flights originating in Denver and continuing to Las Vegas via Grand Junction using 
the DC-6, which cruised at a speed of 327 miles per hour.40 The introduction of this 
new service in 1950 increased the passenger volume by 33%.41 In 1956, Western 
Air Lines advertised “Showroom Holiday Mid-Week Flights” specials, offering low 
round-trip fares from Los Angeles to Las Vegas for $26.80, San Diego to Las Vegas 
for $27.30, San Francisco to Las Vegas for $74, and Minneapolis for $140.40.42 With 
Western, TWA, and United offering more flights at cheaper fares, new routes, and 
flying larger and faster planes, passenger service to Las Vegas from both coasts 
and Honolulu, increased 167%.43 
 
“Expansion, Expansion, Expansion” 
A third requirement for dealing with the travel boom was airport expansion. 
While the Army Air Corps was in the process of upgrading Western Air Express Field 
in Las Vegas, in 1942, George Crockett, an aviation enthusiast and flight instructor 
from Unionsville, Missouri, arrived in town seeking land for a dirt airstrip, a flight 
school, and air tour business he intended to open. Prior to his arrival in Las Vegas, 
Crockett worked as a sales representative for the Stinson Aircraft Company. His job 
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entailed extensive travel, including trips to Las Vegas. While in Las Vegas, Crockett 
observed the lack of general aviation airports for private airplanes to stop and refuel. 
At the same time, he also discovered that the federal government was offering 
lucrative contracts to flight schools to train pilots for the war. He signed a contract 
with the Department of the Interior to lease 640 acres of land at a rate of ten dollars 
per year for twenty years.44  
If his business was to be successful, he needed more airplanes than the 
Waco and Luscombe he owned. Crockett leased $35,000 worth of machinery 
including eight more airplanes, aircraft tools, and other equipment from Sioux 
Skyways, a commercial air carrier that had filed for bankruptcy.45 In order to receive 
a Civilian Pilot Training (CPT) contract from the government he needed a hangar for 
which he sold three of his airplanes and borrowed $4,500. Crockett literally built his 
airfield from scratch, spending days grading the airport‟s gravel runways. He struck a 
deal to purchase an old construction shack for $1,800, in addition to three adobe 
walls and second-hand lumber for building a terminal and a hangar. He also had a 
water tower filled with water but nothing to use as a pump until he acquired an old 
diesel engine for $1,200 to pump running water to the terminal. A gas company gave 
him an old Texaco truck to be used for fueling airplanes.46  
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On January 1, 1943, Crockett officially inaugurated Alamo Field, an airport 
with three runways, a terminal building, flight school, rental car business (U-Drive it 
cars), a motel (the Beacon Inn), and a complimentary shuttle service for pilots to get 
to town.47 Initially, business was slow, but Crockett‟s acquisition of a Cessna 
Distributorship and his agreement to allow Douglas Aircraft Corporation to sell and 
deliver aircraft from his airport helped defray the costs and make a profit which he 
used to improve his facilities. In 1946, he lengthened his runways, built new 
hangars, and opened a restaurant. His airfield was billed as one of the finest of its 
kind in the country, named in remembrance of his ancestor Davy Crockett who 
fought at the Alamo.  
The word “Alamo” has historically been associated with United States security 
and expansionism. So it was with Alamo Field. In 1946, the Army closed its training 
base and ended its partnership with Clark County. But, in 1947, as the Cold War 
ensued, the newly-created United States Air Force, with the financial and political 
support of Senator Patrick McCarran, announced its intention of establishing a 
permanent base at the old site. McCarran had always been a strong supporter of 
aviation, especially for national security. But McCarran had more in mind than a 
military base. Essential to the nation‟s defense, McCarran argued, was the opening 
of international routes to Europe and other continents for American airlines and air 
travelers. To promote this, McCarran proposed Senate Bill 326, which called for an 
“All-American Flag Line,” a single airline, Pan Am, to offer daily flights to London 
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while being financially supported by the US government.48 This would enable Pan 
Am to directly compete with British airlines over international routes. The British took 
umbrage at McCarran‟s proposal and authorized Pan Am to offer flights to London 
only two days a week.49 The British however, were not the only ones who opposed 
McCarran‟s proposal.  
United States Secretary of War Henry Stimson penned a letter to Senator 
Josiah Bailey, Chairman of the Commerce Committee, claiming, “The cause of 
national defense will be best served by affording a maximum encouragement of 
private, competitive enterprise in the international airline operations of this country, 
rather than by creation of a single chosen instrument to engage in foreign air 
transportation.”50 McCarran‟s “chosen instrument” bill never passed, illustrating that 
not all private-public partnerships were acceptable. But a second McCarran scheme 
did gain official sanction. One of the largest achievements of his career involved 
acquiring $7 million in federal aid for southern Nevada airport improvement projects 
under the Federal Airport Act of 1946, a bill he co-authored.51 The bill, also an 
incentive for the city and county to become more proactive in airport expansion 
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projects, bounced back and forth through the House and Senate for much of the 
year before it finally passed.52  
McCarran had shown impressive political muscle when, prior to the war, 
airlines were still operating out of Western Air Express Field, and airport officials 
became concerned about air traffic congestion and crowded airspace as the Army 
Air Corps began to move in with the commercial airlines. Following a series of 
discussions with Pentagon officials and Senator McCarran, Las Vegas Mayor Ernie 
Cragin and County Commissioners Harley Harmon and George Albright discerned 
that Air Force payrolls and supply orders dictated Clark County build its own public 
airport. The airlines supported this move because it enabled them to function out of 
their own airport and not have to worry about colliding with military aircraft in the 
airport traffic pattern. Moving the airlines also minimized ground delays including 
lengthy lines of airplanes waiting to take off. Throughout the War, Western Air Lines 
(Western Air Express became Western Air Lines in March 1941), TWA, and United 
had complained about how military traffic gave them little space in which to 
operate.53 With McCarran‟s assistance, the Clark County Board of Commissioners 
entered into agreement with Crockett to purchase his airport for $125,000.54 In 
addition to the sale, the county also included in the contract, a thirty year lease for 
him to remain on the field as a fixed base operator. After completion of the deal in 
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1948, Western, TWA, and United relocated to Alamo Field while the Air Force 
continued operating out of its base.55  
Preparing Alamo Field for commercial operations was going to be expensive. 
But, Frank Guswelle, Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners was ready 
for the challenge. The County had $850,000 in federal airport funds of the $1.5 
million needed to complete the project. The Board of County Commissioners 
proposed a $750,000 bond issue for the remaining needed funds. Despite opposition 
from a handful of disgruntled local residents who felt that the existing airport was 
adequate and did not want the additional noise of more airplanes flying over their 
homes, the bond issue passed on May 1, 1947, with most of the city‟s residents, 
casino executives, and the Chamber of Commerce agreeing that airport expansion 
was needed.56 As the McCarran Airport Dedication Program noted, “Had it not been 
for Mr. Guswelle, it is entirely probable that the airport project would have fallen by 
the wayside. He whipped up enthusiasm in many quarters. He begged and he 
barked. He cajoled and he drove and, when the pace slackened, he flew into the 
thick of whatever fight was raging at the time. He held meetings with his other 
commissioners, with the airlines, with the Chamber of Commerce.”57 Development 
and expansion plans included two 6,500 feet of paved runways, one graded runway, 
16,100 lineal feet of taxiway, 31,100 square yards of loading apron, a 27,750 square 
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foot building for administration offices, and new airport lighting.58 On December 19, 
1948, the County renamed Alamo Field McCarran Field in honor of Senator Patrick 
McCarran.59 In a tribute to the Senator, the McCarran Airport Dedication Program 
stated, “The senior senator has always been a friend of the air force and the navy 
aviation programs and has done everything within his power to see that these arms 
of the national defense are maintained at a high level.”60 
An editorial in the Boulder City Journal praised the new airport as “a far cry 
from the original facilities in Las Vegas which served the daring pioneer pilots of the 
1920s. For instance, the first community „air field‟ [sic] was a strip of desert a few 
hundred feet long, which was cleared of mesquite and sagebrush in the old 
fairgrounds area. Today the site is occupied by the city swimming pool.”61 It also 
recognized how essential a new airport was to the growth and development of the 
city, declaring, “In the modern air age, up-to-date facilities for all types of aircraft are 
absolutely essential to the growth and prosperity of any community, and more so in 
the case of a city like Las Vegas, dependent to a large degree on tourist dollars.”62 
With the steady increase in air traffic and passenger volume, it became clear to 
airport officials that within the decade more airport expansion would be needed.     
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A Hometown Airline  
With a rapidly growing tourism industry served by three major airlines United, 
TWA, and Western, Las Vegas began attracting other airlines, one of which was 
Bonanza, advertised as Las Vegas‟s hometown airline. Its President Edmund 
Converse, a former WWII military pilot, launched the airline in 1946 with two small 
Cessnas offering sightseeing flights to the Grand Canyon. With business booming, 
in 1950 he acquired five Douglas DC-3s and offered flights to Reno, Tonopah, 
Phoenix, and San Diego.63 Wanting to be a greater presence in the Las Vegas 
market as a competitor to Western, TWA, and United Airlines, Bonanza strategically 
attempted to increase business during the winter months by allowing passengers to 
book flights throughout a fifteen day period to fly roundtrip from Las Vegas to Carson 
City, and from Las Vegas to Reno.64 Unlike its competitors, Bonanza also offered its 
passengers a new amenity of calling friends, relatives, or business partners on radio 
phones during flight for a nominal fee.65  
On January 1, 1958, the airline took delivery of the first Fairchild F-27, a turbo 
propeller-driven aircraft. Capable of flying at speeds of 311 miles per hour, radar 
equipped for better navigation and radio frequency coverage, and seats for forty 
passengers, the F-27 revolutionized the propeller-driven aircraft industry.  
Advertising itself as the first airline to offer turbo-jet service, Bonanza added the F-27 
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to its fleet which brought enormous prestige and a marked increase in business.66 
Better business also brought several new needs to the company.  
Bonanza needed new land leases, a $350,000 hangar for all of its planes, 
and a $125,000 administration building with offices.67 To bypass the expense of a 
new hangar and administration building, the airline paid $170,000 to move its 
$150,000 hangar from Reno to Las Vegas, leased land for fifty years at $800 per 
month, and insured the hangar for $80,000.68 In spite of financial difficulties in 
handling its operation Bonanza in 1960 became the country‟s first airline to operate 
an all turbo-propeller airline fleet, which meant that it had the fastest, safest, and 
most efficient planes in the propeller-driven passenger plane industry. Although the 
airline did relatively well with a passenger load volume of 67% (most airlines had a 
75-80% passenger load volume), it needed to invent a marketing gimmick to 
increase the passenger load volume.69 
Using the “Bonanzaland” experiment, the airline offered package deals where 
people could fly Bonanza routes during a fourteen day period for $90, and a thirty 
day period for $160.70 The experiment worked and Bonanza flights were full. In 
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1961, the airline transported 316,000 passengers, a 24% increase over the previous 
year‟s volume.71 While Bonanza, TWA, United, and Western Airlines experienced 
significant passenger volume growth by offering affordable fares, and assured 
casino resort owners that flights would be full, there was another airline experience 
that would be important to the sustenance and growth of tourism and gambling in 
Las Vegas: junkets.  
 
Junkets 
Beginning in 1941, junkets, or non-scheduled charter flights, became a 
growing business in the air travel industry. Nationwide, people boarded charter 
planes to travel to Orlando, Miami, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
San Diego, and other popular tourist destinations. In Las Vegas, casino owners saw 
an opportunity to tap into the junket industry to increase business and profits. So, the 
El Rancho and Last Frontier casino resorts contracted with private junket operators 
primarily from southern California to transport eager gamblers to their casinos. In 
1943, more than 1,100 travelers, about 7% of the regular passenger volume, flew to 
Las Vegas on junkets from Los Angeles, Burbank, and other southern California 
cities. In 1959, the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce reported 151,173 passengers 
arrived on junket flights, about 10% of passenger flights from Honolulu, Dallas, St. 
Louis, Chicago, New York, and other national cities.72 
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Traditionally, junkets were only available to the wealthy. As Mark Skidmore 
points out in his study of the junket industry, “Each junketeer was a male over the 
age of twenty-one, working in a profession where he earned an annual salary 
exceeding $30,000.”73 Skidmore also noted an additional prerequisite: each 
junketeer had to establish a minimum $2,500 line of credit with the casino, and in 
return, received a complimentary hotel room, meals, beverages, and a show ticket.74 
In Big Julie of Las Vegas, a 1970s expose on junketeer Julie Weintraub and the Las 
Vegas scene, author Edward Linn provides a similar description of a junket 
excursion in 1960 where a group of doctors, lawyers, and other professionals flew 
from New York to Las Vegas on a chartered United Airlines Douglas DC-8 
passenger jet. At the casino, “Each of them spent hundreds of dollars and in return, 
received coupons for complimentary beverages, a buffet, and show tickets.”75 New 
casino resorts such as the El Rancho Vegas and the Last Frontier with their 
luxurious casinos, lavishly appointed rooms, and premier entertainment, attracted 
wealthy junketeers who wanted to be pampered, entertained, enjoy outdoor 
recreation in the sun, drink, eat, gamble, and return home satisfied. 
In 1942, the Hotel Last Frontier bused many of its customers to town from Los 
Angeles, Phoenix, Tucson, and other southwestern cities. Because highway travel 
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was too slow, the casino switched to airplanes the following year. By contracting with 
various air charter services in Los Angeles, the hotel was able to transport more 
people daily. William Moore, general manager and co-owner of the Last Frontier, 
negotiated an arrangement with these carriers that allowed him to offer his guests a 
package deal that included a room, meals, and transportation to and from the 
airport. 76 Customers arrived in Los Angeles from Detroit or Dallas on commercial 
airlines, and then boarded a charter plane operated by a local air charter service to 
Las Vegas.77 In an interview, Moore claimed that the Last Frontier pioneered charter 
airplane promotions advertising air service to Las Vegas from other West Coast 
cities like Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Burbank. This junket air service developed 
a new niche in the Las Vegas air travel market that Moore claimed, “attracted a lot of 
people” to town.78 
One of the air services in southern California with which the Last Frontier 
contracted was Los Angeles Air Service (LAAS), owned and operated by a young 
entrepreneur named Kirk Kerkorian. Forced to drop out of school to help with the 
family farm after his father experienced financial hardship during the Great 
Depression, Kerkorian always had a passion for aviation. Having saved his money, 
he was able to acquire a car wash business and in his spare time took flying 
lessons. After earning his commercial pilot‟s license, Kerkorian sold his business, 
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and flew airplanes from Canada to England.79 Later, with experience as an Air Force 
instructor in the war, Kerkorian thought about starting his own air service. Taking 
part of the revenue he earned from his car wash business, Kerkorian started his new 
air service with a $5,000 single-engine Cessna to be used for flight instruction and 
charter flights.80 He later purchased a Douglas DC-3, a twin engine Cessna, and a 
single engine Beechcraft.81 In 1950, Kerkorian moved his operation to the Lockheed 
Air Terminal in Long Beach to compete with forty other junket airlines for business. 
He struggled for a while until he pleased his customers by upgrading his service with 
a four-engine Douglas C-54, and spent $28,000 to retrofit it and refurbish the 
interior.82 In 1959, he changed the company‟s name to Trans International Airlines, 
transporting regular customers and military personnel on a Douglas DC-8 turbojet, 
and in 1968, sold his business to Transamerica Corporation for $104 million.83 
Kerkorian became an important junket operator in Las Vegas, but he wasn‟t the only 
one.  
 
Warren “Doc” Bayley and Hacienda Airlines  
Warren “Doc” Bayley, a farmer from Platteville, Wisconsin, had no experience 
running an airline. Before he became co-owner and Chief Executive Officer of the 
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Hacienda Hotel in Las Vegas during the hotel boom in the late 1940s and early 50s, 
he traveled throughout the United States as a syndicated travel columnist writing 
articles about his experiences in various hotels. He made special notes from his 
observations of “the good points” to be incorporated into his future hotel, points such 
as friendly staff, fresh bath towels, clean bed linens, and working air conditioners.84 
Bayley had always dreamed of owning a hotel and his opportunity finally came while 
he served as Chairman of the Board for Standard Motels Incorporated, a West 
Coast hotel chain. 
In 1955, with profits from a fruitcake manufacturing business in southern 
California, Bayley opened a chain of hotels under the name Hacienda Resorts in 
Fresno, Bakersfield, and Indio, California.85 That same year, seeking to invest in Las 
Vegas, he formed a partnership with the National Corporation, a Texas firm that had 
already begun construction on a property in the city named the Lady Luck Hotel.86 
Just before the hotel was completed in 1956, Bayley as majority owner, changed the 
name Lady Luck to Hacienda, and sent out initial public stock offerings to 
stockholders of Hacienda Motels Incorporated. He received a promising response. 
But when Nevada Gaming Control Board Chairman Robbins Cahill claimed the Strip 
was overbuilt and nobody would pay any attention to the Hacienda, stock interests 
dropped dramatically and the National Corporation pulled out of the partnership.87 
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Bayley had to sell his fruitcake manufacturing business in California to buy the 
Hacienda. In April 1956, the Hacienda resort, nicknamed “Hayseed Haven” because 
it was not a fancy hotel and catered to working class people, opened. It showcased 
an Olympic-sized “Z” shaped swimming pool, room accommodations for 266 guests, 
and a $17,000 mini racetrack for go-carts with annual national competitions.88  
Bayley shuttled air travelers from the airport to the hotel on air conditioned 
buses. Upon their arrival at the Hacienda, guests received $5 in gaming chips, a 
buffet dinner, a bottle of champagne, membership to a golf course lit at night (where 
each guest had a chance to win $5,000 for a hole-in-one), and a ticket for a show at 
the New Frontier (a casino resort in which Bayley had purchased a ninety percent 
share and offered to sell the rooms to investors for $10,000 each but it never panned 
out).89 Guests also received a tote bag with the Hacienda logo as a souvenir of their 
experience. While at the hotel, guests also enjoyed complimentary glasses of 
champagne. Even with all of these fine amenities Bayley had too many empty rooms 
because he was too far south on the Strip and tourists preferred hotel resorts at the 
other end. 
During the mid 1950s, as Las Vegas became a more upscale city attracting 
affluent tourists and gamblers, rooms reached 100% capacity especially on 
weekends. The New Frontier, Riviera, Flamingo, Tropicana, and El Rancho Vegas 
offered “Show-time Holiday” room rates for $30, which included 3 days and 2 nights 
at any of the hotels, breakfast, cocktails, dinners, shows, a bottle of champagne, and 
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ground transportation between the airport and hotels.90 This public relations program 
was so successful filling the Strip hotel rooms to capacity, that there was no need for 
junket travelers who were turned away. Henry Price, owner of a junket air carrier in 
Burbank presented Bayley with the idea of flying in working class southern California 
gamblers and tourists to McCarran Airport instead of high rollers, and then busing 
them to the Hacienda Hotel. Bayley accepted Price‟s offer and scheduled flights on 
weekdays as well as weekends. Hacienda Hotel Manager Richard Taylor recalled 
Bayley saying “if thirty-two people in Los Angeles are willing to fly to Las Vegas on a 
weekend, then there certainly must be thirty-two more willing to come on a 
weekday.”91 
Bayley‟s flight reservations filled up so quickly, he contracted with Price to 
become the Flight Services Manager of the Hacienda‟s newly leased Douglas DC-
3s. Weekday and weekend junket passenger flights became so popular, Bayley 
added a large DC-4 to his fleet with profits from the Hacienda. He spent $95,000 of 
his own money refurbishing the DC-4 with comfortable seats and a piano bar, with 
which he provided entertainment en route.92 Bayley hired Dick Winslow, a former 
Hollywood actor as his in-flight entertainer, who played tunes and sang popular 
songs during the flights mainly to calm nervous passengers who had never flown 
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before, a common problem in the late 1950s and early 60s.93 Other “shows” on 
these flights included young, attractive women modeling fashions for the mainly 
male passengers. Contrary to rumor and claims in the book Green Felt Jungle, the 
ladies never performed a striptease though they wore lingerie that was considered 
risqué at the time.94  
Because of the growing popularity of his flights, Bayley increased the size of 
his fleet to include two Douglas DC-3s, each capable of seating 32 passengers; one 
DC-4 for 77 passengers; and five Lockheed Super-Constellations that seated 80 
passengers each. His additions were timely. In 1959, Hacienda Airlines delivered 
more than 70,000 passengers to McCarran Airport. In 1960, it delivered 120,000 
passengers, and one year later, 170,000 passengers.95 For 1962, the Airline 
projected transporting 220,000 passengers. These numbers were competitive with 
the total number of passengers transported by United, Western, Bonanza, and TWA. 
According to Hotel Manager Taylor, Bayley‟s flights turned out to be so popular that 
customers had to book their reservations three or four weeks in advance.96 The 
reasons for Hacienda Airlines‟ success were its catering to working class tourists, 
offering low fares, excellent customer service, and frequent advertisement in Los 
Angeles newspapers and on highway billboards.  
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To promote his air service, hotel, and rates, Bayley‟s innovative management 
team not only advertised in newspapers and on billboards, but also came up with the 
idea of printing flight schedules on the inside of matchbook covers that were 
dispensed from cigarette vending machines all across the West. This gimmick was 
an ingenious promotion tactic. Another advertising opportunity presented itself when 
construction work on Highway 58 in Victorville, California created a bottleneck, and 
caused a traffic jam. Bayley paid two attractive females to stand alongside the 
freeway and hand out flyers to the immobile drivers advertising the Hacienda‟s 
junket flights and included coupons for one free buffet at the Hacienda Hotel.97  
The resort‟s flight schedule and range of destinations was impressive. 
Hacienda Airlines offered flights from Los Angeles, Long Beach, Santa Ana, 
Burbank, San Francisco, and San Diego to Las Vegas using Douglas DC-3s for 
$35.50 round trip.98 Longer-range flights from Dallas, St. Louis, Chicago, New York, 
Detroit, and Honolulu, at a price of $44.50 round trip, required use of Bayley‟s DC-4s 
and Super-Constellations.99 In a 2000 interview, Boyd Michael, Hacienda Chief Pilot 
and Director of Pilot Training, outlined a typical weekly crew schedule to 
demonstrate the size of Bayley‟s operation and how it competed with the major 
airlines in many of the same cities. He recalled that on a Friday afternoon a Douglas 
DC-4 crew would leave Burbank Airport for Las Vegas, continue to St. Louis, and 
terminate in Chicago. The crew had a layover on Saturday, and then on Sunday 
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would leave with a partial load of passengers from Chicago to St. Louis. They then 
flew to Las Vegas to drop off passengers and load others. In Las Vegas, they 
switched flight crews before terminating in Honolulu. According to Michael, a DC-3 
crew flew five roundtrips per day between San Francisco and Las Vegas. By 1961, 
Hacienda Airlines ran seventy flights a week.100 
Bayley soon found himself the owner of a sizeable junket airline. Early in 
1961, Bayley ordered twenty-five additional Lockheed Constellations from TWA. The 
transaction also included thirty-eight engines, twenty-five extra propellers, and $3.5 
million worth of spare parts and tools. At that time, it stood as the largest purchase 
by any air service operator in Nevada history and would have put the value of his 
fleet much higher than the later appraisal of between $1 million and $2 million.101 
But, Bayley began having airline operating certification problems with the Civil 
Aeronautics Board.  
In 1960 he had applied for an operating certificate, but the application was 
lost under a stack of CAB paperwork and found two and a half years later, depriving 
him of taking delivery of the Constellations. Resentful of Hacienda success, TWA, 
Western, and United - the three major airlines serving Las Vegas - filed complaints 
with the CAB that accused Bayley of unfair competition and charged that Bayley‟s 
airline was operating without a certificate, which was illegal.102 United, TWA, and the 
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Western also filed a complaint against the Dunes resort, which offered free flights in 
its Douglas DC-3, alleging that the Dunes‟ operation also lacked a certificate.103 To 
be certified by the CAB as a legitimate business, anyone wanting to transport 
passengers by air charter had to fill out an application, draft a business plan, and 
have the documents reviewed and approved by the Board. To avoid expensive 
litigation, the Dunes canceled its air service. Hacienda Airlines became the next 
CAB target.  
A year and a half after Bayley had begun his airline, on August 12, 1961 the 
CAB issued an order to close it down. Board examiner Richard Walsh‟s investigation 
concluded that Bayley‟s airline violated Federal Aviation Regulations by operating 
“package tours” without an operating certificate.104 Despite Hacienda attorneys‟ 
efforts to file numerous appeals, the courts sided with the CAB and the commercial 
airlines. Hacienda General Manager Richard Taylor argued that the Hacienda had 
applied for a certificate and had generated a tremendous amount of business for Las 
Vegas, a point that the resort‟s attorneys and promoters emphasized. But the 
argument fell on deaf ears. Civil Aeronautics Board attorney Robert Toomey argued 
if the Hacienda operated without a certificate, other resorts would follow suit if 
allowed to do so. He asserted that an increase in competition would be detrimental 
to the big commercial airlines, indicating that the CAB caved to the political pressure 
of the major airlines. On July 10, 1962, Bayley was forced to shut down his airline.  
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None of the other casinos supported Bayley and instead sided with the 
commercial airlines. Casino executives criticized Bayley for targeting middle and 
lower-income customers rather than high rollers. They claimed wealthy people 
traditionally spent more money gambling and were more representative of the type 
of image the resorts were promoting. One anonymous casino executive pointedly 
asked “What incentive will the airlines have to boost Las Vegas when we fly a 
minimum of three thousand passengers a month for free?” He further cautioned that 
“We are also going to be in trouble if we couple booze with gambling and gimmick-
style promotions and toss in $5 for lure…. That puts us in a class of „Sin City USA,‟ 
an identification we have successfully avoided for five years,” ironic because the city 
built its reputation around booze, gambling, sex, and promotional come-ons.105  
Investigative journalists Sally Denton and Roger Morris wrote that it was 
difficult for Las Vegas to shed its image as “a garish, vulgar place – either too greedy 
or too cheap, but in any case too much.”106 Nick Tosches, a Las Vegas visitor called 
the city, “A disease, a nightmare, a paradise for the misbegotten.”107 But, for the 
thousands of visitors and permanent residents, Las Vegas had become one of the 
most attractive and classiest towns in the world, claimed Denton and Morris who 
wrote, “In only seven years, Las Vegas had become one of the most distinct and 
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showy cities of its kind anywhere on the planet.”108 They also noted how, “The city‟s 
official handouts extolled its broad streets, ranch-style homes, first-rate schools, 
eighty-one church groups, four hospitals, and no state income tax.”109 The fact is 
that the growth and development of Las Vegas was not made possible by sex, 
booze, gambling, nice homes, and favorable tax structures themselves. The airlines 
played an absolutely vital role in making the city a popular, modern destination for 
tourists and future residents who enjoyed the warm weather, affordability of houses, 
and a growing job market.       
The controversy over the Hacienda underscored a developing tension 
between casino executives like Griffith and Hull who wanted to advertise Las Vegas 
as a wealthy person‟s gambling paradise versus entrepreneurs like Bayley who 
wanted Las Vegas to cater to middle and lower-income guests, while also making a 
profit from gambling and entertainment. Symbolic of upscale Las Vegas, the 
appearance of the Flamingo, Desert Inn, and Sahara, and other luxurious hotel 
resorts along the Strip added to the class conflict. Another source of contention 
between Las Vegans who sought to preserve the old Fremont Street hotels and 
casinos as remnants of the Old West versus those who envisioned a glitzy, modern 
Strip teeming with high-class tourists and entertainers from New York and Los 
Angeles. 
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Last Frontier Town vs. Modern Las Vegas 
The Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce and prominent downtown Fremont 
Street casino owners William Moore, Guy McAfee, and Thomas Hull were reluctant 
to change Las Vegas‟s image as a throw-back to pioneer days. But, they could not 
compete with Mo Sedway and Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, southern California 
organized crime businessmen who wanted to replicate luxurious and lavish southern 
California Bel Air hotels on the Strip.  
In 1946, Siegel, backed by mobster Lucky Luciano and Havana-based Meyer 
Lansky, opened his dream resort, the Fabulous Flamingo, a property bigger and 
more luxurious than the elegant Beverly Hills Hotel in southern California. His 
original budget of $1.5 million ballooned to more than $6 million, which got him in 
mortal trouble with the bosses who suspected Siegel was skimming.110 The 
Flamingo ranked the most glamorous hotel in Las Vegas with 105 lavishly furnished 
rooms, a health club, gymnasium, steam rooms, tennis courts, and areas for squash, 
handball, and shuttlecock. Behind the main building were stables for horses, a 
trapshooting range, a large swimming pool, a nine-hole golf course, and several 
shops. The grounds were landscaped with date palm trees, rare foliage, and exotic 
species. True to Siegel‟s desire for class, the whole staff dressed in tuxedos.111  
Siegel‟s Fabulous Flamingo represented a significant departure from the El 
Rancho Vegas, the Last Frontier, and El Cortez with their traditional western décor. 
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The Fremont Street Las Vegans still viewed their city as one of the last frontier 
towns. A local brochure titled “Las Vegas Nevada, Still a Frontier Town” contained 
pictures of cowboys, horses, rodeos, saloons, and bordellos.112 Some visitors stayed 
at dude ranches scattered outside the town, and enjoyed horseback riding, playing 
the old frontier game of horseshoe, and other outdoor recreational activities. The El 
Rancho Vegas, Last Frontier, and El Cortez offered clean, simple, familiar 
surroundings and amenities to locals and common folk visitors who were not 
interested in luxury, showiness, and big gambling. On the other hand, Siegel and his 
colleagues were determined to change Las Vegas‟s image to an elaborate, classy, 
upscale resort town with luxurious properties that included spacious Monte Carlo 
style casinos, well-appointed rooms, air conditioning, swimming pools, gourmet 
restaurants, premier entertainment, grass golf courses, and large tennis courts. 
Everything was designed to attract the wealthy drive-in and fly-in tourists. But the 
change would not come easily.  
Griffith, Moore, and other Fremont Street casino owners were not yet ready to 
give up the southwestern theme and charm of their town. To prove their 
seriousness, they paid a local business to construct “Vegas Vic,” a giant size 
cowboy statue famous for waving and saying “Howdy podner” to all tourists walking 
on Fremont Street. Vegas Vic was the perfect advertising gimmick for the Old West, 
appearing in newspaper advertisements, flyers, and on television where he was 
viewed by millions of Americans.113  But, even with this advertising, Fremont Street 
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proved to be no match to the gorgeous hotel resorts on the Strip that attracted 
wealthy southern California businesspeople, Hollywood celebrities, world-class 
entertainers, and enormous crowds from southern California. Historian John Findlay 
observed this, noting, “In 1955, the owners of the Last Frontier Hotel turned their 
backs on the bygone era of the Old West nostalgia and opened their doors to the 
age of the future…. Gone was the Old West theme, replaced by space-age luxury 
that can be traced in a straight line from Los Angeles to the Strip.”114 To punctuate 
this shift, historian Hal Rothman summed it up: “The „glamour girl‟ image replaced 
“Vegas Vic” and the western theme used by early properties to portray Las Vegas as 
a wild, no-holds-barred frontier town. By the early 1950s, Las Vegas‟s image had 
more in common with Hollywood than with Dodge City.”115 Like the airlines 
modernizing their fleets and adding first-class amenities to attract more passengers, 
the emerging casino-resorts pioneered the way for bigger and even more luxurious 
resorts to expand their clientele.  
 
The Golden Age of Las Vegas 
In the 1950s, larger and more luxurious resorts proliferated along the Strip, 
each one having the intention of outdoing the others in grandeur and size. In April 
1950, the Desert Inn opened and was given the label “the jewel of the resorts” by 
casino owners and city marketers because of its spaciousness and unique design. 
With seventeen richly landscaped areas, state-of-the-art entertainment, air 
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conditioning, gourmet restaurants, a sky room for nightly dancing, and a 
meticulously manicured and landscaped eighteen-hole golf course, this hotel 
registered the Strip‟s premier resort.116  
It was nearly outdone in December 1952, when the Sahara opened as the 
Strip‟s sixth hotel. The two-story building boasted 276 rooms, an Africa motif 
throughout the facility, a luxurious lounge, and gourmet restaurant. In later years, the 
Sahara built a “space center,” a four thousand square foot convention center used 
for business meetings and special events. That same year, the Sands opened. It 
became a legendary resort with the popular Copa Room in which big-name 
entertainers including before Liberace, the Rat Pack -- Joey Bishop, Dean Martin, 
Sammy Davis Jr. and Frank Sinatra-- and Elvis Pressley gave sold-out 
performances. These world-class entertainers attracted thousands of people from all 
parts of the country. The giant Sahara casino resort landscape featured exotic 
shrubs, palm trees, and luxurious gardens that surrounded an all-glass walled 
restaurant that overlooked its beautifully arbored grounds.117  
In April 1955, the eleven-storied Riviera opened as the tallest building in Las 
Vegas and the first high-rise hotel in town. Its European design, lavish gardens, and 
multi-purpose facilities and other amenities earned the property the title: first “self-
contained” vacation community. On May 23, 1955, the Dunes opened as the tenth 
resort on the Strip. Called the “miracle in the desert,” it had 194 rooms, a ninety foot-
long swimming pool, a fifteen-foot lagoon, a magic carpet revue showroom, and an 
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eighteen-hole golf course. It pampered its guests by offering them complimentary 
drinks, dinner, and shows. In May 1956, the fifteen-story Fremont hotel opened, 
replacing the Riviera as the town‟s tallest building and quickly gained fame for its 
gourmet restaurants with world-class chefs. In June 1956, the Silver Palace opened 
with Las Vegas‟s first two-story nightclub.118  
In April 1957, the Tropicana opened with sprawling bungalow-styled buildings 
consisting in total of one thousand rooms, and one year later, in July 1958, the 
Stardust opened with a 105 foot-long pool, 16,500 square foot casino (the largest in 
Nevada), a horseman‟s park, an area for rodeos, a raceway for Grand Prix racing, a 
golf course, and country club.119  
In total, hoteliers spent more than $7 million on these luxurious resorts to offer 
the best accommodations, recreation, and entertainment to all kinds of travelers. 
Boosters and marketers from the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce now promoted 
the city as an elegant, classy, glamorous, resort city. Hired advertising agents 
pedaled the town as a desert paradise for tourists and gamblers. 120 Additionally, 
they billed it as an “atomic city,” after United States President Harry S. Truman 
approved the creation of the Nevada Proving Grounds, the only peacetime, above-
ground nuclear testing facility in  the continental United States.121 On January 27, 
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1951 the first atomic test took place.  Exploiting the publicity that accompanied the 
test, Las Vegas began marketing the detonation as one of their city‟s attractions.  
Despite all of the money spent on building new casinos, Las Vegas still sat 
isolated in the middle of the southwest southern Nevada desert with accessibility to 
major western cities and more distant metros across the nation always a challenge. 
New, modern airlines reaching out across the continent and overseas were 
beginning to answer the challenge. With a growing increase in the number of tourists 
and gamblers coming to stay at the new Strip resorts, and large airline passenger 
planes such as the DC-4 and Boeing 377 Stratocruiser annually transporting more 
than 35,000 passengers to Las Vegas, city officials realized  McCarran Field needed 
immediate expansion.122 
 
“The White Elephant Basking in the Sun” 
Even after a $150,000 runway expansion program to pave the three runways, 
provide night lighting, and build an air traffic control tower and weather station, 
McCarran Airport remained too small for the 35,106 passengers, 99 daily flights, and 
the 77 passenger DC-6s and Lockheed Constellations that annually arrived by the 
late 1940s and early 50s.123 As the Sands, Sahara, and other plush resorts 
appeared on the Strip in the 1950s, the passenger volume continued to soar at 
McCarran. By 1955, more than 500,000 passengers walked through the airport‟s 
gates, forcing Airport Manager Robert Metten and his staff to draw up plans for 
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further expanded runways, taxiways, and terminal facilities. Metten‟s deputy director 
and eventual successor Gordon Miles also acknowledged expansion was imminent. 
He claimed “Remodeling the present airport would be good for ten years, but the city 
will need a new airport in twenty years.”124  By 1957, with more than 700,000 people 
arriving by plane, the crunch proved so great that Metten and Clark County 
Commissioners George Albright, Harley Harmon, George Christianson, and other 
members decided their only recourse was to expand the current airport and build 
new facilities. Commissioner George Albright stated in a county resolution, “The 
existing terminal building at McCarran Field is inadequate for the present volume of 
traffic. After careful study and research, the Board of County Commissioners has 
determined it more practical to construct a new building rather than enlarge the 
existing one.”125    
In 1957, Metten hired contractor Leigh Fisher to conduct a comprehensive 
airport study. When completed, the study estimated the cost of a newly renovated 
airport to be $3.865 million. Expansion of the existing facilities alone would run $2.5 
million (in today‟s figures, around $5 million).126 The expansion plan included 
$600,000 for runway extension and lighting (the East-West runway would be 
extended from 6,500 feet to 10,000 feet and be widened to 150 feet with high-
intensity runway lighting for night flight), taxiway lighting and widening to 75 feet, two 
buildings connected by a ramp with the first building housing ticket counters, 
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baggage handling, airline offices and rental counters. The second building sized-out 
at 90,000 square feet, and contained 12 gates with flexibility to increase to 20 gates, 
waiting lounges, restaurants, bars, a nursery, concession stands, and restrooms.127  
Once again, the federal government stood ready to lend a helping hand.  
Approximately 62.5% of the expansion cost would be provided through federal 
grants. The county, however, would still have to float a $5 million bond measure and 
use all of its resources to pay for the rest.128 Airline representatives Ralston Hawkins 
of Bonanza Airlines, Charles Wyre of TWA, R.E. Costello of Pacific Airlines, D. 
Dodgson of Transocean Airlines, James Keefe of Western Air Lines, and Ed Lupien 
of United Airlines agreed to the economic soundness of the expansion plan and 
costs as long as takeoff and landing fees remained at $.08/1,000 lbs of aircraft 
weight (including passengers, luggage, fuel, and cargo).129  Getting public approval 
of the bond measure was another matter.   
Initially, the bond issue had few supporters because taxpayers had just voted 
to approve a $6 million bond issue for local schools, and many felt McCarran Field 
was adequate for the airlines. Not even all of the city‟s travel entrepreneurs 
expressed enthusiasm. Some local residents vociferously objected to the entire 
project, calling it a “white elephant basking in the sun.”130 Joe Julian, a local radio 
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host questioned the logic behind moving the airport.131 Airport Director Gordon Miles 
even recalled the anger of some casino resort executives when the County moved 
the airlines to Alamo Field in 1948. He remembered, “When the airport was on the 
west side [of town], all hotels felt that the traffic would be diverted away from their 
hotels.”132 Still, with 959,063 passengers arriving at McCarran in 1959 and the 
airport‟s handling 99 flights a day with basic air traffic control equipment, most 
residents, casino owners, and local businessmen including Herb Waite of Southern 
Nevada Power Company, and Andy Ruckman of the Southern Nevada Industrial 
Foundation, came to understand that the city needed a larger airport. On November 
6, 1957, Waite and Ruckman met with County Commissioners Harley Harmon, 
George Albright, and Arnold Christensen to discuss airport space and leases to 
expand their businesses. The two business leaders subsequently made a case to 
the public that the city‟s economy would benefit from an airport business park.133 To 
mobilize additional support, Gordon Miles also mandated all airport electronic 
equipment repairs be done by Leonard Sheafer and Gerald Forston, owners of 
Airborne Electronics, a local Las Vegas business.134  
Just a few days before the vote on the bond issue, the Las Vegas Chamber of 
Commerce overwhelmingly endorsed the measure by a vote of 12 to 1 (the member 
who voted against the measure owned a hotel). One member justified his vote for a 
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new airport by claiming that, “The increase of Las Vegas air travel is dependent on 
the construction of a new terminal building and other improvements at [the new] 
McCarran Airport.”135 Another predicted a coming revolution in air transport 
technology and argued that a new airport was vital “to keep up with the jet age of 
transportation.”136 The city‟s leading newspaper also endorsed the airport. Las 
Vegas Review-Journal editor Al Cahlan penned an article in support of a new airport, 
explaining how, “The present facilities are completely unfit for the class of people we 
are getting to come to Las Vegas, and the increasing number of airlines serving this 
community has brought obsolescence so far as accommodations are concerned.”137 
With more middle and upper class visitors coming to stay at the luxurious Strip 
resorts, and Las Vegas wanting to continue bringing in more of them, the city 
needed a new airport. Cahlan continued, “Air travel into Las Vegas has mushroomed 
to a point where, this year, it is probable that traffic will reach the one million 
mark.”138 On March 17, 1960, the bond issue passed by a voter margin of 2 to 1.139 
Las Vegas had its newly expanded airport.  
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 The Modern McCarran Airport 
Voters‟ approval for construction of a new airport could not have come at a 
better time. As some Chamber of Commerce members had predicted in the bond 
issue campaign, the age of jet travel was soon upon Las Vegas. The new McCarran 
Airport would accommodate the modern aircraft. According to chief architect John 
Replogle of Welton, Becket & Associates, “The new McCarran facilities have been 
designed for the convenience of the jet-age traveler…. We have tried to provide [the 
traveler] as efficient service on the ground as he usually receives in the air.”140  
In 1958, airlines such as Pan Am, United, TWA, and American added Boeing 
707s, Boeing 720Bs and Douglas DC-8s to their fleets, luxurious jets with seating for 
185 passengers that delivered thousands more passengers to the nation‟s cities, 
making even greater profits, and sending airport managers searching for funds for 
airport expansion to accommodate these large jets. They traveled at a speed of 
nearly 600 miles per hour, shrank geographic distance, and made air travel more 
popular than ever. The air travel industry was growing so rapidly that airport officials 
nationwide had difficulty keeping up. They did not have sufficient funds in their 
budgets to meet the expansion costs, so they turned to federal, state, and local 
funding. This proved to be challenging because the Congress was more interested 
in expanding the nation‟s highways and roadways through the Federal Highway Act 
of 1956 than funding airport expansion projects. As a result, airport officials had to 
work with what monies they had. This too was the case in Las Vegas.  
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Since the 1920s, airport expansion and inadequate funding for expansion 
were dominant themes in the history of airline travel and urban development. 
Passengers often complained to airline and airport officials about standing in line for 
hours at small airline ticket counters, walking through narrow and dimly lit airport 
concourses to get to the gates, inadequate restroom facilities, and not enough seats 
at the gates. As Aviation Historian Roger Bilstein notes, “Airports across the country 
developed reputations for littered waiting areas, odoriferous restrooms, and packed 
coffee shops. Jammed passenger terminals seemed the rule rather than the 
exception.”141 Airport planners and managers also recognized the need for better air 
traffic control centers and towers to handle the increased air traffic, and improved 
navigation equipment (such as the instrument landing system, or ILS) so pilots could 
safely fly instrument approaches to airports in inclement weather. The airlines also 
needed more ticket counter space, baggage carousels, and gates.  
With more passengers walking through the terminals, airport officials needed 
to include in their expansion plans restaurants, shops, and concession stands as 
other sources of revenue to help pay for expansion costs, and day-to-day airport 
operations. But, airport officials simply could not keep up with the explosive demand 
in passenger travel, and the trickle of funding coming from state and national 
legislatures was of little help. In 1947, the commercial airlines had transported more 
than 10 million passengers nationwide. By 1958, that number exceeded 55 
million.142 An editorial in the Las Vegas Sun noted, “Air travel was expanding [at an 
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alarming rate] and the public [increasingly] came to depend on commercial 
aviation.”143  
After carefully examining the Leigh Fisher Study, County Commissioner 
Clesse Turner concluded that, “The combination of lack of space to accommodate 
jets [in the future] and a bad airport location made it prohibitive to enlarge the 
present [terminal] building.”144 This was why the newly expanded airport was vital. 
He emphasized that, “In the next ten years, practically every major airline will have 
changed over to jets…. The feeder lines will have to convert to some sort of 
turboprops…. When that time comes, air traffic will soar enormously.”145 His 
prediction was correct.   
This explosive growth in the air travel industry, the appearance of newer and 
larger passenger planes including jets, and the growth and development of the 
casino resorts, marked the beginning of a new era for Las Vegas. It was a time when 
the symbiotic relationship between the airlines, the federal government, casino 
resorts, and city strengthened. The years 1941-1958 also marked a time when Las 
Vegas became a modern city. With a population exceeding 48,000 people, 
affordable housing, the availability of many jobs (especially mining magnesium, 
which was crafted into airplane wings, and sent overseas to assist with the war 
effort), and large public works programs including construction of roads, public 
parks, and schools, Las Vegas permanently shed its past as an obscure, small 
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railroad desert town constantly struggling to survive. Its new status as a popular 
tourist destination annually attracting eight million visitors (in 1955) enabled it to 
directly compete with larger resort cities like Los Angeles, Orlando, and Miami. Las 
Vegas Historian Hal Rothman observed, “In the comfortable political and cultural 
climate of southern Nevada, Las Vegas became the center of gaming in the western 
hemisphere…. Most of the money the casinos won came from visitors, not from local 
residents…. Combined with the technological improvements such as the expansion 
of McCarran Airport in 1963, the „dinky horrible little oasis town‟ that Lansky and 
Siegel first saw stood poised to take advantage of widespread wealth and changing 
cultural mores.”146 
Passenger planes played a vital economic and technological role helping Las 
Vegas make this transformation. They brought thousands of travelers from all parts 
of the country to Las Vegas, and casino resort owners and city officials responded 
by building a state-of-the-art airport to accommodate the planes and their 
passengers. But, as the passenger volume continued to expand rapidly, and larger 
passenger jets like the wide-bodied Boeing 747 and Douglas DC-10 delivered three 
hundred passengers per flight, and other jets like the Boeing 727, 737, and Douglas 
DC-9 continued to deliver 100-200 passengers per flight, the new airport quickly 
became insufficient. Also, in response to the growing demand of passengers, casino 
resort executives Kirk Kerkorian, Jay Sarno, Jackie Gaughan, and others built bigger 
magnificent, lavish, and luxurious resort properties, some of which had high rise 
buildings with more than 2,500 rooms for guests. The airline industry, casino resort 
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industry, and city rapidly grew, continuing to do so for another four decades, keeping 
airline, airport, and casino-resort officials busy with expansion.
98 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
JETS IN THE CONSUMER AGE 
 
In the history of American aviation, there were two monumental milestones 
that legitimized and solidified the airplane‟s future as a viable mode of public 
transportation. The first was Charles Lindbergh‟s famous trans-Atlantic solo flight 
from New York to Paris in 1927, an accomplishment that opened the nation to the 
age of air travel. The second was Pan American Airlines‟ inaugural Boeing 707 
jetliner flight from New York to Paris in October 1958, launching the airlines and the 
nation into the jet age.1   
Jets revolutionized the air travel industry. With their capacity to hold three 
times as many passengers as the Lockheed Constellation and Douglas DC-6, and 
capability of flying nearly double the speed of their propeller-driven predecessors, 
the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 changed air travel by bringing domestic and 
international cities closer together through time. Pan Am President Juan Trippe 
remarked, “In one fell swoop, we have shrunken the earth.”2 Because of their high 
speed and lengthy fuel range, jets substantially diminished air travel time between 
domestic and international cities. Boeing 707s and Douglas DC-8s delivered 
passengers to Los Angeles non-stop from New York in five hours, less than half the 
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time it took a propeller-driven DC-6 or DC-7.3 A flight from New York to Paris took 
eight hours.4 Yankees looking to take a weekend off in popular Havana hopped 
flights from New York and Chicago rather than board the ferry at Key West.5 While 
the advent of jets symbolized a new age in air travel, they also required airports to 
undergo considerable renovation.  
From coast to coast, American cities prepared for the passenger jet by 
building jetports to facilitate long takeoff and landing needs and to accommodate the 
millions of travelers taking to the air from all parts of the nation and the world. 
Aviation Historian Roger Bilstein observed this growth of airports and expanding 
international business markets noting, “Immediately after the war, trans-Atlantic 
flights drew large numbers of American executives seeking new business 
opportunities in Europe especially during the development phase of the Common 
Market when Europeans needed American machinery and products essential to 
reindustrialization after the war.”6 While market expansion and the rapid increase in 
passenger travel reaped handsome profits for the airlines, they also meant airport 
officials would have to promptly enact expansion plans for their airports that were 
woefully unequipped to handle jets and millions of people. If airports would meet the 
needs of airlines and air travelers, they would have to spend millions of dollars 
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enlarging terminals, reconfiguring airfields, and renovate parking facilities. This 
included Las Vegas. 
 
Jets Come to Las Vegas 
Las Vegas welcomed jet passengers by building several new high-rise casino 
resort hotels and a new airport. It is no exaggeration to say that jet travel put the city 
on the map as an international travel destination with Seattle, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles. Las Vegas Historian Eugene P. Moehring noted, “Beginning in 
September 1960 when United Airlines introduced non-stop service to Los Angeles, 
Chicago, and New York, jets expanded Las Vegas‟s gaming hinterland, making the 
city accessible even to east coast residents.”7     
Las Vegas had anticipated the arrival of the powerful new planes. As early as 
February, 1950, speaking to Las Vegas Rotary Club members at a large convention 
held in the Hotel Last Frontier on the Las Vegas Strip, Jerry Pettis, Executive 
Assistant to the President of United Airlines, announced that the United States 
commercial airline corporations were taking a serious look at new jet aircraft being 
designed at both the Boeing and Douglas aircraft companies.8 These jets would 
eventually replace the propeller-driven fleets in current use. Time and testing were 
needed to ensure safety before the new jet aircraft would be added to United‟s fleet.  
Pettis explained, “The four scheduled airlines serving southern Nevada -- United, 
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Western, TWA, and Bonanza -- are all striving to improve their service, since tourists 
using planes have more time to spend at their destinations. Hence, if these airlines 
bring more tourists into Las Vegas, you residents benefit directly because the 
visitors stay longer and spend more.”9 In 1955, Bob Metten, McCarran Airport 
Manager addressing local civic leaders, added to the anticipation with revolutionary 
words “the jets are coming.”10 
Talk of jets being added to airline fleets and coming to United States cities 
generated mixed feelings - - excitement for the new airliner that would travel at 
nearly 600 miles per hour, improve safety, offer more passenger space and non-stop 
global flights,  but trepidation for the enormous cost of acquiring Boeing 707s and 
Douglas DC-8s. William Hildred, Director General of the International Air Transport 
Association wrote, “One does not buy a $5 million jet as if it were a new bicycle. 
Even one jet aircraft necessitates special maintenance facilities, maybe a new base 
or a new hangar, extensive training of ground and airborne personnel, complete 
replanning of ground handling facilities, and many other changes in airline 
organization, all of which begin costing money before the aircraft can be put into 
service.”11 C. E. Woolman, president of Delta Airlines also initially expressed 
skepticism as his airline prepared to buy its first jets. “We are buying airplanes that 
haven‟t been fully designed, with millions of dollars we don‟t have. We are going to 
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operate them off airports that are too small, in an air traffic control system that is too 
slow, and we must fill them with more passengers than we have ever carried 
before.”12 But, the promises of faster air travel, and the availability of low-interest 
loans to the airlines from government and private lending firms were irresistible. 
Furthermore, greater flight frequency, passenger travel demand, and the possibility 
of airline profitability would pressure the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to sanction 
lower ticket prices (during this time, the airline industry was still regulated by the 
government which controlled ticket prices). Competition among the major airlines 
was another reason for forging ahead with leasing jetliners. By 1965, the value of 
total passenger jet deliveries to the airlines totaled $1.2 billion, and a decade later 
more than tripled to $3.8 billion.13   
  TWA was among the first to add jets to its fleet in 1959, in competition with 
Pan American for international trans-Atlantic routes, later introducing jets into its 
domestic flights. Western Airlines, with heavy passenger volume through the 1950s 
from increasing flight routes, grew from a minor to a major airline and soon added 
jets to its fleet.14  Bonanza Airlines, covering short to medium length routes, added 
turbo propeller-driven Fairchild F-27s to its fleet.  
The primary advantage of the jet was its engine, which had fewer moving 
parts than the piston engine, was more reliable, safer to operate, and easier to 
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maintain. It burned kerosene, much cleaner than gasoline, and it produced 
tremendous thrust for the weight. Thus, jet aircraft could be made larger and fly 
faster than piston engine planes. Though jets had larger fuel tanks for longer hauls 
than propeller-driven planes, they guzzled hundreds of gallons of jet fuel per hour, 
making them fuel inefficient and adding to the operating expense.  They were, 
nevertheless, the passenger planes of the future. The Boeing 707s, first to come off 
the Boeing assembly lines in 1958 and at the same time the Douglas DC-8s from 
Douglas assembly lines were sleek, stealthy, long-bodied jets capable of flying at 
altitudes of 30,000-40,000 feet, high above the storm levels, and reaching speeds of 
575 miles per hour.15 With seating for 165-200 passengers, they had spacious 
interiors with comfortable seats, ample leg room. Like propeller-driven airliners, they 
featured a professional staff of flight attendants to assist travelers with their needs.16   
Recalling his first experience on an American Airlines Boeing 707 jetliner, 
flying from New York to Los Angeles, Daniel Solon, a transportation journalist 
remembered how “the flight attendants made it [the flight] a good party. I know that 
sounds a little frivolous, but we had a very good time, and five and a half hours later 
we were on the ground in L.A.”17 Jet cabins were much quieter than the propeller-
driven DC-6 and Lockheed Electra cabins so passengers could enjoy listening to 
music, watching movies, or reading an assortment of newspapers and magazines. 
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The whole atmosphere of the jet was one of sophistication, moving passengers to be 
cordial, dress in their best clothes, and feel privileged to fly.  Fortune author Paul 
Lukas claimed, “The Boeing 707 was the single most transformative event in the 
annals of twentieth century flight. It affected everything from heavy industry to 
tourism, killed the railroads and ocean liners, while having a cosmopolitan 
sophistication.”18 An editorial in the Las Vegas Review Journal praised the size and 
speed of passenger jets, claiming, “New jets carry upwards of 100 passengers 
where the present conventional planes average around 60. The speed of the jets will 
be so fantastic that a trip from New York to Las Vegas will take only as much time as 
a jaunt from Denver to Las Vegas does now.”19 But, jets also had their downsides. 
Among the biggest complaints about jets were ground noise and engine 
exhaust. The decibel level of jets taking off and flying over residential neighborhoods 
with high engine power thrust settings drew the ire of city residents who vociferously 
complained about the noise and in some cases, their homes shaking. Associate 
Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics T.A. Heppenheimer 
has noted, “When the jetliners entered service, complaints from homeowners were 
soon as loud as the engines themselves. People were soon bombarding the new 
FAA and their congressmen with angry letters. The FAA administrator, Elwood 
Quesada, had to get an unlisted phone number because people were waking him up 
with phone calls at three and four o‟clock in the morning.”20 In Las Vegas, to control 
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noise, airport officials implemented curfews late at night prohibiting passenger jets 
from taking off, and they restricted planes from turning over residential 
neighborhoods at low altitudes. McCarran Airport even installed special takeoff pads 
tilted downhill to lessen the sound of jet engine noise on takeoff. With more than 128 
takeoffs each day in 1963 and surrounded by residential areas, McCarran prided 
itself on being a good neighbor by reducing jet noise as much as possible.21  
Another drawback of the jet engine was the exhaust constantly spewing out of 
the tail cone, consequently adding to city pollution. Even though jet fuel (kerosene 
and water) burned cleaner than regular aviation gas that fueled the radial engines of 
DC-4s and Lockheed Constellations, which too belched large white clouds of 
exhaust, residents living near airports complained to airport authorities about the 
smell of jet exhaust. With little that airport officials could do to remedy the situation, 
the airlines continued to lease more jets. 
 Edmund Converse, CEO of Las Vegas‟s hometown Bonanza Airlines, 
purchased three Douglas DC-9 twin-engine turbojets. The DC-9, which cost $3 
million to manufacture, configured for 75-100 passengers, was quieter, faster, and 
could fly farther distances without refueling than the F-27 turboprop currently in 
use.22 Clocking a top speed of nearly 500 miles per hour, the DC-9 quickly became a 
favorite with the traveling public that could now arrive in Los Angeles from Las 
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Vegas in 50 minutes instead of the hour and a half in the F-27.23 By adding DC-9s to 
its fleet, Bonanza put pressure on the highly competitive Las Vegas to Los Angeles 
route. The airline added ten daily non-stop flights at a price of $13 round-trip to 
compete with Western‟s “Thrift Air” flights where passengers paid $26 to fly round-
trip on Douglas DC-6B propeller-driven planes.24 While Bonanza did not make as 
much of a profit from these discount fares because Las Vegas was a low-yield, high-
volume market, the airline made up the difference by replacing its DC-3 fleet with F-
27s. The F-27‟s modern, turbine engines operated far more fuel efficiently than the 
inefficient radial engines on the DC-3.25  
The airlines also offered three daily round-trip flights from Las Vegas to Reno 
and five daily non-stop flights to Phoenix.26 This drew the praise of Nevada Senators 
Alan Bible and Howard Cannon who jointly commended the CAB for, “Recognizing 
that the continued growth of both Las Vegas and Reno fully justified a 
commensurate expansion of airline service.”27 Any flight under 100 miles was not 
economical for the DC-9 because jets operated most efficiently at higher altitudes, 
faster speeds, and longer distances, so Converse kept F-27s and a few DC-6s for 
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the short hops. Bonanza in 1967 transported 1,005,193 passengers and generated 
$20,840,000 - more than at any time in the airline‟s history.28 
On July 1, 1961, United, Bonanza, TWA, and Western were joined by a new 
competitor, Delta Airlines, which inaugurated its service to Las Vegas with a 58 
passenger seat propeller-driven Douglas DC-7 originating in Atlanta with stops in 
Birmingham, Alabama, and Dallas, Texas.29 With the help of Nevada Senator Alan 
Bible, Delta filled a badly needed niche for visitors and Las Vegans. Testifying 
before the Civil Aeronautics Board, Bible claimed, “It is clear to me this outstanding 
potential for future development of tourist facilities, the Las Vegas area is peculiarly 
in need of good air transportation service to all parts of this nation. People of the 
South and Southeast portions of the country will now be able to come to Nevada and 
the far west directly. No part of the State of Nevada has ever had good, one-carrier 
air transportation service to any part of the Southeast.”30 Delta‟s arrival in Las Vegas 
was significant because prior to that time, no airline serving Las Vegas offered 
passenger service to southern and southeastern cities. A Delta Air Lines official 
observed, “On July 1, 1961, a Delta Air Lines‟ jet (DC-8) departed Las Vegas, 
crossed the continent, and opened a new economic highroad between this city and 
the Southeast. The Las Vegas authority helped mark the transformation of Delta, 
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once a regional carrier, into a transcontinental airline.”31 The new airline boasted a 
nationwide fleet that included 18 jets – Douglas DC-8s, Convair 880s, and by 1965, 
an all jet fleet. 
Hailing the airline‟s new service to Las Vegas, Al Adams, Las Vegas Airport 
Sales Manager, proclaimed, “With this service, Delta provides an excellent 
opportunity for people of the South and Southwest to visit Las Vegas and in turn, 
give residents of Nevada convenient service to do some visiting themselves.”32 The 
airline‟s first year in Las Vegas brought a seventy percent increase in air travelers in 
the Las Vegas market.33 And on June 1 1962, Delta replaced its DC-7 with a 200 
passenger seat DC-8 turbojet. T.M. Miller, Delta‟s Vice-President of Sales stated, 
“Our flights have done even better than we anticipated. And we are delighted to 
report that they are profitable for Delta as well as for the Las Vegas tourist 
industry.”34 The major carriers United, Delta, and TWA were not the only airlines 
benefiting from jets. New regional airlines also began leasing jets. 
 
Regional Airlines    
In the late 1960s because of intense competition for popular West Coast 
routes, Bonanza Airlines of Las Vegas, Pacific Airlines of San Francisco, and West 
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Coast Airlines of Los Angeles, merged to form Air West, a regional airline. With its 
Douglas DC-9 jets seating 75 passengers, the airline faced stiff competition from 
California-based Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA), Western Airlines, TWA, and 
United, for the popular Las Vegas to Los Angeles, Las Vegas to San Francisco, and 
Las Vegas to Portland routes.35 The new merger set records in passenger volume 
with 106,342 passengers at McCarran Airport in the first quarter of merged 
operations.36  
In 1969, billionaire Howard Hughes purchased Air West, renaming it Hughes 
Air West. This was not the first airline he owned. In 1939, he acquired control of 
TWA with the purchase of 78% of the company‟s stock, helping the airline to grow 
and expand its network.37 With strong financial backing, he consolidated 
maintenance operations and replaced TWA‟s older fleet of Douglas DC-2s and DC-
3s with beautiful, new Lockheed Constellations that he co-designed. While Hughes 
lacked a college education and had no formal training in aeronautical engineering, 
he was an aviation genius and an astute businessman. At a young age, he formed 
his own airplane company, Hughes Aircraft, to build fast planes in which he broke 
records for round-the-world flights, which ended in ticker-tape parades in New 
York.38  
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Like his airline competitors, United, TWA, and Western, Hughes understood 
well the value of the airplane as the most popular method of transporting tourists and 
gamblers to Las Vegas. Having sold ownership of TWA for $560 million in 1966, 
Hughes bought the Air West merger for $94 million, assuming $40 million of the 
company‟s debt.39 After managerial restructuring and replacement of DC-9-10 jets 
seating 75 passengers with the newer DC-9-30 jets seating 103 passengers, the 
airline in 1974 finally witnessed a profit of $7.9 million.40 Hughes Air West performed 
exceedingly well as a competitor, especially in the Southwest market. The airline 
reported monthly passenger hauls of 254,700 passengers, a 65%-75% passenger 
load factor, making it the leading carrier in the short-haul market.41 But in the mid 
1970s, the quality of passenger service declined as the airline received numerous 
complaints from customers about tardiness, unfriendly customer service, and 
offering too few flights (such as no morning flight from Las Vegas to Reno). In fact, 
an editorial in the Las Vegas Review Journal called for more airline competition 
because it claimed Hughes Air West had a monopoly on the Las Vegas to Reno 
route and flew only four flights daily between the two cities instead of the promised 
five.42 Residents in Reno and Las Vegas complained to their city commissioners, 
who then asked the Nevada Public Service Commission to step in, seeking a 
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resolution from state legislators mandating the airline to improve the quality of its 
service.43 The airline responded to the complaints claiming it was waiting for 
approval of an application by the Civil Aeronautics Board to authorize the airline to 
fly from Las Vegas to Seattle via Reno and Portland.44 
The Civil Aeronautics Board approved the application on condition that 
Hughes Air West adjust its schedule to include a morning flight.45 Western Airlines 
also added two morning flights to Reno to become competitive with Hughes Air 
West. But the complaints did not discourage Hughes, ever the aviation 
businessman, who dreamed of making Las Vegas an aviation center and model 
metropolis. His plan involved converting McCarran Airport into a supersonic 
transportation facility capable of accommodating the Concorde, a jet capable of 
carrying 200 passengers from New York to Paris at a speed of 1,350 miles per hour 
in a little more than three hours.46 County Commissioner Bill Briare, McCarran 
Airport Manager Erle Taylor, and Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce President 
Gaylord Prather responded with “cautious optimism that Las Vegas might become 
the site of a supersonic transport air terminal serving the entire southwestern United 
States.”47 Taylor expressed his excitement about Hughes‟s endorsement that 
McCarran Airport would need further expansion including runway extensions and 
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more buildings to accommodate “jumbo airliners and the supersonic transport.”48 
County Commissioner Briare lauded Hughes for his forward thinking about 
commercial aviation‟s future in Las Vegas claiming, “This exciting suggestion by the 
Hughes people confirms our (County Commission‟s) thinking that the future of Las 
Vegas lies in the airways. We have the potential of being the world‟s largest air 
center.”49 Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce President Prather echoed the 
sentiments of Briare and Taylor, claiming, “We (Chamber of Commerce) are 
supporting expansion of the airport for jumbo jets, but believe the airport should stay 
close to the community and especially close to the tourist-oriented community of Las 
Vegas.”50  
Another part of Hughes‟s plan was to bring airplane manufacturing giant 
Boeing industries to Las Vegas. Hughes owned 40,000 acres of land around 
McCarran Airport, which included much of the Strip and offered Boeing 20,000 acres 
upon which to build an airplane manufacturing plant.51 According to Las Vegas 
Historian Eugene Moehring, Boeing considered moving to southern Nevada 
because of a less pro-union environment, warm weather, and friendly tax structure 
for businesses. The deal supposedly fell through because of months of inaction and 
Boeing‟s fear of relocating its workers to a city where they might cash their checks at 
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the casinos.52 But Boeing must have been aware of organized crime figures‟ support 
for labor unions, which was a major deterrent. Additionally, the giant airplane 
manufacturer must have known about the troubled history between Hughes and the 
Las Vegas City Council over property acquisition.  
With Hughes buying most of the casinos on the Strip and land around 
McCarran Airport, the Las Vegas City Council blocked him from acquiring any more 
property in Las Vegas for fear of his taking ownership and control of the city. The 
City Council accused him of breaking antitrust laws.53 As a result, Hughes was 
unable to realize his hopes of turning McCarran Airport into a supersonic airport for 
the Concorde. When Hughes died in 1976, his airline merged with Republic Airlines, 
a Minneapolis-based regional air carrier that less than a decade later became the 
tenth largest U.S. airline serving more cities, including Las Vegas, than any other 
airline in the nation.54 It was not long however, before Republic and other airlines 
began replacing their first generation jets with newer ones.   
 
A New Generation of Jets Comes to Las Vegas 
Like their predecessors, the propeller-driven Douglas DC-6 and the Lockheed 
Constellation, the popular Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 became outmoded as the 
airline industry continued to expand at a prolific rate and the airlines replaced their 
aging passenger jets with newer ones. In the mid- to- late 1960s, the Boeing 727, 
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737, Douglas DC-9, and the wide-bodied Boeing 747, Douglas DC-10, and 
Lockheed Tri-Star L1011 became the foundation for modern passenger jet travel. 
Able to carry even more passengers, have more fuel efficient engines, and fly even 
greater distances without refueling, this second generation of passenger jets once 
again revolutionized the commercial air travel industry.  
The Boeing 737, a twin-engine jet with a seating capacity for 126 passengers 
and a fuel range to fly non-stop from Seattle to Las Vegas, became an air traveler 
favorite because of its comfort, speed, and ability to land at smaller airports. The 
jet‟s versatility to fly short and medium distances without refueling enabled airlines to 
offer service to more cities, better air travel schedules (flight frequency), and lower 
fares because the jet was not as expensive to operate as its larger predecessor, the 
Boeing 707. This invigorated the Las Vegas market as airlines placed multiple 
orders for the 737, and its competitor, the Douglas DC-9, so they could offer flights 
to Las Vegas from smaller cities in Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona.  
Another jet that revolutionized air travel in Las Vegas was the Douglas DC-
10, a wide-bodied jet with seating for 290 passengers and the fuel range to fly non-
stop from Honolulu.55 The advent of this jumbo jet in Las Vegas marked the 
beginning of yet another revolution in commercial air travel as it and other wide-
bodied jets such as the Lockheed L-1011 and Boeing 747 enabled airlines to 
transport people from London, Paris, and Frankfurt to Las Vegas in little more than 
half a day. They also elevated Las Vegas to the level of world-class tourist cities 
such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Paris, and Tokyo. Of course the size and 
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weight of these jets meant airports such as McCarran had to extend runways to as 
long as 12,000 feet, and renovate gates with jetways to enable passengers to safely 
and comfortably enplane and deplane.56 This meant McCarran Airport officials would 
have to find additional funds for airport expansion.  
 
 Jets and Feds 
Jetports, like money, do not grow on trees. In fact, they require dollars.  
During the 1960s and 1970s the skyrocketing demand for air travel and the 
introduction of jets to airline fleets augmented air traffic and terminal congestion to 
the point that airport officials had to accelerate expensive expansion plans. Runways 
had to be lengthened and reinforced with better and more durable concrete, 
taxiways required widening and extending, aprons built, and better runway lighting 
had to be installed for jets to safely operate at night and land in bad weather. Like 
McCarran, airports in Los Angeles, San Diego, and others across the nation needed 
better air traffic control centers and airport towers, with proper equipment to handle 
increased air traffic, improved navigation equipment for airplane instrument 
approaches, and more ticket counter space, baggage carousels, and gates. To 
cover the cost, airlines and local governments once again turned to Washington.  
Federal aid for airport expansion was usually slow in coming for several 
reasons: political bickering among Democrats and Republicans in Washington D.C., 
priority placed on increased automobile travel and the need for highway 
construction, and always for budgetary concerns. Airport officials typically had to 
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plan two to three years ahead for growth needs and search for state and local 
funding. Even after Congress passed the Federal Airport Act in 1946, which 
promised $500 million over seven years for new airport construction, expansion, and 
improvement of the nation‟s commercial airports amounted to a mere trickle. Each 
year‟s allocation constituted less than one-half of what President Harry S. Truman 
requested because Congress claimed the allocations would add to the national 
deficit.57 In the end however, the government – airline industry partnership endured 
and federal funding continued.  
 After President Truman appointed an Air Policy Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the nation‟s air travel system, Congress approved a 
recommended $40 million for continued government subsidization of the airlines, 
modernization of the nation‟s airways, installation of weather navigation systems, 
and research and development programs for better aviation technology. In 1953, 
under the Federal Aid Airport Act, Congress appropriated $13 million for airport 
expansion and other aviation facilities improvements.58 Because of increased air 
travel demand, and rapid growth of the airline industry, the appropriation increased 
to $30 million in 1954 and in 1959, $58 million.59  
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961) ordered a task force to 
undertake a comprehensive study on the state of the commercial airline industry and 
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the nation‟s airports. The task force‟s findings clearly showed insufficient funding to 
airports needing to upgrade their facilities to meet the needs of the airlines and air 
travelers. Yet, the budget-conscious Republican administration felt no sense of 
urgency and believed that the previous allocations were sufficient. Eisenhower 
instead prioritized funding to improve the nation‟s highways and roads under the 
Federal Highway Act of 1956.60 While this piece of legislation was an enormous 
boon for the oil, automobile, construction, and trucking industries, and before 
advanced highway safety, it overlooked the explosive growth of air travel, which by 
the late 1950s surpassed train travel and closely rivaled the automobile. After 
Eisenhower left office, funding for commercial air travel during the Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations (1961-1969) substantially increased largely due to a steady 
growth in air traveler volume and the number of aircraft in service.  
In a letter to the Senate and House of Representatives, President Kennedy 
wrote, “Air Commerce since the enactment of the Federal Airport Act of 1946 has 
grown so rapidly that many existing airport facilities are both overburdened and 
underequipped. The increase in speed, weight, and capacity of jet age aircraft has 
already antiquated existing airports and threatens to outmode many more.”61 From 
1963-1967, the number of commercial aircraft increased from 87,267 to 116,796 and 
                                                          
60
 Ellis L. Armstrong and Michael C. Robinson  and Suellen M. Hoy  A History of Public Works in the United 
States (Washington D.C.: American Public Works Association, 1976), 197.  
 
61
 President John F. Kennedy to the Senate and House of Representatives 24 April 1961. Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 4 vols. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961-
1963), 315-316.  
 
118 
 
the passenger volume which barely exceeded 126 million in 1963 nearly doubled.62 
In response, the Kennedy Administration in conjunction with the Congress increased 
the annual allocation to airports to $75 million a year. President Lyndon Johnson 
increased it again to $200 million a year.63 In May 1970, Congress passed the 
Airport and Airway Development Act which provided even greater funds for airports 
in the amount of $250 million for facilities and equipment and $150 million for airport 
construction projects.64 Airport officials essentially looked at airport improvement 
design based on passenger conveniences, airline efficiency, economy in 
construction, and operational safety. McCarran Airport in Las Vegas quickly 
emerged as a leading candidate for airport improvement funding.  
 
The New McCarran Jetport 
In 1960, after Las Vegas voters approved the $5 million bond, Airport Director 
Gordon Miles and his staff began the expansion of McCarran Airport immediately. 
The plan was to extend the airport eastward across neighboring desert flats to 
provide additional necessary space for both passenger jets and charter planes.65 
Contractors lengthened runways, widened taxiways, and enlarged the terminal, but 
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with 99 flights per day and over one million passengers passing through the 
terminal, the airport still lacked sufficient space.  
In 1961, with the help of a federal grant of $943,121 procured by Nevada 
Senators Alan Bible and Howard Cannon, construction of a new jetport named 
McCarran Airport, began at a different location, today Paradise Road and Russell 
Road.66 The new jetport, completed in 1963, consisted of a 262,000 square-foot 
clam-shell shaped three-level terminal with airline ticket counters, baggage 
carousels, the Flight Deck Restaurant, the Omni Bar, shops that annually brought in 
more than $34 million, terminal gates, two runways (one 10,200 feet in length, and 
the other 8,900 feet in length), taxiways, and a 239,610 square-yard apron for 
commercial airline use only, and parking spaces for automobiles.67  
The new McCarran jetport opened on March 15, 1963. In its first year, the 
facility handled over 1.5 million passengers and averaged 128 flights a day.68 Seven 
airlines served McCarran including Pacific Airlines, Delta, and American, and the 
original four – Bonanza, United, TWA, and Western. A spokesman for Lembke 
Construction Company of Nevada publicly proclaimed, “There are few airports in the 
country that can compare in facilities and design to the McCarran Field Terminal.”69 
The Las Vegas Review-Journal praised the Airport as the embodiment of 
“determination and vision when the prospect of air transportation had become an 
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integral part of the development of Las Vegas and the new McCarran Airport 
Terminal.”70 The building of this new airport was significant because it confirmed 
what had been happening since the beginning of commercial aviation in Las Vegas: 
the city was becoming increasingly dependent on commercial airlines to deliver 
tourists and business travelers, and the airlines themselves were becoming a critical 
and growing part of the city. In a letter to McCarran Airport Director Gordon Miles, 
Senator Bible congratulated him on the new airport, saying, “Please accept my 
congratulations for one of America‟s most modern airports. The completion of this 
facility really puts Nevada into the jet age, and I predict that the tremendous 
passenger volume will soar to even greater heights in the foreseeable future. This 
airport is a living testimonial to harmonious and productive cooperation between the 
federal and local governments.”71 Las Vegas finally had a large enough airport to 
handle more than one million passengers and more than double the flights of 1960. 
In October 1967, the passenger volume rose to 683,773, setting a record for 
the largest monthly passenger volume in airport history.72 The new jetport needed 
much more space, and was operating $1 million in the red because of larger 
overhead costs, which included maintenance and upkeep, and a larger airport 
staff.73  Airport Manager Earl Taylor, who replaced Gordon Miles in 1966, claimed it 
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would take the airport two years to get out of debt due to the great influx in tourism 
and air travel that were increasing too fast for the airport to keep up with them.74 He 
and his staff immediately moved forward with plans for further expansion. Their plan 
called for doubling the size of the terminals, lengthening runways, widening the 
taxiways, and adding 36 more gates.75 The construction got underway in 1968. 
Completion of the expansion project on September 6, 1974 carried with it a 
hefty price tag of $30 million.76 This time, county commissioners found a new source 
of funding to avoid antagonizing local residents every time the airport needed 
additional facilities. Bonds were sold to businesses and wealthy city residents that 
cost the taxpayers nothing. The airport was finally able to pay for its own expenses 
because it made a tremendous profit from increasing landing fees, leasing the gates, 
ticket counters, and baggage carousels to commercial airlines, and terminal space to 
concessions (slot machines monthly brought in $100,000 in revenue, as did food 
courts and shops), in addition to the sale of the bonds.77 McCarran Airport revenue 
was essential because the metropolitan area‟s population base of 125,787 residents 
in 1970 made it difficult for the county to rely on taxpayers as the primary source of 
funding for airport expansion.78 The airport had to become self-sustaining and it did. 
But, the newly completed expansion project was inadequate, and in fact, symbolized 
                                                          
74
 Ibid. 
 
75
 Ibid. 
 
76
 Las Vegas Sun, 11 June 1998, p.8E. 
 
77
 Ibid. 
 
78
 Moehring, Resort City in the Sunbelt, 109. 
 
122 
 
a problem for Las Vegas. A constant need for airport expansion, growing urban 
population, and skyrocketing passenger volume presented city and airport officials 
the challenge of keeping up. Sun and fun, gambling, entertainment, conventions, 
and jobs, kept the masses coming to Las Vegas, which in turn, required more flights, 
a larger airport, and bigger casino resort hotels.     
By 1973, the passenger volume reached five million travelers, too many for 
the $30 million expansion project.79 By 1976, the airport struggled to handle 317 
daily arrivals, and an annual passenger volume of 5,944,433, with projections of ten 
million in 1980.80 Plans that had been drawn up by airport contractors Landrum & 
Brown for the next two decades had to be changed. The contractors urged the 
airport to immediately purchase 3,000 more acres of land for further runway 
extension, more taxiways, a strengthened apron for heavy jets, a new runway in 
1990, and 69 additional gates by 1995.81 It also recommended that the old airport 
acquire additional property for construction of a new terminal, runways, and taxiways 
for general aviation and charter operators. The projected price was $276,575,700.82 
In 1976, Airport Director Erle Taylor hired TRA, another airport consulting 
company, to get a second bid (it was common for airports to offer bids to multiple 
contractors to find the best offer). In its 1979 executive summary, TRA 
recommended construction of a third runway at the new airport, terminal expansion 
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to include three satellites, and a people mover system.83 Planners for TRA and 
Landrum & Brown clearly recognizing the need for immediate expansion reported, 
“The terminal building is now burdened with more passengers and airplanes that it 
can comfortably accommodate…. Every part of the facility is overcrowded, from 
ticketing and baggage areas to coffee shops and restrooms.”84 Both firms also 
predicted that by 1995, “passenger loads would exceed 30 million and the number of 
commercial aircraft seeking to use the airfield would more than double.”85 TRA won 
the contract and began construction in 1980. But the overarching question was: 
once again how to fund the airport‟s expansion?  
To help finance the cost of expansion through the Airport Development Aid 
Program the Federal Aviation Administration provided $106,253,900 in funding, 
leaving airport officials to come up with $170,321,800, which they did through bond 
sales, charging the airlines takeoff and landing fees and rent for ticket counter space 
and concourse gates, concession fees, and slot machine revenue.86  
 
The Resort City in the Desert Grows   
In the 1960s and 70s, as major airlines United, Western, Delta, TWA, and 
smaller regional and charter airlines delivered millions of worldwide passengers to 
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Las Vegas, McCarran Airport did not expand alone. The city‟s casino resort industry 
also erected larger and more elegant properties. With the airline industry booming, 
casino executives in cooperation with the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, the 
Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority, and McCarran Airport, sought ways to 
attract as many air travelers as possible. They did this by building high-rise, super 
luxurious resorts. The 700 room Caesars Palace was one of the first, a 
quintessential first-class resort completed in 1966 by Cabana motel chain owner Jay 
Sarno, an award-winning designer, builder, and hotelier.87   
With approval from Teamsters Union President Jimmy Hoffa and mobster 
Murray Humphrey‟s front man Allen Dorfman, Sarno received $20 million from the 
Teamsters Union Pension Fund to develop the property, the most money ever spent 
on a resort.88 In an attempt to quash the deal the FBI leaked a wiretap report to 
Sandy Smith, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, fingering Sarno as a front man for 
the Chicago mafia.89 While the negative publicity angered mafia bosses, the public 
still felt no qualms over gambling, shopping, and staying at the European-styled 
resort. With its ancient Roman theme, including fountains and statues, and an eight 
hundred seat Circus Maximus patterned after the Coliseum, Caesars was the place 
in town for performances by top entertainers including Frank Sinatra, Ella Fitzgerald, 
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Paul Anka, Tony Bennett, and others.90 More than 20,000 people daily walked 
through the property‟s doors. They gambled, dined at five-star restaurants and 
buffets, shopped, and sunbathed by the resort‟s Olympic-sized and lavishly 
decorated swimming pools.91  
Sarno would be outdone by Kirk Kerkorian, a former crop duster, cargo pilot, 
and charter airline owner from southern California who too wanted to establish 
himself in Las Vegas as a casino resort magnate. In 1969, Kerkorian built the largest 
casino resort in Las Vegas‟s history, the $60 million International Hotel, a towering 
property with 1,600 rooms and a 30,000 square foot casino, symbolizing a new era 
in the casino resort industry.92 One of the largest hotels in the world, it attracted top 
entertainers to Las Vegas including Barbra Streisand, Sammy Davis Jr., Dean 
Martin, Dom DeLuise, Joey Bishop, Johnny Carson, and others.  The stars typically 
commissioned $100,000 a week and filled auditoriums with hotel guests and local 
residents nightly.93 Three years later, he would trump the International by building 
the $120 million, 2,089-room MGM Grand, a massive property based on the 1932 
Hollywood film Grand Hotel, where five guests who never met, spend two days 
interacting in Berlin‟s plush and luxurious Grand Hotel. The MGM housed an 
enormous casino, two showrooms – one for the entertainers and the other for 
production shows, Olympic-sized swimming pools, health spas, and restaurants run 
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by world-class chefs.94 With the casino-resorts responding to the growing air travel 
and tourism industries by expanding their properties or building larger, newer ones, 
the symbiotic relationship between the airlines, airport, and casino-resorts 
strengthened. According to Paul Titus, Director of Marketing, Advertising, and 
Tourism at the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority, future outlook plans for 
continued hotel room expansion called for 49,000 total rooms by 1980, and 64,000 
by 1985.95  
Construction of these new resorts also created jobs. The casinos needed 
gaming dealers, bartenders, cocktail waitresses, hotel registration staff, managers, 
and maintenance personnel, which kept unemployment low. Keith Schwer, Director 
of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas‟s Center for Business and Economic 
Research, has explained that the city‟s circle of growth “starts with the building of 
new resorts, which results in larger visitor volumes, which results in increased 
gaming revenue, which results in more employment, which results in more 
population, which results in more home construction, and more personal income.”96  
Low taxation on businesses and a favorable year-round climate also 
prompted business from other cities to relocate to Las Vegas. An article in Holiday 
magazine claimed, “The city extols its broad streets, ranch-style homes, first-rate 
schools, eighty-one church groups, four hospitals, and no state income tax. Most 
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Las Vegans felt satisfied with their city and its economy. If outsiders like U.S. 
senators did not agree, let them stay away from this amusing, colorful, and 
interesting town.”97  
In 1978, Las Vegas was a maturing city with a population nearing 165,000 
residents, churches, schools (including the city‟s first university, the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas, which opened in 1957), and parks.98 With the explosive 
increase in air travel to Las Vegas, a larger and more cosmopolitan airport and 
expanding casino resorts, the city stood to benefit from public works projects such 
as the construction of Bond Road (today Tropicana Avenue, an eight lane major 
route connecting the airport with downtown), which enabled tourists, business 
travelers, and conventioneers arriving at McCarran Airport to speed to the Las 
Vegas Strip in less than ten minutes. This prompted McCarran Airport Director Erle 
Taylor to include $900,000 in his budget for upgrading roadway systems.99 All of this 
underscored the importance of commercial air travel and its affect on cities, including 
Las Vegas.  
Western Historian Earl Pomeroy confirmed that, “Air service ultimately 
justified much of the confidence of its [Las Vegas‟s] advocates, transforming cities 
and their tributary territory at least as much as ship and railroad had done earlier. 
Within two decades, between the 1950s and the 1970s, Las Vegas became the 
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fastest-growing metropolitan area in the mountain states region after patrons of its 
casinos began arriving by air.”100 
 
Tourism Grows in Las Vegas 
By 1976, Convention and Visitor Authority statistics showed that Las Vegas 
had become the number one tourist destination in the country with 9.8 million 
visitors, a 6.8% increase from 1975, and 44% increase from 1970.101 Four million of 
these visitors arrived by plane.102 The city‟s tourist increase mirrored the larger 
national trend in air travel. Between 1955 and 1978, the number of airline travelers in 
the United States rose from 41 million to 275 million.103 The post-war increase in 
population, in affluent Americans, and in a well-employed working class, all 
contributed to a staggering tourist growth that was bigger than that of any other 
industry in the nation. The airlines and travel agents took advantage of a growing 
consumerism that focused on travel by using massive promotions of economy fares 
and package vacations.104    
Until this time, airline passengers usually consisted of leisure class travelers 
who could afford long, expensive trips, and businessmen who chose air travel for its 
speed and became its most frequent fliers. After World War II, modern mass tourism 
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– middle and working class fliers encouraged the airline industry to democratize air 
travel by introducing coach service with economy fares and package deals. Pan 
Am‟s President Juan Trippe called the introduction of coach class service the third 
major milestone in aviation history; Lindbergh‟s famous 1927 flight from New York to 
Paris being the first and the advent of the jetliner the second.105 When the smaller 
non-scheduled airlines began specializing in fast, efficient, total coach service, the 
big four airlines - - United, TWA, Pan Am, and American - - jumped on the wagon 
and set up first class, business class, and coach class.106  
As air travel grew, tourism grew. Travelers had to have a place to stay, which 
prompted the airlines to convince the hotel industry to get involved building hotels 
wherever there were airline passengers. By the 1960s, “there were Hiltons, Hyatts, 
and Sheratons to house deplaning Americans almost everywhere.”107 The advent of 
credit cards further accelerated air travel and hotel stays. Pan Am adopted the 
slogan, “Fly now and pay later,” and attracted thousands of domestic and 
international travelers.108 Travel agents picked up on the credit policy, and booked 
their customers a complete travel agenda with airline tickets, transportation service, 
and hotel service, all on the credit plan.109  
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The introduction of coach class travel, the ability to fly using a credit card, and 
the use of jets changed the nature of air travel. The focus of airline travel in pre-war 
days was on the excitement and prestige of flying.  The selling point was the 
airplane. But as planes became larger, flew faster and higher, and were crowded 
with coach fare travelers, the focus of the trip became the destination. Las Vegas 
capitalized on this through larger casinos, more luxurious and comfortable hotel 
rooms, premier entertainment, top recreation facilities, nicely manicured golf 
courses, and excellent customer service. With the partnership of jetliners, the jetport, 
the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority, the Las Vegas Chamber of 
Commerce, and government funding, Las Vegas became an ideal model for selling 
the destination, a winning technique for making the passenger volume mushroom. 
Airlines billed Las Vegas as a desert tourist attraction.   
In 1960, Western Airlines transported 21,501 passengers to Las Vegas, TWA 
18,103, and United 11,370.110 A decade later, those numbers increased more than 
ten-fold when Western Airlines monthly transported more than 231,000 passengers, 
Hughes Air West 224,000, United 151,000, and TWA 141,000.111 With such a 
significant increase in passenger volume, the Flamingo Hotel opened a “flight wing” 
to help guests with reservations and accommodations on Hughes Air West, TWA, 
United, and Western.112 The MGM Grand and Riviera Hotels opened Delta Airlines 
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ticket offices where guests could purchase one-way travel to Atlanta on the Tri-Star 
L1011 for $154 in first class, or $123 in coach.113 Guests also could purchase one-
way travel to Charlotte via Atlanta on the Tri-Star L1011 for $170 in first class or 
$136 in coach.114 
In 1970, for a modern desert city with a metropolitan population of 273,000, 
and more than four million air travelers annually arriving at McCarran Airport, and a 
booming tourism industry, Las Vegas‟s future looked endlessly bright. The 
passenger volume and airport growth was phenomenal compared to Phoenix, 
another Southwest desert city with a population of 470,000 and a passenger volume 
of 2.9 million travelers, or San Diego with a population of 697,000 and a passenger 
volume of 3.3 million.115 But, problems with government regulation of the airline 
industry and the airlines themselves led to a major shakeup that strongly affected 
the nation, including Las Vegas.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND THE MEGA-RESORTS 
      
In the 1970s, the continued public demand for more airplane seats, and tight 
government regulation of fares, routes, and flight frequency led to problems. The 
Civil Aeronautics Board, the government agency tasked with overseeing the airline 
industry, worked hand in glove with the airlines to assure a profit by awarding them 
the most financially lucrative air routes. United, TWA, Delta, American, and Eastern 
dominated the best national markets and busiest airports including Atlanta, Chicago, 
Minneapolis, and Dallas. With government protection through adjustable fares and 
subsidization of mail transport, these major carriers did not have to worry about 
filling all of their seats.  
At the same time, regional carriers such as Southwest, PSA, and AirCal, 
offering lower fares and service to small cities, especially in California and Texas, 
experienced completely filled flights and sought access to larger markets. The Civil 
Aeronautics Board denied them entry because the major airlines protested these 
new discount carriers as unfair competition. Although regulation prevented the major 
airlines from charging customers unreasonably high prices and mandated federal 
approval for any airfare changes, ticket prices typically remained high.  
This drew criticism from industry experts such as Peter Ueberroth, President 
and Chairman of the Board of First Travel Corporation, who argued that deregulating 
the airline industry would be an ideal solution to the problem.1 With the major airlines 
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monopolizing the nation‟s markets, and the quality of their customer service 
declining, Ueberroth argued deregulating the industry would ensure fair competition 
among all air carriers, passenger service to small cities through a hub and spoke 
system, lower fares, and better quality customer service.2 
Also stoking the deregulation debate was the surging price of jet fuel. In 1973, 
the OPEC crisis caused the price of oil to skyrocket, severely impacting the cost of 
jet fuel.  Prior to the crisis, jet fuel cost $.10/gallon. Afterward it rose to $1.00/gallon, 
deeply threatening airline profitability because of gas guzzling jet engines.3 In 
response, the CAB increased fares to compensate the airlines for lost revenue, a 
move that angered the traveling public and prompted numerous complaints to 
Congress. Furthermore, airline profit losses exceeding $150 million portended an 
ominous future unless something substantive was done.4 Congress began 
considering alternative solutions, including deregulation, which would mark an 
important shift in the pattern of government involvement in the airline industry but not 
by any means eliminate the partnership.  
Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy and Nevada Senator Howard 
Cannon spearheaded the exploration of deregulating the airline industry.5 Senator 
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Kennedy, long considered the leader of the liberal wing of the Democrat Party, had 
ambitions for the White House and needed a cause to win votes. But, as the national 
economy reeled from both stagnation and inflation in the OPEC era, the Republican 
Party moved toward embracing the candidacy of a conservative former governor of 
California named Ronald Reagan. Republican attacks on government programs 
became a mainstay of United States political culture. Thus taking on the political 
issue of deregulating something so big and powerful as the airline industry, had 
enormous potential. But, it also presented an opportunity for the Democrats. 
Kennedy‟s friend, future Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer suggested ousting 
the CAB, so Kennedy could “be seen as a champion of the growing movement to 
curb the size of big government.”6  
Kennedy‟s toughest challenge for writing the bill and getting it passed would 
be to convince his colleague, the powerful senior Democratic Senator from Nevada, 
Howard Cannon, to join him. Everything connected with airlines was Cannon‟s 
territory. In 1963, he was appointed to the prestigious Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee, and its Aviation and Surface Transport Subcommittee.7 
Cannon, a former bomber pilot in the Army Air Corps during World War II, and later, 
a pilot in the Air Force Reserve, long had been interested in aviation and aviation 
policy. He was well aware of the need to improve the nation‟s aviation infrastructure 
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and strengthen national defense.8 Following in Senator Patrick McCarran‟s 
footsteps, his post on the Interstate Foreign Commerce Committee and Aviation 
Surface Transport Subcommittee gave him jurisdiction over the Civil Aeronautics 
Board and the Federal Aviation Administration where he could use his power to 
influence aviation policy. He also chaired the Senate Rules Committee, which 
governed all congressional committees including Kennedy‟s.9 Cannon was strongly 
interested in airline issues, and felt, “Airlines were as essential to the development of 
Las Vegas, as air conditioning and dice.”10 He had lent a helping hand to charter 
airlines coming to Las Vegas who sought a loosening of Civil Aeronautics Board 
restrictions. Cannon would be a powerful ally for Kennedy.  
In their investigation, Cannon and Kennedy concluded that deregulating the 
airline industry would allow other airlines to enter the market and create greater 
competition and cheaper fares. Airlines could determine which destinations they 
would fly to, offer as many flights to those destinations as possible, expand existing 
markets, and create new ones.11 Airlines would not have to wait months and even 
years for the CAB to approve their route applications, creating greater market 
efficiency.  
Deregulation seemed a winning solution to many problems, but the opposition 
was formidable. Aviation Journalist Thomas Petzinger Jr. observed, “The major 
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airlines had some of the most powerful Washington lobbyists on retainer. They had 
operations in all fifty states and in hundreds of congressional districts. The airlines 
could count on the support of big labor in fighting anything that threatened high fares 
because high fares meant high wages.”12 Also, with more airline competition and jets 
serving the nation‟s airports, air traffic congestion would become problematic.13 
Kennedy and Cannon however, were joined by Democratic President Jimmy Carter 
who appointed Alfred Kahn, Professor of Economics at Cornell University and a 
strong advocate of deregulation to head the CAB. With that appointment the major 
airlines did not stand a chance of winning.14 United, Delta, American, Eastern, and 
Continental no longer would have CAB protection. On April 19, 1978, the Senate 
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the bill 83 to 9.15 After a short delay the bill finally 
passed the House by a vote of 363 to 8.16 On October 31, 1978, President Carter 
signed the Airline Deregulation Act into law. He declared, “For the first time in 
decades, we have deregulated a major industry.”17  
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After forty years of federal oversight, the law finally gave airlines the freedom 
to “decide where they would fly and what fares they would charge.”18 Smaller air 
carriers such as Sky West, Pacific Southwest Airlines, Air Cal, and Republic Airlines 
aggressively entered new markets, offering cheap fares, convenient flight schedules, 
and undercut their competitors. As a result, markets nationwide proliferated as 
airports became inundated with more flights and air travelers. Floyd Hall, Chief 
Executive Office of Eastern Airlines declared, “This was the time when the airlines 
finally came of age. Ever since they started carrying coach passengers, they had 
been growing faster than any other American industry. But now they became big 
time business.”19 They especially became big time business in Las Vegas. 
 
More Airlines Come to Las Vegas 
Congressional passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 could not have 
come at a better time for Las Vegas. Still sensitive to its historic associations with 
sex, drugs, and organized crime, Las Vegas set out to seriously recreate its image 
into a new modern metropolis resembling other well-known cities in the nation and 
the world. Construction of exquisite high-rise casino-resorts run by Wall Street 
corporations instead of mafia bosses, an ambitious $30 million McCarran 
International Airport expansion plan, and seventeen airlines bringing seven million 
passengers to Las Vegas helped the city extricate itself from its hedonist past. If Las 
                                                          
18
 Ibid. 
 
19
 Carl Solberg, Conquest of the Skies: A History of Commercial Aviation in America (Boston and Toronto: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1979), 395. 
 
138 
 
Vegas was going to compete for tourists with other rapidly growing western cities 
such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego, it had to offer something 
unique, something different aside from gambling that unmistakably would distinguish 
it from its competitors. A man-made erupting volcano, pirate ship battle, jousting 
tournament, and dancing water fountains along the city‟s most famous avenue would 
do just that. As historian Hal Rothman described it, “The Strip became a world-class 
center of entertainment encased in a fantasyland portrayal of time and space…. It 
offered a world fantastic and unreal, yet simultaneously tangible and available for 
purchase.”20 This Las Vegas “experience” became the new attraction that annually 
drew millions of tourists. But, these tourists somehow had to get there and the 
primary vehicle transporting them was the passenger plane.  
In 1979, the jump in the number of airlines serving Las Vegas from seven to 
seventeen was remarkable for a high passenger volume, low profit yield leisure 
market, even in comparison to the high passenger volume, high profit yield business 
markets of Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York dominated by the 
major airlines.21 Because the latter cities predominantly attracted business and 
international travelers who were willing to pay higher fares, Las Vegas was just the 
opposite - - a leisure market attracting middle and lower-income tourists through 
bargain-basement fares. With low-fare airlines like Southwest, America West, and 
National entering the Las Vegas market, and casino-resorts such as the Landmark, 
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MGM Grand, and Caesars Palace offering discounted room rates, it was a winning 
combination for Las Vegas and it had been made possible by airline deregulation. 
Duane Busch, TWA Executive Station Manager in Las Vegas explained how 
deregulation “afforded middle and lower income people the opportunity to travel.”22 
Southwest offered one-way fares from Las Vegas to Los Angeles and other 
California destinations for $29, making it extremely difficult for United, Delta, and 
other major airlines to match.23 America West and National followed Southwest‟s 
lead by creating their own niches through cheap “red-eye” flights and low-fare 
transcontinental flights from Las Vegas to East Coast cities. For airlines like 
Southwest, America West, and National that embraced the business model of low 
fares, multiple flights, and excellent customer service, deregulation provided a major 
boon. Phoenix, Las Vegas, San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other 
western cities enjoyed the benefits of having a larger clientele of business and 
leisure travelers.24  
 
Airline Deregulation Challenges 
While airline deregulation brought great benefits to these cities, it also initially 
created problems for the airlines. Small airlines still needed to elbow their access to 
larger city hubs dominated by the major carriers. Competition proved fierce for all air 
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carriers and ill-conceived marketing strategies made even the most time-honored 
airlines vulnerable. Essentially, deregulation as Thomas Petzinger Jr. put it, 
threatened to plunge the entire airline industry into chaos. 
Appearing before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the United States House 
of Representatives Committee and Transportation Infrastructure, Joseph Leonard, 
CEO of Air Trans claimed smaller airlines such as his could not compete in certain 
markets such as Minneapolis, Chicago, Atlanta, and Dallas because of major airline 
dominance at hub airports.25 At a hearing by the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, he and other regional airline executives expressed 
their concern about trying to compete in an environment of “predatory behavior 
where one airline accounts for more than 50% of the traffic.”26 This became 
problematic for small cities where residents had to drive to larger airports to catch 
their flights because the hub and spoke system was inconvenient. Passengers could 
not fly directly from one small city to another. Instead, they had to connect through a 
hub airport, which was time consuming. The major airlines made substantial profits 
through this hub and spoke system because connecting flights ensured larger 
passenger loads. They opposed any policy changes that threatened this system, 
including deregulation. But, the government viewed it differently. Deregulation 
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provided so many benefits to consumers nationwide that repeal of substantial 
amendment was unthinkable. 
According to the United States General Accounting Office, had Congress 
passed legislation deregulating the airline industry a decade earlier, “The airlines 
could have operated at a far lower cost, annually saving air travelers $1.4-$1.8 
billion.”27 When the Civil Aeronautics Board set fares, it was reluctant to lower them 
too much because the airlines and government needed to make profits. The high 
operating costs of passenger jets, increased wage demands by airline employees, 
and airport expansion costs required the CAB to keep fares at a considerably high 
level. This slowed passenger demand.  
During regulation, the United States General Accounting Office reported the 
Civil Aeronautics Board kept fares 22%-52% higher than they would have been 
under deregulation.28 Transcripts from the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure indicated, “During the past twenty 
years, deregulation and competition lowered fares by more than 40%. This was 
especially true when a low-cost carrier entered the market. Fares dropped by 50%. 
Three times as many people fly now is they did before deregulation.”29 Federico 
Pena, Secretary of Transportation claimed in 1995, the airline industry saved $6.3 
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billion due to low cost competition.30 A 1995 Brookings Institute study claimed that 
lower airfares saved the traveling public $12.4 billion per year.31 To Congress, 
deregulating the airline industry clearly was the appropriate course.    
According to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation records, after deregulation, regional and commuter airlines 
passenger volume grew by 20%, departures at major hubs increased by 15.7%, 
medium airport growth was up by 22.5%, and small airport growth increased by 
12.4%.32 Large cities such as Denver, Dallas, and Phoenix experienced 
unprecedented passenger volume growth because more airlines and flights 
increased business at those hub cities. For resort cities such as Las Vegas, airline 
deregulation opened the floodgates for business. Southwest, America West, and 
National Airlines took advantage of it. 
 Despite the aggregate, national statistics, deregulation‟s costs and benefits 
varied significantly and affected carriers to Las Vegas in numerous different ways. 
Las Vegas Marketing Representative for Southwest Airlines Susan Davis 
emphasized the airline‟s financial success and growth based on its philosophy of 
“the three fs: fun, fares, and frequency.”33 The airline prided itself on friendly 
customer service, offering low fares, on-time flights to more than 100 destinations 
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nationwide, and became a formidable contender in the Las Vegas market, in 1996, 
transporting 22.7% of the 30,459,965 passengers who came to McCarran 
International Airport.34 Because of its reputation, reliability, and affordability, from 
1997 to 2001, the airline led all others in passenger transportation volume, bringing 
more than 30% of the travelers to Las Vegas.35 
Founded in 1971 by an astute, aggressive, eccentric businessman who had a 
penchant for smoking several packs of Camel Cigarettes, drank Wild Turkey 
whiskey, and transported himself to and from work on a Harley Davidson 
motorcycle, Chief Executive Officer Herb Kelleher sought to dominate the national 
airline markets, which he did.36 Beginning with three Boeing 737s, offering low fares, 
and instructing flight attendants to provide excellent in-flight service, the airline 
enjoyed remarkable success as one of the most popular interstate regional airlines.37 
Originally, the airline offered service within the state of Texas and crafted its 
business model there, but within two years it sought to expand service to other cities 
in the Southwest that had underserved airports. Kelleher‟s airline soared because of 
simple marketing strategies that were specially tailored to cities like Las Vegas ready 
to accommodate a different clientele than in years past. Southwest‟s planes offered 
only one class of service that catered to all customers.  
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Offering some of the best low fares in the market, two for the price of one 
fares under their “friends fly free” program, and bonus rewards for the number of 
trips flown, Southwest quickly developed a large working-class clientele.38 With 200 
daily arrivals and departures at McCarran International Airport, Southwest with a 
primary hub in Phoenix, opened a second hub in Las Vegas, making the Nevada 
resort city the airline‟s top market.39 The airline rapidly became the air traveler‟s 
favorite. Susan Davis emphasized that the airline, “Tried to target „young-minded‟ 
travelers, but catered to all passengers…. So there really was no specific focus on 
any type of passenger.”40 The airline also strategically focused on a “short haul” 
market where the average flight did not exceed a five hundred mile radius or a flight 
time of more than two hours.41  
To improve its service the airline created many methods for quick turnarounds 
including deplaning and enplaning passengers in as little as fifteen minutes by not 
assigning seats, a strategy that effectively avoided costly delays at the gate.42 By the 
late 1990s, Southwest became so popular among tourists and gamblers it was the 
sole tenant of McCarran‟s “C” Concourse.43 According to Ginger Hardage, Vice-
President of Public Relations, the airline offered non-stop flights to 27 destinations 
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including New Orleans, Nashville, San Antonio, Tulsa, and Omaha. 44 This offered 
passengers more choices and competitive fares to those of Delta, one of 
Southwest‟s greatest competitors serving the southern United States. The 
Southwest business model of low fares and the casino-resort industry model of 
affordable room rates and many tourist attractions worked well luring middle and 
lower-income customers, enabling both to become leaders in their respective 
industries, and to grow together.   
In contrast to Southwest Airlines, America West Airlines, a strong competitor 
in the Las Vegas market, focused on the business traveler. Headquartered in 
Tempe, Arizona, and flying Boeing 737s, 757s, and Airbus A-319s and A-320s in the 
southwest and other regions of the country, America West took a different approach 
to air travel than its competitors.45 One of the airline‟s marketing managers, Jennifer 
Myers, explained, “Because the airline catered to the business traveler, it provided 
more flights in certain markets that proved to be more profitable.”46 To accomplish 
this, America West scheduled a majority of its flights to depart from Los Angeles, 
Phoenix, Las Vegas, and San Francisco so business travelers could easily make 
connecting flights to eastern destinations. Myers explained that “the airline had a 
complex system, more so than passengers just flying to Las Vegas to stay there…. 
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Las Vegas was primarily a connecting airport for a majority of America West‟s older 
passengers.”47 
The airline also created a niche by scheduling many of its flights in the 
evening and late at night (“red eye” flights) because those times for travel proved to 
be the most in demand and profitable for business and leisure travelers wanting to 
arrive on the East Coast early in the morning the next day. Since no other airline at 
McCarran International Airport offered an entire bank of late night flights, America 
West executives seized the opportunity to increase business and profits by offering 
low fares to late night fliers.48 It was a simple concept: people traveling during the 
day paid higher fares, whereas those hunting for cheaper fares flew late at night.  
According to Myers, America West‟s other innovative business practice was 
to observe a geographic region to see which airline was the most dominant and what 
their strategy was.49 America West would then move in and offer competitive fares 
and provide amenities that the other carriers did not provide in order to capture the 
lion‟s share of the market. These amenities came in the form of a first-class or 
business-class section with wider and more comfortable seats. Passengers also 
enjoyed meals and drank beverages out of real glassware instead of plastic cups. 
And the airline offered in-flight movies and multiple music stations with headphones 
to entertain passengers. This marketing strategy, in addition to low fares, enabled 
America West to compete in the Las Vegas market because that was what 
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passengers wanted: cheap and available flights, discounted hotel rooms, affordable 
entertainment, and amenities all in one location.50    
Michael Conway, Chief Executive Officer of National Airlines, Las Vegas‟s 
“hometown airline,” adopted a similar philosophy to that of America West: catering to 
the business traveler, leisure tourist, and Las Vegas resident. By offering 
inexpensive transcontinental flights from Las Vegas to eastern destinations such as 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York, Conway believed he would attract more 
business travelers and tourists than his competitors.51 For instance, in 1999 
passengers could fly round trip from Las Vegas to Miami for $238.52 Since Las 
Vegas was such a popular destination for air travelers and a city that attracted many 
businesses, Conway felt it was the ideal base for his airline. He contended that, “For 
a true hub-and-spoke market to be successful, the hub of the operation must be a 
strong destination in and of itself.”53 Also, by using one type of aircraft, the Boeing 
757, he kept the airline‟s maintenance and pilot training costs to a minimum.54 
In its first year of business, National Airlines‟ was successful, but during its 
second year, the airline went into the red for three reasons. First, the rising cost of 
fuel consumed much of the airline‟s capital, accounting for over forty percent of its 
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operating expenses.55 Like other airlines, National felt the pain of high fuel prices 
dating to the OPEC Crisis in 1973, when a domestic oil shortage and an increased 
demand for Middle Eastern oil caused oil prices to skyrocket. Subsequent spikes in 
oil prices in 1979, 1990, and 1999 also spurred airlines to raise their fares.56 From 
1988-1992, the airlines collectively had lost more than $12 billion with sharp 
increases in oil prices prompting President William Jefferson Clinton to hold an 
emergency meeting with his Cabinet and oil company executives to search for 
desperately needed solutions, none of which were found.57 Clinton blamed it on the 
government‟s “failure to create an economic climate necessary for this leading-edge 
industry [commercial aviation] to thrive at home and in an increasingly global 
economy.”58 But as long as fuel prices remained high and the airlines kept losing 
money, they became more dependent on the federal government for subsidization in 
the form of loans to help keep them afloat which was nothing new since the airline 
industry‟s inception. 
A second reason for National‟s economic strife was its route system, which 
included flights from Las Vegas to San Francisco and Los Angeles, short-haul routes 
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that were not economically sensible for gas guzzling Boeing 757s, passenger planes 
designed for long-haul transcontinental flights. The airline had placed orders for 
737s for the short-haul flights, but with massive debt and insufficient capital from 
financial backers including Harrah‟s and the Rio casino-resorts, National officials had 
to cancel the orders, and file for bankruptcy in 2000, shortly thereafter, going out of 
business.59  
A third and final problem for National was the overwhelming competition with 
other airlines serving Las Vegas. No airline received preferential treatment from the 
casino-resorts because they depended on the airlines to bring business. Though the 
idea of Las Vegas having a hometown airline was catchy to Harrah‟s Resort and 
Casino and the Rio Resort and Casino, companies that provided Conway $30 million 
of the $50 million Conway to start his airline, all airlines were equally important to 
Harrah‟s and the Rio for business.60 Las Vegas Historian Hal Rothman observed 
this, noting how, “The casinos could not afford to antagonize the major airlines. They 
depended on all of the airlines to bring them passengers, and if one of the big four 
carriers perceived the casinos as competition, the airlines could confidently move 
their seats to more lucrative routes.”61 National just could not financially compete 
with Delta, United, American, Continental, and other major air carriers.  
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As Rothman observed, some of the major and regional airlines were cutting 
back on their number of flights and seats to Las Vegas because other markets were 
more profitable. He noted, “The combination of price-sensitive vacation travelers and 
the discount packages that defined the local market meant that on a per seat basis 
when demand almost exceeded supply, business travelers between Chicago and 
Los Angeles offered far higher profit per traveler. The major airlines cut their flights 
to Las Vegas to maximize profit from market conditions.”62 Hence, when National 
Airlines CEO Conway tried to provide a new niche by offering cheap transcontinental 
flights, his airline could not remain profitable, so he began cutting flights and 
returned his Boeing 757s to leasers until the airline eventually went out of business 
in 2001. With the new competition from deregulation, some airlines like National 
went out of business while others were forced to reduce their number of flights to 
Las Vegas, or in TWA‟s case, completely pull out of the Las Vegas market.  
TWA, one of Las Vegas‟s most successful airlines since 1930, also reduced 
its number of daily flights from twenty-two to four in the 1980s, and discontinued its 
service in the Las Vegas market in the 1990s because its international routes of Los 
Angeles to Paris and domestic transcontinental routes of San Francisco to New York 
were more profitable.63 This was a better business strategy for TWA, an airline 
whose fleet mostly consisted of wide-bodied Lockheed L-1011s and Boeing 747s, 
which could carry 300-400 passengers. According to Duane Busch, “It was never 
profitable for TWA to fly to Las Vegas, hence that is why we focused on and 
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dominated the international market. A flight from New York to Paris brought in far 
more revenue than a flight from New York to Las Vegas. And many other airlines 
such as United and American followed suit.”64 But some major airlines were able to 
weather the competition because they served enough markets where they could 
afford it.  
Unlike TWA, United and American did not entirely eliminate their flights to Las 
Vegas. They were able to do this because of their sheer volume of business from 
the most profitable transcontinental routes of Los Angeles to New York or 
international routes of San Francisco to Paris enabled them to absorb the smaller 
profits in high-volume, low-yield leisure markets such as Las Vegas.65 Delta Airlines, 
a major Las Vegas air carrier, followed the same business strategy as United and 
American, offered 22 daily non-stop flights from Las Vegas to Atlanta, Cincinnati, 
Dallas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Salt Lake City.66 Servicing Las Vegas brought 
revenue for the airline, McCarran International Airport, and southern Nevada‟s 
economy. 
Delta annually contributed more than $38.5 million to southern Nevada‟s 
economy, $3 million of which comprised employee salaries, take off and landing 
fees, and ticket counter and gate rentals at McCarran Airport.67 According to Al 
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Adams, Delta‟s District Marketing Manager, “Wherever Delta flies, its presence in 
the community helps spur a city‟s economic growth. Airport jobs create buying 
power, and airlines and airline-related businesses are important customers for goods 
and services by other firms. In addition, airlines bring business people, vacationers, 
and conventioneers into a city,” all of which in the case of Las Vegas, mandated 
significant airport expansion.68 
 
 Expansion, Expansion, Expansion 
Although deregulation took the federal government out of the fare-fixing 
business, the huge expansion in air traffic that ensued would still require government 
assistance. The initiative for expansion often came from the air carriers, hoteliers, 
and airport officials. But true to form, the United States government stood by ready 
to assist in airport funding as it always had. 
Prior to airline deregulation, McCarran Airport officials in 1974 had completed 
a huge $30 million expansion project to accommodate five million travelers passing 
through its gates.69 The onslaught of seven million air travelers in 1978 and more 
jets forced them to activate their even longer-term expansion plans right away, which 
included lengthening runways, reinforcing and lengthening taxiways, providing more 
jet ways, and expanding terminals. McCarran, so conveniently located near the 
Strip, became a facilitator for the entire process. Robert Cohn, a partner with the 
airline legal firm Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, pointed out that, “Airports 
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should work hand-in-glove from the beginning with the airlines. Cities have to 
recognize the importance of air service to the economics of the community, and 
appreciate the economic power of the airport. It is the central nervous system of the 
economy. It enables the city to attract more commerce.”70 This was true of McCarran 
Airport, which by 1998, along with the airlines, pumped more than $17 billion into 
southern Nevada‟s economy.71  
Airport officials were forward thinking enough to have finished a well-thought 
out master plan for future expansion. After the Airline Deregulation Act opened the 
floodgates for more planes, more flights, and more airport slots, and certainly more 
travelers, everything changed. Airport Director John Solomon and his staff had to 
immediately revise and activate the master plan.  
Solomon, formerly Assistant Director of Tulsa Airport, and as Chairman of the 
Governmental Affairs Committee of the Airport Operators Council International, 
acknowledged that the newly renovated airport was inadequate to meet the needs of 
an explosively growing airline industry and passenger volume. He stated, “By the 
time the industry stabilized, McCarran had approximately three times the number of 
air carriers previously serviced. We needed a terminal plan to not only provide 
adequate service for seventeen existing airline tenants, but to additionally prepare 
us for anticipated future demands.”72 Looking at the logistics of the new master plan, 
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Solomon added, “We started working on roadways, a new satellite and a baggage 
claim building. Seven consulting firms and more than 1,000 persons were employed 
on the project.”73 Beginning the expansion was timely because the studies by 
Landrum & Brown and TRA accurately predicted ten million travelers passed 
through McCarran‟s gates in 1980, but dramatically fell short when the number grew 
to twenty million in 1990 and to more than thirty million by 1996.74 The expansion 
would meet several problems along the way that would find solutions.  
Since this was the most ambitious expansion plan in the history of the airport 
and city, the first problem was the cost. Phase I of “McCarran 2000,” called for a 
third runway 5,000 feet in length, expansion of the existing terminal by 1,171,000 
square-feet for a total of 1,677,650 square-feet to house 12 baggage claim 
carousels and 18 more gates, bringing the total to 54 gates.75 It also included plans 
for construction of a six-story parking structure with 3,526 parking spaces, new 
cargo facilities, a crash/fire/rescue facility, an air traffic control tower cab complete 
with radar for arriving and departing aircraft, and an automated transit system to 
shuttle passengers from the terminals to the gates.76 The cost of Phase I of this 
project totaled $315 million, exceeding initial projections of $276.6 million.77 Through 
the Airport Development Aid Program, the federal government would pay for $126 
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million of the cost, leaving the Airport to bear the remaining $189 million, which it 
would pay through $1.3 million in slot machine revenue and $187.7 million through 
bonds and take off and landing fees assessed to the airlines.78       
Another problem facing Airport Director Bob Broadbent, Solomon‟s 
successor, was a substantial underestimation in passenger volume predicted by 
Airport Planners Landrum & Brown. Whereas planners had anticipated twenty million 
passengers coming to Las Vegas by 2000, that milestone was reached ten years 
earlier in 1990. Broadbent and his staff were caught unprepared.79 Phases II and III 
of the “McCarran 2000” Master Plan, had to begin immediately. 
The plans called for more airline ticket and rental car counter space, an 
expanded baggage claim area, and an enlarged parking structure to nine stories 
with the capacity to accommodate 6,500 automobiles and commercial vehicles in 
addition to a remote parking site for overflow.80 The plans also included construction 
of two more satellite concourses, with 16 gates in the “C” concourse for Southwest 
Airlines, and 26 gates in the “D” for United, American, Delta, and other airlines. 
Phase III, which was unveiled in 1994, included plans for an airport connector and 
roadway system to give drivers easy access to the airport from Interstate 215.81  
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With the increase in the number of airlines serving McCarran International 
Airport and the explosive passenger volume as well as the construction of a second 
terminal for additional international flights, airport officials encountered significant 
problems with ground traffic congestion. Landrum & Brown‟s Airport Master Plan 
contained a provision informing airport officials that there would be heavy ground 
traffic and offered solutions to resolve them. Widening Paradise Road and Tropicana 
Avenue, as well as building additional access roads, and bypass roads to the 
terminals, would alleviate much of the congestion, especially during peak hour 
traffic.82 An important element in this expansion was the growing number of new 
airlines, including international airlines coming to Las Vegas, a fulfillment of a 
prediction by the president of a prominent travel corporation. 
 
More International Air Travel Comes to Las Vegas 
Deregulation played no small part in encouraging Las Vegas government and 
business leaders to seek lucrative international customers for travel to their city. 
Thus, during the 1990s, a high octane coalition of private entrepreneurs, local 
boosters, and federal government officials combined the city‟s aviation agenda. The 
strategy even provided a role for the nation‟s chief diplomat, the President, to help 
clear the path by negotiating liberalized international aviation agreements. The 
impact on Las Vegas would be immense. 
 As early as 1975, marketing officials advised city officials to prepare for a 
boom in international tourism and travel, a market where airlines, the airport, casino 
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resorts, and the city could make more profits. Peter Ueberroth, keynote speaker at a 
Sahara Hotel luncheon observing Nevada World Trade and Tourism Association 
Week, told local business leaders they could, “Fill hotels seven days a week if they 
can capture an exploding international tourist business.”83 He predicted that, “The 
amount of international travelers is going to overwhelm us.”84 Ueberroth urged local 
hotels to work with airlines and travel agencies to attract international travelers by 
lowering room rates, offering international flights to Las Vegas from other countries, 
and encouraging international travelers to fly during the week in addition to 
weekends. He cited statistics showing tourism nationally generated $5 billion in 1970 
and $11 billion in 1974.85 Ueberroth‟s admonition proved prescient. In the 1980s, a 
group of airports called US Airports for Better International Service, united to bring 
more foreign air carriers to the United States. The centerpiece of their plan called for 
an international “Open Skies Agreement.”86 United States presidents including Bill 
Clinton sought to promote and expand open-skies agreements. In 1995, he was able 
to broker an agreement with Canada, “deregulating the world‟s largest aviation 
market, [offering] more flights, and lower fares.”87 In 1998, he signed a bilateral 
agreement with Japan, creating a $10 billion market from annually transporting 12 
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million passengers, and over a billion pounds of cargo.88 For Las Vegas, the open-
skies agreements were vital to sustaining and growing its two primary industries 
upon which it depended for revenue: tourism and gambling. The city needed to tap 
more national and international markets, and the passenger plane helped it do this. 
According to McCarran Airport Director Broadbent, the Open Skies 
Agreement benefited the airport in many ways. First, in 1985, the number of 
international visitors comprised seven percent or 600,000 of the more than twenty 
million air travelers. A decade later that number jumped to ten percent or nearly one 
million air travelers.89 Second, it opened the door for negotiations with international 
airlines that had never served Las Vegas. Part of what prompted that search claimed 
John Hanks, head of McCarran Airport International Marketing, was a conversation 
that had taken place between Kirk Kerkorian, owner of the MGM Grand, and Bob 
Broadbent. In 1986, Kerkorian approached Broadbent asking if his air travelers could 
fill MGM hotel rooms, to which Broadbent replied, “No, we need more flights.”90  
This statement was important because it underscored what the airport 
needed to do to increase business and make Las Vegas more globally known: reach 
out to international air carriers. By establishing partnerships with international 
airlines for direct, non-stop flights, John Hanks and his staff were able over the next 
decade to add Toronto to Las Vegas flights on Air Canada, Tokyo to Las Vegas 
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flights on Japan Airlines, London to Las Vegas flights on Virgin Airlines, and 
Hermosillo to Las Vegas flights on AeroMexico.91 These new flights opened Las 
Vegas to international markets that would provide over 14% of McCarran‟s total air 
traveler volume.92 Manuel Cortez, President and CEO of the Las Vegas Convention 
and Visitors Authority especially hailed the service from Tokyo as “a boon to the 
Japanese market in Las Vegas, which accounts for the second greatest number of 
overseas visitors.”93 Herald Bomberg, Senior Vice-President of AeroMexico‟s U.S. 
Operations, praised the Hermosillo to Las Vegas route as an opening “to the 
untapped Latin American market for Las Vegas, as the city becomes AeroMexico‟s 
11th U.S. gateway.” He added, “The new non-stop service will provide an important 
link for feed traffic from other Mexican cities.”94   
With increased international travel demand and more foreign airlines coming 
to Las Vegas, Bechtel Airport Contractors drafted blueprints for an international 
terminal with eight gates for use by Japan Airlines, Mexicana, Aero Mexico, 
Canadian, Air Canada, Condor, Virgin Atlantic, and a screening area for the United 
States Customs Service.95 The growing international air travel demand prompted 
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County Commission Chairwoman Thalia Dondero to claim that an international 
terminal was needed because, “It is not only possible, but highly probable that 
passengers, if offered the chance, would rather fly direct to Las Vegas from Japan, 
for example, than to Los Angeles or San Francisco since this is the ultimate 
destination for many of them.”96  
In 1998, the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority, McCarran Airport, 
the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, the Nevada Resort Association, and the 
Nevada Development Authority united to form The Parties, whose responsibility was 
to focus on increasing both domestic and international air service to southern 
Nevada.97 According to Bill Mahaffey, Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority 
Manager, “The role of the Las Vegas Parties is to counsel the airlines of the world on 
the opportunities available for expansion of existing service or to welcome new 
service to Las Vegas.”98 Opening international markets and bringing foreign airlines 
to Las Vegas however, was not easy because the federal government first had to set 
up bilateral agreements with foreign countries to open their market to international 
travel.  
Once those agreements were set however, international travel to Las Vegas 
increased dramatically. In 1990, 800,000 international air travelers came to Las 
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Vegas. By 2000, that number increased to 1.2 million.99 While the increase in 
international passengers was a boon to tourism and the internationally-themed 
mega-resorts, airlines needed bigger jets to transport the larger numbers of air 
travelers which meant substantial work on airport runways. 
With many international airlines flying heavier wide-body aircraft to McCarran 
from Tokyo, Frankfurt, Toronto, and Seoul, especially Boeing 767s, Douglas DC-
10s, and Airbus A-340s, the airport needed to lengthen and reinforce its existing 
runways, and build new ones. This included building another runway paralleling the 
north-south runway 1-19 that would be 8,900 feet in length and 150 feet in width, 
and extending a runway paralleling the east-west runway 7-25.100 The cost of the 
runway 7-25 extension and 1-19 construction was $87 million. Other parts of the 
$500 million Phase IV expansion plan included a nine-story parking structure for 
8,000 automobiles, lengthened ticket counters, four more baggage carousels in 
Terminal 1, and a tunnel under the east-west runways to linking Interstate 215 to the 
airport.101 The plan also allowed space for more concessions in Concourses A and 
B, a pilot‟s lounge, customer service center, and restaurant with a balcony view, 
stores, more restaurants, slot machines, and other revenue producers. The 
concourse‟s walls and ceiling would be made of 66,000 square-feet of glass to give 
people in the facility an unobstructed view of the airport and the desert. The floor 
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would consist of 130,000 square-feet of imported Italian marble. With the opening of 
the “D” gates in 1997, it enabled McCarran to annually handle up to 45 million 
passengers.  
To get to the “C” and “D” gates from the terminal, travelers rode an 
Automated Transit System tram. Additionally, the airport built a $4 million, 78,500 
square-foot warehouse to handle more than 200 million pounds of cargo.102 Getting 
contracts with new passenger airlines often depended on McCarran‟s ability to 
handle cargo because low-yield markets prompted airlines to supplement income by 
also transporting freight. With the rapid expansion of the air cargo market and many 
carriers looking for new locations to increase air service and have access to land 
routes in more heavily populated areas, Las Vegas was ideally located to become a 
major West Coast cargo distribution center.103     
The Airport also financially benefited from the Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ), an 
area on the airport‟s periphery established in 1989, which allowed international 
importers duty-free storage and assembly of foreign products tax free. The FTZ 
originally consisted of a 120,000 square-foot warehouse on 160 acres with an 
adjunct 25 acres of land for future development and FTZ use.104 The FTZ was not 
only beneficial to the airport, but also to the city in that it helped diversify the 
metropolitan area‟s economy and benefited the resorts by easing the pressure to 
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raise gaming taxes. More importantly, the FTZ stimulated free trade, increased 
cargo business, and enticed businesses such as Douglas Aircraft, Levi Strauss, 
Service Merchandise, and other international companies to move their headquarters 
to Las Vegas.105  
The Free Trade Zone also inspired the County Commission to look into a 
Foreign Trade Center, which would consist of a five-story building totaling 1,700,000 
square-feet of display space, international services area, a restaurant, and meeting 
areas, all for a price of $190 million.106 But once again, rapid growth created space 
problems. Despite the airport plans for enlarged FTZ facilities, they still remained 
inadequate. By the late 1990s, officials realized that further expansion would be 
necessary as the passenger volume steadily surged toward McCarran‟s maximum 
capacity of 55 million travelers.107 
In 1999, airport planners conducted a study and concluded that the 
construction of a second major airport would be necessary to alleviate McCarran‟s 
air traffic and terminal congestion problems. In a letter to the Chairman on the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation, Clark County Director 
of Aviation Randall Walker pleaded the airport‟s desperate need for land. He 
explained that there were over 550,000 aircraft operations annually at an airport 
whose maximum capacity was 705,000, a figure that would be easily reached by 
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2013.108 Walker then estimated that without expansion the average flight would be 
delayed by at least twenty minutes, costing commercial airlines and charter carriers 
over $1,000 per delayed flight.109 He feared that the added expense might 
discourage airlines from offering more flights to Las Vegas and encourage them to 
seek more profitable markets.110 Also, there was pressure to make McCarran a 
connecting airport, which it had never been until the growth of Southwest and 
America West in the Las Vegas market necessitated it.  
 With the passenger volume steadily increasing and Southwest and American 
West increasing their presence at McCarran, it only was a matter of time before 
connecting flights became popular at McCarran. The concept of connecting flights in 
Las Vegas was new because for years, like Orlando, Las Vegas was a final 
destination for air travelers. With better year-round weather, and an efficient air 
traffic control system in place, McCarran International Airport grew to become a 
connecting flight airport for millions of air travelers. As a result, the increase in flights 
put more pressure on airport officials to expand the airport. In his letter, Walker 
indicated that, “The airport had already reached its 2,400 acre capacity with only 
enough room for “short and mid-term growth.”111 He noted that during peak periods, 
Las Vegas air traffic controllers handled over 120 hourly arrivals and departures and 
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any additional flights would saturate the system. Walker also emphasized that since 
1990, passenger traffic increased a whopping 75%.112 In fact, in 1998-1999 alone, 
the tally of the travelers passing through the airport‟s gates jumped from 30,227,287 
to 33,669,185.113 
By decade‟s end, air travel had become the most popular mode of 
transportation for tourists to southern Nevada, surpassing the automobile. It was, 
“The lifeblood of Las Vegas,” claims Duane Busch, TWA Station Manager.114 
“Without it, the city would not enjoy even half of the revenue tourists bring.”115 But 
the golden age of air travel to Las Vegas really began when the passenger volume 
between 1980 and 1990 doubled from ten million to twenty million. Eight years later 
it surpassed thirty million and in 2000, nearly reached forty million.116 The airlines 
prompted this growth and made Las Vegas a model for travel-based urban 
development in twenty-first century America. While many Las Vegas historians and 
urban scholars attribute Las Vegas‟s growth and development to gambling, tourism, 
favorable weather, and a relaxed tax infrastructure, all of which were a part of its 
growth, the main catalyst was the airlines. With the airlines annually delivering 30 
million passengers to McCarran Airport, airport planners and officials hoped that all 
of their renovated facilities including 93 gates would be sufficient to accommodate 
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more than 28 million passengers by 1990 until plans could be drawn for a more 
comprehensive airport expansion plan in the twenty-first century.117 One concern 
about such ambitious expansion as it had been with any past project was the cost.  
To help pay for current expansion costs the airport charged a $3 passenger 
facility fee and a 10% tax on all airline tickets.118 In the meantime, Airport Director 
Walker requested more money for a much discussed new airport to be built in 
Ivanpah Valley, geographically located thirty miles south of Las Vegas.  
In 2001, with federal funds becoming available for a new airport near Ivanpah 
Valley and help from influential Nevada Democrat Senator Harry Reid and 
Republican Senator John Ensign, airport officials devised a new plan to secure 
additional monies for McCarran to alleviate its congestion and prepare the facility to 
handle its maximum capacity. The centerpiece of “Vision 2020” was a new airport 
south of Las Vegas. Despite opposition from environmentalists who argued that 
arrival and departure routes crossing over the Mojave National Preserve would inflict 
excessive damage, the County received approval from the Bureau of Land 
Management to purchase 6,500 acres of land thirty miles south of the Las Vegas 
Valley for $13 million. When complete in 2013, the new airport would handle cargo 
flights, international carriers, and the overflow of scheduled commercial flights to 
McCarran. Dennis Mewshaw, planning manager for Clark County Department of 
Aviation, estimated that two to four million passengers would pass through the new 
airport‟s gates by the end of its first year in operation. The first phase of construction, 
                                                          
117
 Ibid. 
 
118
 Las Vegas Review-Journal, 3 August 1995, p.3. 
167 
 
which was slated to begin in 2005, included a terminal building, one runway, and 
surface parking at a price tag of $1.5 to $2 billion.119 
In addition to the new airport in Ivanpah, other stages of the plan already 
underway included more airline ticket counter space and baggage claim carousels at 
McCarran‟s main terminal, a third wing added to the “D” Concourse, which provided 
ten more gates, and construction of a $770 million third terminal including its own 
parking garage, ticket counters, and baggage claim facilities with fourteen gates, 
eight of which were reserved for international air carrier use.120 The airport also built 
an offsite 80,000 square foot $120 million facility for all rental car companies to make 
space available for the new baggage claim carousels, and a new air traffic control 
tower.121 
Future phases of the plan also included provisions for the improvement of 
other Clark County airports. To handle more private planes and air tour carrier 
services, North Las Vegas Airport would receive a third runway, a new apron, more 
hangar facilities, and a new air traffic control tower. Henderson Executive Airport 
would be funded for construction of a new terminal building, a second parallel 
runway, a new apron, and more shade hangars.122 The plans also included 
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construction of a fourth terminal at McCarran providing fifteen more gates, allowing 
the airport to meet its goal of 120 gates. Excluding the new airport, all of the 
additional expansion outlined in “Vision 2020” would cost $1.26 billion.123 According 
to Hilarie Grey, Public Affairs Manager for the Department of Aviation, federal airport 
improvement funds and airport revenue would finance the project in addition to $385 
million in municipal bonds at a 6.32% interest rate.124 Thus, the public-private 
partnership that shaped the airline industry carried on into the new century. 
Airport officials and the County Commission desperately needed the land in 
Ivanpah. With McCarran Airport property completely occupied, Walker and his 
planning staff clearly recognized the urgency to build a new airport, claiming, “Nearly 
half of all Las Vegas visitors arrive by air via McCarran International Airport, 
highlighting the important connection between the tourism industry and airport 
demand…. In fact, growth in passenger volume has been so closely linked to the 
construction of new hotel rooms that statistical analysis reveals that for each 10,000 
rooms that open in Las Vegas, 3.5 million additional passengers used McCarran.”125 
Las Vegas had twenty-nine airlines, and an expanded international airport, but 
needed resort hotel accommodations on the Strip and elsewhere to accommodate 
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record numbers of arriving national and international air travelers.126 All of this 
prompted the new mega-resort movement.   
 
New Mega-Resorts Appear on the Strip 
In 1989, the mega-resort movement got its start with pioneer Steve Wynn‟s 
Mirage, a massive Polynesian-themed $750 million property with 3,044 rooms, a 
volcano with fire pyrotechnics, a lagoon, waterfalls, a 20,000 gallon salt water coral 
reef aquarium (behind the registration desk), eight private bungalows, six swimming 
pools, twelve restaurants, a dolphin habitat, and the famous animal trainers and 
performers Siegfried and Roy with their White Bengal Tiger shows, which drew 
thousands of awestruck tourists.127  
Wynn, the son of a bingo parlor owner, got his start in the casino industry in 
Las Vegas as part owner of the Frontier Hotel and as owner of Standard Liquor 
Distribution.128 His liquor distribution company, which serviced many of the casinos, 
gave him the opportunity to learn first-hand about the casino business from 
friendships with the old and new casino owners. Wynn‟s ambitions did not stop with 
redesigning and refurbishing old casinos. He was determined to build a property that 
was bigger than Kirk Kerkorian‟s International and Landmark, and Jay Sarno‟s 
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Caesars Palace. According to Las Vegas Historians Eugene Moehring and Michael 
Green, Wynn‟s Mirage, “Boasted not only size and elegance, but also the special 
attractions that separated the Strip from Fremont Street, Reno, other Nevada 
Resorts, and every gambling town, tribal casino, and Internet Web site in the 
world.”129 Wynn set the bar higher than his predecessors to accommodate every 
visitor‟s need and provide the ultimate tourist experience. It was up to his 
competitors to rise to his level. 
The next year, in 1990, William Bennett, owner of the Circus Circus, a lower-
end property that catered to families, built a more elegant resort for guests, the 
4,032 room Excalibur themed after King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table 
complete with a castle and moat. This mega-resort contained a 100,000 square-foot 
casino, thirteen restaurants, several of which were to offer buffets with service for 
families, an arena with knights in jousting matches, theatre for family entertainment, 
a large swimming pool, and spa. Bennett followed this up with the middle-income 
Luxor, an Egyptian-themed, actual-sized pyramid resort surrounded by beautiful 
gardens filled with Egyptian statuary. This mega-resort boasted 2,526 rooms, a 
120,000 square-foot casino, swimming pool, spa, showroom, movie theatre, 
entertainment lounge, visitation to a replica of King Tut‟s tomb, and fourteen 
restaurants all at a cost of $375 million to build.130    
In 1993, Kirk Kerkorian, built the new MGM Grand (the old one suffered fire 
damage), the world‟s largest high-rise mega-resort to challenge Wynn‟s Mirage. The 
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Emerald City, Wizard of Oz-themed mega-resort sat on 112 acres of land, contained 
5,005 rooms in a massive thirty-story tower, a 171,500 square-foot casino, parking 
for 6,000 automobiles, an entire sports casino (including gaming book), twenty-three 
retail shops, five lounges and bars, eight restaurants, a 30,000 square-foot video 
arcade for children, a 144,000 square-foot swimming pool area with a beach, a 
thirty-four acre theme-park complete with rides, a 380,000 square-foot conference 
center, and a monorail connecting the resort to Bally‟s Resort and Casino. This 
property, like the Mirage, was designed to be all inclusive so visitors would not leave 
it.131 
Other mega-resorts included the Venetian, simulating Venice with visitor-filled 
gondolas floating along artificial canals. This mega-resort had 3,036 rooms, elegant 
international shops and fine restaurants, and 500,000 square feet of convention 
space. The Paris opened, consisting of 2,916 hotel rooms, a 140,000 square-foot 
convention center, an 85,000 square-foot casino, and giant replica of the Eiffel 
Tower, all at a construction cost of $760 million. The new, redesigned Aladdin, an 
$826 million Arabic desert-themed resort with 2,567 rooms, 115,000 square-foot 
casino, and 426,000 square foot shopping mall opened in 2000, and immediately 
became a tourist favorite.132  
Off the Strip, in January 1999, the Latin-themed Rio Hotel opened with 2,000 
hotel rooms, a 102,000 square-foot showroom complex, 1,500 seat state-of-the-art 
theatre, and 110,000 square-foot entertainment and convention complex. In an 
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interview, Wanda Chan, Director of Hotel Operations, claimed that there indeed was 
a symbiotic relationship between the airlines and casinos, stating, “They went hand 
in hand.”133 The mega-resorts depended on the airlines to bring business in the form 
of tourists, gamblers, conventioneers, and business travelers. And the airlines 
depended on an attractive destination for their passengers. Chan indicated that 
package deals had a “decent-sized” impact on the hotel, but the greater impact 
derived from convention attendance.134  
Airport Director Walker agreed with Chan, claiming, “The airport has a 
symbiotic relationship with the hotel industry. It responds to growth in the hotel 
industry,” or sometimes vice-versa.135 According to Walker, one hotel room annually 
meant 350 passengers.136 In 1989, Las Vegas reported an 89.8% hotel room 
occupancy rate of the mega-resorts, and just over 17 million air travelers passed 
through McCarran‟s gates.137 In 1993, the hotel occupancy rate increased three 
percent to 92.8% and the passenger volume at McCarran increased to 22 million.138 
By decade‟s end, it easily surpassed 30 million. 
These hotel occupancy rates and passenger volume statistics reflected the 
national and local trends of low fares, a growing consumer movement, an increased 
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public affluence, a growing national population, and more public interest in national 
and international travel.139 According to Las Vegas historians Eugene Moehring and 
Michael Green, Las Vegas at the-turn-of-the-century had undergone, “The kind of 
explosive growth that few American cities have ever experienced. For all of the 
1990s and into the twenty-first century, Las Vegas was the fastest growing 
metropolitan area in the nation.”140 The airlines were the vital link that enabled this 
growth to happen. W.R. Mahaffey, Delta Airlines District Marketing Manager, said as 
much, claiming, “The changes which have come to Las Vegas and Delta in the years 
since the airline became part of the city‟s life [1961] have been marked by a 
common denominator: healthy, well-founded progress. Las Vegas and Delta have 
both gained world recognition. Both have greatly contributed to each other.”141  
Mahaffey added, “The past 25 years have been good to Las Vegas and Delta. The 
city has continued to increase in importance as one of the world‟s major convention 
and tourist center.”142 Clark County Commissioner Bruce Woodbury unequivocally 
admitted this when he said, “McCarran Airport [including the airlines] is the absolute 
heart of our tourism industry and economy.”143 The mega-resorts also played an 
important role. 
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With exotic luxury suites, lavishly designed casinos with more private gaming 
rooms, more five-star restaurants, and expensive box seat tickets to entertainment 
venues and sporting events, the mega-resorts symbolized a new Las Vegas. With 
the exception of Atlantic City and Monte Carlo, no other properties in the world 
compared to these resorts. Owners Steve Wynn, Sheldon Adelson, Kirk Kerkorian, 
and others designed them to attract more higher-end domestic and international 
tourists, whom the owners believed would spend more money. To them, bigger was 
better and the only way Las Vegas could compete with Los Angeles, San Diego, and 
Phoenix, western industrial cities that did not have to entirely depend on tourism and 
gambling for economic sustenance. Western historian Walter Nugent emphasized 
this point about resorts cities like Las Vegas, claiming, “The keys [to local growth] 
were tourism and resorts, metropolitan spread, and capitalizing on the retirement 
proclivities of a population growing older and wealthier.”144 For the airlines too, it was 
all about destination.  
For air travels, riding in a passenger plane once comprised excitement, a 
sense of adventure with flight, delicious meals, and other amenities. But in the 1990s 
and later decades, air travel changed. The airlines shifted their focus to the 
destination to attract more business and leisure passengers. They still used 
spacious modern jets such as the Boeing 757 and 767 to accomplish this, but the 
destination became even more important. With mega-resort magnates Wynn, 
Kerkorian, Adelson, and others prepared to build super mega-resorts with more 
rooms, shops, and amenities, the time was right for airlines to further strengthen 
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their partnership with the federal, state, and local governments; the airport, and 
casino-resorts by expanding. But, as always was the case with growth of any kind 
for the airlines, airport, or city, it came with problems. This time though, the problems 
came in the form of a terrorist attack that threatened the symbiosis between the 
airlines, airport, and casino-resorts.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
STILL GROWING DURING TOUGH TIMES 
 
 
The end of the twentieth century was boom time for the resort city in the 
desert with record numbers of global air travelers, an expanded airport, and ten new 
mega-resorts on the Strip offering a smorgasbord of entertainment venues, fine 
dining, and lavish room accommodations. The future looked endlessly bright for Las 
Vegas. But, for the airlines, it did not. 
 Since 1970, the airlines experienced turbulent times of unprecedented 
competition, crippling fuel costs, high labor costs including wages, strikes, and 
pension payouts, debt from expensive aircraft leases, growing passenger discontent, 
and marginal profits leading to mergers and bankruptcies. Deregulation added to the 
problems for the major airlines by opening the flood gate for competition. It had a 
rippling effect for the nation‟s airports including McCarran International Airport, which 
experienced problems of air and ground traffic congestion, insufficient land for 
expansion, and costly airline delays due to an overcrowded air corridor 30,000 feet 
above the airport.1 But neither the airlines nor the airports were prepared for the 
coming problem that threatened to bring the entire industry down.  
On September 11, 2001, the nation experienced a terrorist attack where 
passenger planes used as missiles crashed into the World Trade Center Towers and 
destroyed part of the Pentagon. In response, the Federal Aviation Administration 
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grounded all flights. Airports were filled with jets idly parked at gates, remote 
locations, and anywhere else where there was room. Air traffic control radar screens 
were blank. Millions of travelers stranded at airports desperately sought ways to get 
home. Residents living near airports for the first time heard the rare sound of silence. 
The security of the country was in a serious state of national emergency with the 
airlines and airports at the heart of it. Nobody knew when or how the airline industry 
would resume operations, but it was certain there would be major repercussions 
involving the entire air travel industry. 
Airliner hijackings and terrorism were nothing new to the airline industry and 
the world. In 1969, hijackers commandeered a TWA Boeing 707 from California, 
forcing it to land in Rome.2 On March 8, 1972, after TWA flight 57, a Boeing 707, 
landed at McCarran Airport, and the crew and passengers deplaned, it was moved 
to a remote site for inspection after an extortionist called in a bomb threat. A bomb 
planted in the rear of the cockpit exploded. There were no injuries and the 
perpetrator never was caught.3 In 1988, a Pan Am Boeing 747 with 259 passengers 
on board was hijacked and exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing everyone on 
board.4 All of these shocking events put into action very strict security measures at 
airports nationwide. On November 16, 1990 President George H.W. Bush signed the 
Aviation Security Improvement Act mandating greater availability of resources to 
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tighten and enforce security at the nation‟s commercial airports.5 Six years later, on 
October 9, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization 
Act, part of which included $1 billion for 54 state-of-the-art bomb detection units, 100 
bomb-sniffing dog teams, and authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration 
to hire 300 special agents.6 Guidelines following 9/11 were even stricter.   
Passengers were required to be at airports two hours in advance of their 
departure time, and entered terminals heavily guarded by armed security personnel 
with bomb-sniffing dogs. After receiving boarding passes at the ticket counter, 
passengers advanced to long lines at security checkpoints to have their luggage 
inspected, and then to bodily move forward through metal detectors. The entire 
process became a miserable hassle for passengers, but was essential for passenger 
and airline security. Historian David Courtwright observed, “Metal detectors and spot 
inspection weeded out the amateurs who lost their nerve and ditched their weapon 
in airport trashcans. But they failed to stop determined terrorists who studied security 
weaknesses and who were willing to go down with their planes. Precisely because 
air transport was so vital to the American economy, it remained the priority target.”7    
The financial implications of the September 11 attack were catastrophic 
nationally for several airlines, including those servicing Las Vegas. Midway, United 
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Shuttle, and National Airlines, in massive debt from high fuel prices, poor 
management, and now a rapidly declining passenger volume as a result of the 
public‟s fear of flying after 9/11, went out of business. The entire United States 
airline industry went into an economic tailspin. America West Airlines faced 
bankruptcy for a second time as its stock plummeted more than 65% to $2.60 per 
share, United Airlines 40% to $18.71 per share, Delta 41% to $21.82 per share, 
American 39% to $18.11 per share, and Southwest 22% to $13.33 per share.8 Not 
only did stock values sharply decline, but most of the airlines had to reduce flight 
operations and slash thousands of jobs. 
America West had to reduce its flight operations by 20% and eliminate 2,000 
jobs. United Airlines, US Airways and Continental Airlines combined, cut more than 
46,000 jobs.9 Nationwide, passenger traffic declined by more than 50% as the 
airlines faced their biggest losses in nine years.10 Delta Airlines reported 30% of its 
daily flights full, and Northwest Airlines only 59% (the airlines needed 65% of their 
airplane seats filled to break even). That year, Delta lost $734 million and United lost 
nearly $1 billion. By the end of the fiscal year 2001, the airline industry lost a total of 
$9 billion, an unprecedented amount for one year in the industry‟s history, and a 
continued trend of losing money dating to the early 1980s.11  
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Airline insurance rates sharply increased, forcing a raise in fares to cover 
insurance costs and additional fuel surcharge fees.  From June 30, 2001 to June 30, 
2002, economic liabilities jumped to $117.3 billion, a 20% increase.12 As a result, the 
airlines had to ground planes, reduce the number of flights, and even seriously 
consider merging. Essentially, the industry‟s future looked bleak forcing air travelers 
to choose other modes of travel. 
 
The Impact of 9/11 on Las Vegas  
In Las Vegas, the Federal Aviation Administration in immediate response to 
the terror attack grounded all arriving and departing flights at McCarran for an 
indefinite period of time. With no new air travelers coming to Las Vegas, officials 
from Caesars Palace, Paris, Bellagio, and other mega-resorts reported that within 
one week, room occupancy had declined to 60%, and estimated gaming revenue 
losses to be in the tens of millions.13 As a result, hotel executives ordered the laying 
off of thousands of employees. They also canceled shows because of so few ticket 
sales. Retail shops in the Forum, Desert Passage, and Showcase Mall experienced 
enormous revenue losses. Taxicab companies eliminated dozens of cab driver jobs 
after business dropped by at least 50%. For the first time in six decades, Las Vegas 
went into recession.14 The terrorist attack, bringing air travel to a halt, clearly 
demonstrated the dependence of a large national and international tourist industry 
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on commercial airlines for transportation to resort cities such as Las Vegas, Miami, 
and Orlando. It also demonstrated the airline industry‟s dependence on the federal 
government for protection, this time airport security. But, it would not take long for 
Las Vegas to recover from the 9/11 attack.   
Despite 171,960 fewer air travelers in 2002 due to the 9/11 attack, in 2003, 
the number of air travelers and visitors coming to Las Vegas was bigger than ever. 
That year, 36,265,932 passengers arrived at McCarran International Airport, rising to 
41,441,531 in 2004.15 By 2007, 47,729,527 people arrived by plane.16 With this 
increase in passenger volume, came an increase in tourist-generated revenue. From 
1998-2007, the amount of money generated by visitors rose from $24,577,499,000 
to $41,578,079,000, a more than 40% increase.17 The reasons for this growth 
according to historians Eugene Moehring and Michael Green were new tourist 
attractions, gambling, affordable hotel rooms, and cheap entertainment for middle 
and lower-income visitors. Missing from this explanation however, is the airlines as 
the engine driving this growth by delivering ever increasing numbers of tourists and 
gamblers to the resort city in the desert. Despite the threat the 9/11 attack posed to 
transportation and tourism in Las Vegas, people still came in droves to Las Vegas to 
experience what the city had to offer, and the airlines brought them there. As Las 
Vegas continued to experience growth in air travel and visitor volumes, its future 
once again looked endlessly bright. But the airlines still struggled.  
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In 2002, America West, Las Vegas‟s second biggest airline, reported a loss of 
$347 million in the first quarter.18 The airline had to cut ten of its daily flights serving 
Las Vegas from New York, Phoenix, and Washington D.C. Southwest Airlines, the 
largest carrier serving Las Vegas, saw a passenger decrease of 4.8% and reduced 
its daily operated flights from 169 to 125 at McCarran.19 That same year, United 
Airlines lost $2.97 billion, the largest annual loss in airline industry history, and had 
to declare bankruptcy for the first time in its own history. United‟s restructuring plan 
of frugality pressured all union staff -- pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and 
customer service agents to agree to a 30% pay cut.20 Further, the airline retired 100 
of its aged jets-- Boeing 727s, 737s, and DC-10s and replaced them with more 
efficient jets such as the Airbus A319 and A320, and the Boeing 757 and 767 to 
save money on fuel and other costs. The company also cut 10% of its domestic 
flights. The fifth largest airline nationwide watched its passenger volume in Las 
Vegas drop by 21.2%.21 Even with the restructuring, which included the need to 
reduce wages by $2.4 billion per year through 2008, the airline still lost $3.2 billion in 
2002. United left bankruptcy with $17 billion in debt and received $3 billion in exit 
financing secured with weak mortgages on all of the airline‟s assets.22 
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 Delta and American did not fare any better. Facing massive debt and 
bankruptcy, Delta had to ground 40 planes and cut domestic capacity by 10%.23 
American followed suit, having lost a total of $5.2 billion from 2001-2002, forcing 
CEO Don Carty to resign, and the airline had to cut 189 daily flights and 12% of its 
domestic capacity nationwide.24 In the first three months of 2002, all of the US 
airlines lost a combined $2.4 billion, on course to lose another $6.4 billion.25 By the 
end of that year, long-term debt for the airlines increased from $15 billion to $43.2 
billion, the most ever.26  
Recognizing how the airlines were drowning in debt, and facing economic 
collapse, in 2001, Congress had passed the Air Transportation and System 
Stabilization Act, an emergency $5 billion loan to keep troubled airlines afloat.27 It 
was insufficient. The airlines still needed more money. Knowing how vital air travel 
was to the country and its economy, Congress was not about to let the airlines go 
out of business. This would have been devastating to the country, especially to 
leisure travel markets like Orlando and Las Vegas that heavily depended on the 
airlines to bring business. So, the government stepped in again. 
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United received $1.8 billion more in government loans to help ease its 
economic needs.28 Delta received $600 million in loans from the government. 
America West was given $380 million.29 But, this loan money did not last long as the 
airlines continued to rapidly burn through the cash to pay down their massive debt 
which included pensions, aircraft leases, and high fuel costs.  
 In 2005 Continental Airlines grounded 67 planes and slashed 3,000 jobs 
nationwide.30 Sky West, a usually profitable regional Las Vegas commuter airline, 
saw its profits decline by 27%. Editorialists nationwide warned that the airline 
industry would continue to lose billions of dollars before anything could improve. St. 
Louis Dispatch editorialist Tim McLaughlin warned how, “Despite shedding billions of 
dollars in labor and pension costs since 2000, U.S. airlines will need to cut billions 
more before the end of the decade to make money and remain competitive.”31 
Anthony Sabino, a St. John‟s University law professor echoed McLaughlin‟s gloomy 
outlook by asserting, “Barring a miraculous recovery – cheap oil, massive increase 
in travel or the low-cost carriers disappearing, one, if not two, of these legacy 
carriers will disappear via merger or liquidation.”32 The impact of a merger would 
mean reduced flight capacity, higher fares, a greater possibility of labor issues or 
financial crises, a loss of service in certain communities, increased difficulty for new 
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upstart airlines to enter markets to increase competition and lower fares, and a 
decline in the quality of customer service.33 An airline forced to go out of business 
such as Pan Am meant less service for air travelers and the loss of 24,000 jobs.34 
This had the potential to be an ominous sign for McCarran Airport, the casino-
resorts, and the city of Las Vegas. The casino-resorts and city had to figure out a 
way to continue attracting tourists, which they did through offering cheaper package 
deals, providing a great array of shops, and more diverse entertainment venues. It 
was not so easy for the airlines. 
 Desperately trying to minimize loss and attempt some kind of recovery, the 
major airlines took serious steps to control costs. Delta, Continental, Northwest, and 
American like United, all demanded tough cost saving measures, including cutting 
into employee salaries and deferring their benefits. The unions threatened pickets 
and strikes, but to no avail, forcing them to save the airlines by reluctantly accepting 
managements‟ demands, which included salary cuts, less comprehensive medical 
benefits, and reduced pension payouts. United and US Air attempted to merge, but 
United‟s pilots opposed the merger not wanting to assume U.S. Air‟s own financial 
problems and take on the difficult task of integrating seniority lists to match pay 
scales.35  
All airlines continued to downgrade their gas guzzling mid-size jets, the 
Boeing 737 and Airbus A 319, to smaller ones such as the Bombardier and 
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Canadair, regional jets with seating for 50-100 passengers. Though these aircraft 
were much smaller than their counterparts, they still flew at the same altitudes, 
speeds, and distances as the larger jets, and were more fuel efficient. The sacrifice 
of downgrading for passengers was smaller seats in crowded cabins, and fewer 
services. In 2001, regional jets replaced 732 larger planes, and plans by 2013 intend 
to put 2,970 regional jets into operation.36 Most airlines also assessed their markets 
to discern which were the most profitable, and moved their fleets there. As a result, 
according to Mark Suman, Co-Founder of Las Vegas-based National Airlines, 
“Planes may be moved to routes where they can serve more business customers. 
Business customers are more profitable to airlines than leisure travelers because 
they tend to book more expensive last-minute flights.” He further added, “Las Vegas 
is competing with other cities when it comes to aircraft allocation and the economics 
put the city at a disadvantage.”37 Even these cost-saving measures, however, had a 
limited impact because many of the airlines still were too deep in debt, and struggled 
to break even.  
Southwest Airlines and Allegiant Airlines, two discount carriers with less debt 
than the other major carriers, managed to turn a profit by 2003. Southwest earned 
revenue of $511 million.38 The airline‟s Chief Executive Officer Herb Kelleher had the 
ideal business model of keeping fares low, offering service to smaller cities where 
other airlines did not fly, having one class of seating, and adequately compensating 
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employees. Like many other discount carriers, Southwest not only enjoyed 
profitability, but saw much of its market grow as the “Big Six” airlines, American, 
United, Continental, Delta, Northwest, and US Air, reduced their numbers of flights 
and service to cities. In May 1992, the “Big Six” controlled 72% of the airline market, 
while regional airlines controlled 11% and discounters 10%. In May 2002, the “Big 
Six” controlled 56%, regional carriers 15%, and discounters 23%.39 One editorialist 
claimed discounters would control even more of the airline market in the future. He 
asserted, “Low fare airlines gravitating toward secondary airports were likely to fare 
better than the major airlines because at secondary airports, there was less air traffic 
congestion and lower airport user fees would keep the costs down.”40 In fiscal year 
2003-2004, Southwest was in such demand transporting 5,904,426 passengers to 
and from McCarran International Airport, it established a third hub in Las Vegas.41    
Allegiant Airlines, a Las Vegas-based, low-cost airline, earned a profit of $132 
million and added additional flights to Las Vegas from all of the cities the airline 
served.42 Allegiant followed Southwest‟s strategy: fly one type of plane and serve 
outlying airports. The airline flew McDonnell-Douglas MD-80s, 140 passenger jets 
able to fly at an altitude of 37,000 feet and a speed exceeding 500 miles per hour. 
Because of the airline‟s affordable fares and accommodating flight schedule to 
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second and third-tier cites and airports, in 2004 the airline was on track to make 
$265 million in revenue the next fiscal year.43  
For leisure travelers, and more broadly, the Las Vegas market, discount 
airlines like Southwest, Allegiant, and Jet Blue remained popular because they kept 
fares low. In the month of June 2005, 3.8 million passengers came to Las Vegas.44 
Of that record number, Southwest Airlines transported more than 1.2 million 
passengers, America West 697,387, Northwest Airlines, 144,070, Jet Blue 77,126, 
Allegiant 70,754, and Frontier 38,496, all double-digit percentage increases over the 
same month of the previous year.45 West Jet, a low-cost international carrier 
increased its number of daily non-stop flights from nine Canadian destinations to ten, 
and Singapore Airlines offered three weekly flights on the Boeing 777s, which 
monthly brought an additional 3,000 international travelers to McCarran Airport.46 In 
2007, the air travel volume in Las Vegas reached its peak with 47,728,414 
passengers, indicative of a thriving high-volume market. 47 For the right price, people 
still were willing to come to Las Vegas for fun and sun, but they did not spend as 
much money as they had when the nation‟s economy was better in previous years. 
Even with the increased travel demand, the airlines still had to figure out more ways 
to further reduce costs.  
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For more cost-cutting measures, the airlines used one-third fewer wide-body 
jets for the 143 daily transcontinental flights in the United States. Also airline 
executives directed pilots to fly slower to conserve fuel. With fuel at $3.54 per gallon, 
airlines in 2008 expected to pay $61.2 billion for fuel, more than $20 billion over the 
previous year‟s total cost.48 The US domestic airline market was not the only one 
suffering from high fuel prices. 
Globally, non-United States airlines lost $5.2 billion prompting Giovanni 
Basignani, a spokesman for the International Air Transportation Industry that 
represents 230 airlines and 94% of the world‟s passenger and cargo flights to call for 
a meeting in Istanbul, Turkey where he noted, “The industry is in crisis, perhaps the 
biggest crisis we‟ve ever faced.”49 But, the United States airlines were in worse 
shape, which impacted other industries. An article in the USA Today noted, 
“Resorts, hotels, cruise lines, and convention destinations could suffer. Tourism, 
especially in states like Florida, Hawaii, and Nevada that depend on it [the airline 
industry] heavily, could take a hit damaging state economies and forcing cuts in 
government services.”50 The terrorist attack and airline turmoil also impacted 
airports. 
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McCarran International: An Expanding Airport in Troubled Times    
Following the 9/11 attack, airport officials suspended all but the most needed 
expansion plans and reconfigured the lower concourses that housed the ticket 
counters and airport offices to make room for bomb detection machines. The added 
expense of the security equipment, and a drop in revenue from fewer flights and 
passengers augmented McCarran‟s economic problems. The airport had 
considerable debt from previous expansion projects including $360 million 
outstanding in service bonds, and $1.3 billion in subordinated bonds.51 Inadequate 
revenue from parking fees, retail concessions, and airline-related fees (airlines 
accounted for 35% of the airport‟s revenue), caused officials to worry about the 
airport defaulting on its debts.52 
The airport also delayed expansion plans because of the serious problems 
facing the airlines of high jet fuel prices, a failing national economy, and a possibility 
that some of the major airlines could go bankrupt or out of business. McCarran had 
to postpone a $348 million phase of its $4 billion expansion project, which included 
$10 million for a new elevator and escalation system, $114.5 million for a new 
heliport south of town, and reconstruction of Runway 25R, which would have cost 
$215 million.53 The airport also had to postpone $6 million for new curbside signs, 
and $9.3 million for an improved baggage handling system.54  
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But, the passenger volume quickly recovered after the 9/11 attack because 
people still wanted to vacation in Las Vegas, enjoying its themed mega-resorts with 
affordable rooms, slot machines, entertainment, five-star restaurants, and other 
amenities. As more people came to Las Vegas, their numbers set new records. In 
2002, 35,009,011 passengers passed through McCarran‟s gates. In 2005, that 
number reached 44,267,262.55 
Clark County Aviation Director Randall Walker and his planning staff realized 
that further airport expansion was needed, and revised their plans in 2005 to 
accommodate a projected 55 million passengers, the airport‟s maximum capacity.56 
They began looking at areas where the airport could expand. With houses and 
apartment buildings in the surrounding periphery, airport officials offered more than 
440 families equitable relocation to make way for expansion. The airport also offered 
to build a twenty-two acre public park in an adjoining neighborhood.57 The Master 
Plan included two more terminals in addition to the already existing two. Terminal 3, 
one of the new terminals, an $800 million facility, would house and serve 
international airlines and was scheduled to open in 2007. Plans also included a road 
expansion and access program that would allow traffic to drive on Russell Road to 
directly get to the airport. This included the expansion of a tunnel underneath the 
runways that connected Interstate 215 with the airport. McCarran officials selected 
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an eighty-acre nearby site for consolidation of all eleven car rental companies. 
These road expansion plans and the rental car relocation would cost $1.4 billion.58 
Part of the airport expansion program also included $5 million for a new air traffic 
control tower, and $9 million for a new radar facility.59  
Passenger volume growth had been steady since 1948 when 35,106 
passengers arrived at McCarran Field.60 In 1963, the passenger volume reached 1.5 
million.61 In 1996, more than 33 million passengers came to McCarran International 
Airport and in 2002 McCarran became the seventh busiest airport in the United 
States and the sixteenth busiest in the world in passenger traffic.62 In 2007, it 
became the sixth busiest in the United States and fifteenth in the world. The reasons 
for this growth not only included a steadily increasing passenger volume, but more 
cutting edge technology and passenger amenities, prompting the local newspaper 
Las Vegas Sun to proclaim, “Besides building and maintaining the facility to 
accommodate the phenomenal growth in air traffic, McCarran has set the global 
standard for airport management and is known as an industry in technology and 
passenger amenities.”63  
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In 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration completed a study called 
“Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System,” indicating that Las Vegas like 
Chicago and San Diego, needed air field, terminal, and roadway expansion. The 
report stated that McCarran could expect changes to airport capacity through 2025, 
but Randall Walker claimed based on the growing number of passengers coming to 
McCarran each year, the airport likely would reach maximum capacity before 2025.64 
He therefore pushed forward with plans to finish construction of the $770 million 
Terminal 3, and began an environmental study of the new airport in Ivanpah, 
scheduled to open in 2017 to handle 16 million more passengers.65  
The passenger volume at McCarran Airport remained above 43 million, 
sufficiently high enough to warrant further airport expansion. This included widening 
Russell Road, opening the fourth wing of the “D” Concourse, which added nine more 
gates, jet bridges to enable more efficient and convenient passageways for travelers 
catching connecting flights without having to leave security areas, retail space, and 
resurfacing of the tarmac.66 The expansion was vital not only to accommodate the 
increasing passenger volume, but also to help generate annual airport revenues 
exceeding $500 million and sustain the airport‟s direct and indirect economic impact 
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on Nevada through fees, taxes, and the amount of money travelers spent, which 
altogether amounted to $30 billion.67 
Another important but controversial measure McCarran operators took to 
save costs was allowing jets to turn right as well as the accustomed left turn over 
residential areas. Turns in both directions minimized delays in air traffic flow, 
speeding up takeoffs and landings, and allowing for more flights with more incoming 
passengers.68 Wealthy homeowners of the right-turn area complained vociferously 
about the noise and jet fuel smell polluting their peaceful neighborhoods, and 
pressured the mayor and City Council to investigate violations of their homeowner 
rights. Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman showed concern about the safety of flights 
over heavily populated residential areas.69 Middle class residents in the left-turn area 
responded with appreciation that the arrogant, wealthy residents on Spanish Trail 
and other upscale locations would have to endure jet noise.  
Alan Feldman, spokesman for MGM Mirage, Nevada‟s largest hotel operator 
with ten mega-resorts on the Strip including the $9.2 billion City Center, gave the 
right turn firm approval. Needing to keep his hotel rooms fully occupied, he publicly 
criticized the complaining homeowners claiming, “A couple dozen residents are 
drumming up a dust storm at council meetings and the council is responding for 
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purely political reasons.”70  With enough support from the airlines, the airport, the 
left-turn residents, and the hotel resorts, the City Council voted unanimously to 
approve the right turn, which brought $281.3 million cost savings to the airport with 
the arrival of 375,000 more passengers.71 More resorts also appeared along the 
Strip. 
 
The Super Mega-Resort Boom 
A Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority statistic showed that the 
portion of city visitors making $100,000 or more per year had jumped from 10% in 
2003 to 24% in 2007.72 This trend of both high passenger volume and increased 
high-end travelers caught the eye of wealthy mega-resort operators Steve Wynn, 
Sheldon Adelson, and others urging them to build bigger and better, not only for the 
masses, but for those who had the money to fly, to stay, and to spend. As Las 
Vegas Sun journalist Jeff Simpson put it, “There is no denying that Las Vegas 
resorts are symbiotically linked to the airlines that bring in almost half of the city‟s 
visitors. But recent trends make clear that the city‟s dependence is about to get 
stronger…. The two newest Strip‟s resorts, Palazzo and Wynn Las Vegas, and 
resorts under construction including Encore, City Centre, Fontainebleau, and 
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Echelon are the kind of places less likely to attract drive-in customers.”73 As resort 
executives embraced the idea of even bigger and better, airlines continued to 
annually bring millions of passengers to their properties.  
Steve Wynn especially raised the bar of sophistication when he built the two 
most luxurious mega-resorts on the Strip, the Wynn Las Vegas and the Encore. 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Public Administration Professor Bill Thompson said 
that Wynn was in the forefront of Las Vegas change toward richer big-spending 
visitors and gamblers. “He sets the standard and others catch up to him. He 
understands these high rollers better than anyone.”74 Thompson added, “With all 
suites and bigger rooms, this [Encore] will probably be where Wynn keeps some of 
his best casino guests.”75 Wynn built his posh resorts not for tourists, but for his 
guests. The other beautiful resorts on the Strip built by him were wonderful 
attractions to him, “But there is no franchise in the tourist attraction. There is a 
franchise in a guest and the guest is something that happens inside the building 
usually between the staff, the people of the building, and the building itself….The 
audience isn‟t the sidewalk. The audience is the hotel…. You have to go inside…. 
And you are in a world of your own.”76 Wynn‟s world for his guests was exquisite.   
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His $2.7 billion super mega-resort Encore opened in October 2008, sitting on 
a 20 acre parcel of land once occupied by the famous Desert Inn resort. It contained 
5,000 hotel rooms, 2,000 of which were luxury suites. The super mega-resort had 
several world renowned, chef-designed and operated restaurants, a massive 
convention center and meeting place, high-end retail stores, a spa and salon, and 
entertainment venues. All suites were designed for higher-paying customers, with 
rates at $284 to $2,000 per night.77 A spectacular concert hall had seating for 3,000 
with the capability to be converted into a giant ballroom suited for dancing and 
conventions. According to Richard Branson, British billionaire and Virgin Airlines 
owner, “There is nobody in the world who creates such entertaining and beautiful 
casinos as Steve Wynn. Every other casino must be nervous. He has lifted the bar 
dramatically.”78      
In a keynote address at the International Gaming Business Exposition, 
billionaire and mega-resort mogul Sheldon Adelson admonished members that Las 
Vegas needed to improve the quality of its mega-resorts to attract a higher class of 
people, whom he believed, would spend more time and money if resort executives 
built properties with more luxury and amenities. He said, “Undifferentiated product 
additions to the same old rooms, $1.99 buffets, and casino lounges wrapped in a 
thematic façade do not constitute new thinking. They embody the worn-out 
assumptions which may have contributed to the recent slowdown in growth…. The 
Bellagio truly adds value to the Las Vegas Strip and the attractiveness of the city as 
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a destination resort, not Circus Circus, the Aladdin, and Stratosphere, companies 
that built the same old products.”79 But, what Adelson did not mention in his speech 
was how his upscale guests got to Las Vegas. In 1998, 1,198,540 passengers 
arrived by charter flights, not including those who arrived by scheduled commercial 
flights. A decade later, that number remained near one million.80 While existing 
mega-resorts expanded and new ones were built, the onslaught of passengers 
passing through McCarran‟s gates continued. This was the newer and more 
improved Las Vegas: more glitz, glamour, private and chartered jets, suites, and 
whales (jargon for big spenders) all in one location. And Wynn and Adelson helped 
facilitate Las Vegas‟s newest image.   
The Palazzo, a $1.8 billion world-class luxury hotel casino and resort opened 
on January 17, 2008. It consisted of a fifty-story luxury hotel tower with 3,068 rooms, 
375 concierge-level suites, and six villas up to 11,000 square-feet each. It also 
contained a 105,000 square-foot casino with 1,900 slot machines, and 80 table 
games. The 250,000 square-foot pool deck connected with the Venetian‟s pool deck. 
The Palazzo‟s pool deck also housed an outdoor restaurant and two private villas. In 
February, a 270 unit condo-tower was built, in addition to a 450,000 square-foot 
shopping mall, dining, and entertainment complex, and 80 high and mid-end retailers 
connected to the existing Canal shops at the Venetian. The property also had 
450,000 square-feet of meeting and conference space connected to the Sands 
Convention Center. Visitors to the Palazzo had access to the massive 4,000 space 
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underground parking garage that directly led them to the casino. This mega-resort 
catered to high-rolling gamblers, offering them high-class suites at a price of $25,000 
per night, in addition to private gambling rooms and personal servants. The 
combined Palazzo, Venetian, and Sands Convention and Exposition Center, all 
Adelson properties, when finished, became the largest resort and hotel complex in 
the world with 7,074 hotel rooms and suites.81 
The popularity of Wynn and Adelson‟s new luxury mega-resorts with the 
continual influx of many tourists influenced the other Strip resort owners to upgrade 
and expand their properties. Caesars Palace built a $475 million, 900-room tower, 
and a separate 665-room tower with an outdoor café, wedding venue, and a 240,000 
square-foot convention center, all at a cost of $1 billion. With this addition, the 
property had more than 300,000 square-feet of available convention space, more 
than 4,000 rooms, and a gambler database exceeding 10 million clients.82 The 
Bellagio built a $375 million, 925-room tower with a spa, 60,000 square-feet of space 
for meetings, and 5,000 square feet of space for retail and restaurants. The 
Mandalay Bay added a $235 million, 1.8 million square-foot convention center which 
contained a 100,000 square-foot ballroom, and a 50,000 square-foot junior 
ballroom.83 Planet Hollywood opened its $1.2 billion twin-towers with 1,228 time-
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share condominiums. The Hard Rock Hotel added 875 more rooms to its property at 
a cost of $760 million.84  
The new mega-resorts and other expanded resorts easily were outdone in 
size by the MGM-Mirage City Center project, the most ambitious in the world. This 
76 acre metropolis, which cost $9.2 billion to build, consisted of 18 million square 
feet of vertical development, a mixed-use cosmopolitan center of hotels, luxury 
condominiums, and shopping, all within an urban setting. Included was a skyline of 
two 400 room boutique hotels, one 4,000 room hotel and casino, four towers of 
2,500 residential units, and 55,000 square-feet of high-end dining and entertainment 
space. The tallest buildings were 65-70 stories in height, and the Center also 
contained a convention center. Visitors could gamble, shop in world-class retail 
stores including Louis Vuitton, Hermes, Prada, Christian Dior, Bulgari, Van Cleef & 
Arpel, Tiffany and dine in Beso, Mastro‟s Olan Club, and two new Wolfgang Puck 
restaurants. They could also live in and promenade about the self-contained 
property without ever leaving it.85 The City Center was the first on the Strip to 
combine private residences with hotels and casinos. Public squares, hidden parking 
structures, covered passageways, and a boulevard were all incorporated in the 
Center located in the heart of the Strip.86 These palatial tourist attractions drew 
enormous crowds of visitors from national and international cities who flew to Las 
Vegas on more than thirty airlines to experience the simulated feeling of living the 
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opulent, wealthy lifestyle by being papered, shopping in world-class stores, and 
enjoying other amenities. The airlines, airport, and casino-resorts continued to work 
in symbiosis to enable Las Vegas to exist as a world-class tourist destination. But, 
big economic problems loomed for the city.   
 
The Great Recession Hits Las Vegas 
In 2008, the country faced a severe economic recession that had especially 
harsh repercussions in Las Vegas. Collapse of the United States banking system, a 
steep downturn in the economy, a sharp decline in home values, and an explosive 
increase in the number of home foreclosures left Las Vegas in an economic 
predicament the city had not experienced for decades. “We are in a deep economic 
recession, bordering on depression,” said former archivist and state historian Guy 
Rocha. “People are hurting and they are hurting badly.”87 Unemployment reached 
14.2% with the loss of an additional 140,900 jobs.88 There were more home 
foreclosures than in any other large city in the nation, 28,000 residents fled the city, 
and the Strip was left with many unfinished construction sites.89  
Wynn Resorts reported a loss of $159.6 million in the fourth quarter compared 
to a profit of $65.5 million in the same quarter of the previous year.90 A Las Vegas 
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Sun editorial stated, “Gaming companies are suffering from an oversupply of hotel 
rooms and excessive debt taken on during the boom years [2002-2007]. As gaming 
companies have cut jobs in response to the recession, the laid-off workers have had 
difficulty finding other work because of the lack of non-gaming job opportunities.”91    
The impact was made worse when tourists who did come to the city, spent 
less money. Las Vegas Sun journalist Liz Benston observed this, writing how, 
“Hotels are filling rooms with penny-pinching tourists in place of the expense 
account-wielding business travelers who flocked here before the recession.”92 This 
was an ominous sign for the mega-resorts that not only depended on high visitor 
volume, but also generous visitor spending. Resort executives had overbuilt in 
response to the 2002-2007 booms in air travel and tourism. They had borrowed 
billions of dollars from Wall Street banks to expand existing properties and build 
even larger, more expensive resorts. When the banks failed in 2008, the mega-
resorts were left with giant debts and needed a strong source of steady revenue to 
keep them afloat. Tourist declines magnified their problems. Steve Wynn, mega-
resort tycoon, recognized the obvious situation claiming, “People who lose their jobs 
can‟t go and spend money. People who have money when things get widespread 
get careful and don‟t spend money.”93 Serious measures had to be taken to bring 
visitors to Las Vegas, even if it meant substantially reducing room rates at the debt-
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ridden resorts. Rooms normally priced at $300 or higher per night, were reduced by 
half.  
According to a quarterly report by Brookings Mountain West, a partnership of 
the Brookings Institute think tank in Washington D.C. and at UNLV, focusing on 
economic trends in the intermountain West, Las Vegas had the sharpest 
unemployment rate increase among the nation‟s one hundred largest metropolitan 
areas from March 2009-March 2010.94 A question arose: Why is Las Vegas, a city 
noted for its rapid recovery from previous recessions, in such worse shape than 
most other cities?  Mark Muro, co-author of the report, attributes the rebound 
slowness to the city‟s dependence on tourism and real estate, which rely heavily on 
consumer spending. He claimed, “Many consumers simply cannot afford to spend 
the amount of money they once did because they are under water in their mortgages 
or drowning in debt much more so than in prior recessions. Others are unwilling to 
spend because they are worried about losing their jobs.”95 John Restrepo, a Las 
Vegas economic analyst, echoed this, claiming that, “The Las Vegas economy is not 
particularly diversified, heavily dependent on consumer spending, and consumer 
confidence.”96 Terry Jicinsky, Senior Vice-President of Marketing for the LVCVA, 
noting a ten percent decline in the Las Vegas visitor volume in 2009, even 
expressed surprise at the staggering impact of the recession. He claimed, “Because 
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our growth cycle has been going on for twenty years, for many people, including 
myself, that‟s a career. That is the entire length of your experience. We have casino 
executives that started working in their 20s and 30s that are now in their 40s and 
50s, where all they knew was double-digit growth year after year after year.”97 
Suddenly, Las Vegas faced a serious situation as thousands of people lost their jobs 
and abandoned their homes. The recession also had an impact on McCarran 
Airport.  
Though Walker and his staff always were prepared to deal with the economic 
upturns and downturns of the air travel industry, they did not anticipate the economic 
problems of a sharp recession. The airport had to prepare for US Airway‟s cutback in 
its number of daily round-trip flights to McCarran from 128 to 64 in February 2009.98 
The reason for this was an unprofitable Las Vegas market for the airline. According 
to Andrew Nocella, Senior Vice-President of Marketing and Planning for US Air, “Las 
Vegas has always been a low-fare leisure market but now the fares are considerably 
lower because of falling demand. When you take that and combine it with high fuel 
prices, Las Vegas has become extremely unprofitable for US Airways and would 
remain unprofitable indefinitely at its current size.”99 Airline Analyst Mike Boyd saw it 
as a blow to Las Vegas, but more so to US Airways. He claimed, “US Airways 
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dropped those flights because they couldn‟t make any money on them. But I don‟t 
see it as a death blow for Las Vegas.”100  
Statistics clearly show from 1998-2007 the volume of commercial airline 
passengers steadily increased despite the September 11 attack, and in 2008 and 
2009, still remained above 40 million passengers. Despite the depressed economic 
conditions gripping the city, airport officials still were revising their outlook based on 
multi-million dollar contractor studies that indicated the maximum capacity would 
arrive by 2011, instead of 2012, and therefore, it was imperative to think about 
additional airport expansion at McCarran, or build a new airport. As columnist Tony 
Cook pointed out, “The problem is McCarran is expected to reach capacity by 2011 
or 2012. And because it is not in the middle of the desert anymore, the airport‟s 
growth is limited by surrounding development.”101  
 
Saving the Symbiotic Relationship    
With the United States airlines overburdened by their own problems of 
enormous debt, too much competition, high fuel prices, and a steady passenger 
loss, it was up to the casino-resorts and the airport to find other means to pick up the 
slack. U.S. Airways drastically cut its number of flights to Las Vegas, and Allegiant 
Airlines pared back its flight schedule, which prompted an emergency meeting on 
June 20, 2008 between McCarran Airport Director Randall Walker, LVCVA Vice-
President of Marketing Terry Jicinsky, Allegiant Airlines CEO Maurice Gallagher, and 
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US Airways CEO Doug Parker to discuss ways McCarran could persuade Allegiant 
and US Airways to minimize their cutbacks. The situation also prompted the mega-
resorts and the airport to reach out to international airlines to bring in global travelers 
who had the money to fly, could stay longer, and spend more money. According to 
Jeff Voyles, a Casino Management Professor at the University of Nevada Las 
Vegas, the international travel market “was a great untapped market.”102   
Tourism boosters from the LVCVA, and officials from McCarran went abroad 
to attend conferences with airline route planners to attract more direct and non-stop 
international flights. Developing services from existing markets and finding new 
markets was the goal. Las Vegas needed guests to fill its hotel rooms, but it also 
needed to handle competition to other domestic and global destinations. The value 
of routes conferences was the opportunity to network with many airlines from 
different countries.103  
Usually the major casinos do their marketing in foreign countries through their 
own long-established business offices to recruit high rollers instead of doing mass 
marketing. During the recession, Harrah‟s Resorts, with the largest list of customers 
in the casino industry, enlisted Discover the World Marketing with 450 businesses at 
83 offices in 55 countries to sell the seven major Harrah‟s properties on the Strip to 
travel agents, tour operators, and business groups in foreign countries.104 A 
Discover specialty was gathering travelers for foreign holidays not celebrated in the 
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United States. MGM Mirage, a Harrah‟s competitor, connected directly with foreign 
travel agents and tour operators in addition to using its casino marketing offices.105 
Historically, recruiting foreign tourists to Las Vegas was difficult because of 
expenses, visa processing problems, and security demands. But good package 
deals made the trouble worth the effort. Las Vegas offered reasonably priced hotel 
rooms, one-stop airline services, and other amenities to foreign customers, which 
were very attractive. Though struggling domestic airlines cut many routes to and 
from Las Vegas, international air service increased in 2009 with additional flights 
from Canada and other countries because of the package deals. “What Las Vegas 
needs even more than incremental flights is more aggressive marketing to foreign 
tourists who may not perceive Las Vegas as a value,” says Mike Boyd, independent 
airline consultant.106 Part of this effort included finding new ways to make 
international travel easier for all airlines. 
On March 28, 2008, the United States expanded the Open Skies Agreement 
with the European Union to increase air traffic in the transatlantic market by easing 
restrictions dictating where United States and European air carriers could land. This 
meant more money for local communities through the creation of 80,000 jobs and 26 
million more tourists over five years.107 According to statistical data from the 
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International Air Transport Association, in 2009, transatlantic air traffic increased 
11%.108 Beyond the European Union, the United States also signed bilateral 
agreements with the Philippines and ten other Southeast Asian countries, Australia, 
Chile, and New Zealand.109 Jeff Shane, A Washington D.C. attorney who worked for 
the State Department and the Department of Transportation credits airports for 
stimulating government thought and interest in bringing more international airlines to 
the United States, and more United States airlines serving other countries. He 
stated, “Until the airport operators got into the fray in Washington, which I date to the 
late 1980s, we really weren‟t able to make sensible progress in expanding markets, 
especially in bringing more foreign carrier service to the U.S.”110 Of course, airports 
including McCarran International now must prepare themselves to find slots for 60% 
of the world‟s air traffic.111 
In May 2010, XL Airways France made its inaugural non-stop direct flight from 
Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France, arriving at 6:40 pm at McCarran 
International Airport, Las Vegas. According to Randall Walker, Clark County Director 
of Aviation, “Based on XL Airways current schedule, the airline could bring in 10,000 
visitors to Las Vegas this summer, and that is great news for Clark County and the 
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community as a whole.”112 The 2010 Visitors Profile Study showed that these visitors 
bring $9.7 million in revenue to the city. XL Airways France will operate non-stop 
service to Las Vegas from Paris through September 23 on Thursdays and Sundays 
using an Airbus A330 with seating for 364 passengers. International traffic has been 
good for McCarran, up more than 15% from 2009.113 “We are very pleased to 
welcome first ever non-stop flights from Las Vegas to France,” says Cathy Tull, 
Senior Vice-President of Marketing at the LVCVA. “France is a key source of 
overseas visitors to Las Vegas and this partnership with XL Airways broadens our 
accessibility to a market that has shown 19% growth in the last two years.”114 Las 
Vegas truly became a world-class megalopolis. 
      
The Future Las Vegas 
 In 2007, the Brookings Institute, a think-tank that studies urban growth and 
design in the nation, declared Las Vegas a model city for others to emulate. With 
affordable housing, jobs, decent weather, and proximity to shops, restaurants, 
schools, the airport, and the casino resorts, Las Vegas was an ideal twenty-first 
century city. According to a United States Department of Commerce study, from 
2001-2006, Las Vegas experienced a 58% increase in personal income, compared 
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to 42% in Phoenix, and 23% in Denver.115 Former Las Vegas Mayor and City 
Councilwoman Jan Jones declared Las Vegas, “One of the last cities in the world 
where true entrepreneurial spirit can flourish. The giant owners of this big destination 
are visionaries. They‟re competitive, fearless, and just as much gamblers as the 
guests they entertain.”116 In 2007, at the World Leadership Awards in London, 
England, Las Vegas was named American City of the Year, specifically citing the 
city‟s sustainability efforts for transportation and alternative fuels.117 But with the 
devastating effects of the 2008 recession, the overarching question is: how would 
Las Vegas pull out of this economic downturn affecting the entire metropolitan area? 
Rory Reid, Clark County Commission Chairman and contender for the 
governor‟s race, also son of United States Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, 
claimed the only way Las Vegas, and more broadly Nevada would survive the 
recession is with the creation of more jobs and diversification of the economy. Reid 
contended that the state no longer could survive on tourism and gambling revenues 
alone without bringing other businesses to Nevada such as those in modern 
technology and renewable energy.118 “I don‟t think anybody believes the gaming 
industry will take us to the promised land again,” Reid said. “In our history that has 
been the prevalent view. There is urgency in the air. This is a unique opportunity to 
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do the things we have always said we were going to do. We have to do it now. This 
is the moment.”119 Though Reid did not entirely discount gambling and tourism which 
still were important to the city‟s economy, he failed to mention how the airlines 
continued to play a vital role bringing tourists and gamblers to Las Vegas.  
In an article written by Las Vegas Sun journalist Patrick Coolican, he 
compared Las Vegas to Rust Belt cities which also depend on a single economy - - 
Detroit on automobiles, Pittsburg on steel, and Las Vegas on gambling and tourism. 
Coolican asked how do cities achieve goals of diversification and progress? He said, 
“The answer is simple. You have to produce something fresh and new such as 
renewable energy technology that will blow the doors off the market place, or a 
resort so incredible - - like the Mirage in 1989 - - the tourists just have to see it…. 
You have to innovate. Where does the innovation come from? In part, from sheer 
entrepreneurialism”120  
Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman strongly exercised the entrepreneurial 
spirit when he convinced the City Council to draft plans to redevelop the downtown 
business district. Included in the plans were a high-rise tower for an international 
Jewelry Center with a 165,000 square-foot retail center promenade, banking 
facilities, restaurants; the building and landscaping of Union Park - a 61 acre plot of 
land for office, hotel, residential space; construction of the Cleveland Clinic Lou 
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Ruvo Center for Brain Health designed by world-renown architect Frank Gehry; and 
a $475 million, four-theatre complex Smith Center for the Performing Arts.121  
The reason for the Jewelry Center‟s relocating to Las Vegas is because the 
city has been one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the United States and 
is one of the most visited international cities in the world, a perfect place where 
global jewelry manufacturers and artisans can conduct business and live.122 The Lou 
Ruvo Center for Brain Health was planned to become the national resource for the 
most current research and scientific information in the treatment of Alzheimer‟s 
disease. It is operated by the famous Cleveland Clinic, a multi-specialty medical 
center in Cleveland, Ohio. The Smith Centre for the Performing Arts claims, “Las 
Vegas is poised to make the leap from popular tourist destination to one of the 
nation‟s leading cosmopolitan hubs. Upon completion, the Smith Centre will place 
Las Vegas on the world stage for performing arts, attracting world-class artistry, 
diverse productions, and a highly-skilled workforce.”123  
Globalizing Las Vegas with these world-class facilities in conjunction with the 
opening of the City Center, Echelon, and Fontainebleau mega-resorts, and the 
expansion of McCarran International Airport, will help provide the city a route to 
recover from the economic recession, and better diversify its economy. Though Las 
Vegas is becoming a high-class, highly-cultured metropolis comparable to Los 
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Angeles and New York, it still sits in the Mojave Desert, and heavily depends on the 
airlines to bring in business, including international travelers. 
“In today‟s airline business, if you are not global you are not a player,” says 
Clive Irving, Senior Consulting Editor for Conde Nast travel magazine.124 The recent 
merging of United Airlines with Continental and the 2008 merging of Delta with 
Northwest Airlines, now the two largest air carriers in the world, and major airlines 
serving Las Vegas, have better connected Las Vegas with the world. By combining 
their domestic networks with international routes, they offered more choices for 
leisure and business travelers, which included more destinations, a greater array of 
flight times, and more services. Of course, they are in strong competition with 
Lufthansa, Air France/KLM, Singapore Airlines and Emirates, airlines with long 
established routes, and clientele who pay top dollar for premium service.  
Las Vegas has its eye on China, a giant international market with enormous 
numbers of travelers flying all over the globe, with United States destinations in high 
demand. According to Irving, “Given that international traffic is usually more 
profitable than domestic, they [airlines] will be fine tuning routes, realigning their 
Pacific hubs to maximize their ability to tap into that roaring wave of Chinese 
travelers, many of whom will be heading for the US. And once they board a US 
carrier, they will be locked into that carrier‟s domestic network.”125 By tapping into 
the Chinese market, Las Vegas will attract more customers, increase revenue from 
tourism and gambling, and give the city even greater international presence.    
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Part of attracting national and international travelers to a world-class 
destination is offering them facilities with amenities, services, entertainment, fine 
dining, and recreational activities, all for a reasonable price. The other part is 
providing comfortable travel accommodations. For national and international airlines 
serving Las Vegas, this means using modern, state-of-the-art passenger planes 
such as the Boeing 777, which British Airways flies daily from London Heathrow to 
McCarran International Airport, and the new, much anticipated Boeing 787 “Dream 
Liner.”  
This new passenger jet has seating for 250 passengers, uses minimal-energy 
lighting, has an energy-efficient galley, and more notably, is made of lighter, 
composite materials, making the jet the first of its kind to be the most aerodynamic 
and fuel efficient ever. Despite the jet‟s two year production delay due to design 
flaws, when it comes into service in the very near future, the airline industry will 
experience nothing short of another revolution in air travel because this plane not 
only carries more passengers than most of its competitors, but comfortably can fly 
more than 8,500 miles without refueling, and uses 20% less fuel than the wide-
bodied 767. With this new plane added to their fleets, the airlines will be able to save 
millions of dollars because of the 787‟s light airframe and fuel efficient engines.126 
The 787 will mark a new age in the passenger jet industry much the way the super 
mega-resorts symbolized Las Vegas‟s postmodern future. 
 
 
                                                          
126
 Boeing Company’s 787 “Dream Liner” Website 
215 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
         “Commercial air travel is the lifeblood of Las Vegas.” Duane Busch, Executive 
Station Manager for TWA in Las Vegas 
 
At 8:30 p.m., on October 25, 2009, British Airways Flight 275 touched down at 
McCarran International Airport after a 10 hour 50 minute inaugural flight from 
London‟s Heathrow International Airport.127 Among the 217 paying passengers on 
board were British Airways CEO Willie Walsh making his first trip to southern 
Nevada, escorted by Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman, CEO and President Rossi 
Ralenkotter of the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (LVCVA), and two 
other LVCVA executives.128  
For the special occasion, British Airways chose one of its most luxurious 
jumbo jets, the Boeing 777-200 with First Class, Club World ( business class), World 
Travel Plus (premium economy class), and World Traveler (economy class) 
services. As the jumbo jet taxied to the international terminal, a waiting McCarran 
fire brigade spouted a giant water arch under which the plane passed, a grand 
welcome reserved for maiden flights. After deplaning and going through customs, 
passengers were given a special greeting by Clark County Department of Aviation 
Director Randall Walker, representatives from the luxurious Wynn Las Vegas resort 
where CEO Walsh would be guest of honor, members of the news media, and two 
beautiful Las Vegas showgirls. Mayor Oscar Goodman‟s words to the assembled 
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crowd summed up the specialty of the event, “This is a great day for Las Vegas and 
a great day for London.”129 
For nearly a decade, McCarran International Airport officials and the LVCVA 
unsuccessfully tried to convince British Airways that Las Vegas had much to offer its 
clientele. With Virgin Atlantic Airlines making daily non-stop trips since 2006 from 
Gatwick International Airport, London‟s second busiest, and British Midland 
International doing long-haul flights from Manchester, the United Kingdom had 
become the primary source of overseas travelers to Las Vegas with nearly 400,000 
visitors in 2008 alone.130 So, it made sense to form a partnership with the largest of 
the United Kingdom‟s air carriers. British Airways annually flew 36 million travelers to 
143 worldwide destinations in 69 countries, was based at Heathrow International 
Airport the largest and busiest of London‟s six airports, and would give Las Vegas 
the advantage of an extensive global network from which to draw thousands more 
international travelers.131 
British Airways indicated that it was more than satisfied with all that the resort 
city had to offer when it confirmed the Las Vegas route with the assignment of its 
flagship Boeing 777 designated only for direct daily flights. Other international 
carriers had begun operating at McCarran on a trial basis with a few flights per 
week, but British Airways became the first regularly scheduled overseas airline to 
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begin daily operations, a vote of confidence in the city‟s ability to draw worldwide 
travelers.  
Advanced bookings from London to Las Vegas were sold out with passengers 
who paid $663.10 for a round-trip ticket, prompting CEO Walsh to remark that the 
Las Vegas route was the best-performing new route he had ever seen, and that he 
would speak with “great passion” about the resort city.132 The LVCVA assured him 
that with its strong marketing connections in many European countries, it would in 
turn include British Airways in its advertising. Walsh was impressed with Las Vegas 
as a world-class travel destination with its luxurious internationally themed mega-
resorts that were so attractive to global travelers. He pledged that British Airways 
would provide package deals assuring its travelers affordable air fare, deluxe hotel 
accommodations, fine international cuisine, and high end entertainment. McCarran 
offered British Airways cheap airport fees which would help lower operating costs, 
and impressed the company with the rapid progress being made on the construction 
of Terminal 3 to be equipped with cutting edge systems designed to most efficiently 
process thousands of international passengers, minimizing delays.133  
McCarran International Airport was ready for the assigned Boeing 777 jumbo 
jet with its 274 passenger seats: 36 Club World business class, 24 World Traveler 
Plus premium economy class, and 212 World Traveler economy class -- business 
seats converting to beds, all meals prepared by world-class chefs, and 
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entertainment systems including movies, television programs, music, and outlets for 
personal computers.134 The carrier was scheduled to leave Heathrow daily at 3:35 
p.m. and arrive in Las Vegas the next evening at 7:25 p.m. with a return Flight 274 
leaving Las Vegas daily at 9:20 p.m. and arriving in London the next day at 2:05 
p.m. Las Vegas Sun journalist Rich Velotta, among the welcoming crowd at the gate, 
said of the special event, “Everything is good for Las Vegas. It has nonstop round 
trips to Heathrow and Gatwick. It has great connections to the rest of Europe, the 
Middle East, Africa, and Asia. It has world-renowned companies to partner with. It 
couldn‟t have happened at a better time when the city [in a time of deep national 
recession] could use an economic lift,” hopefully returning to the 2002-2007 years of 
the highest air traveler and visitor volumes in the city‟s history.135       
Commercial air travel enabled Las Vegas to become a model, twenty-first 
century American city, and an internationally famous tourist mecca. With passenger 
planes annually delivering more than 30 million air travelers and tourists from 
national and international points of origin to McCarran Airport and the luxurious 
mega-resorts on the Strip, Las Vegas joined Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Francisco, 
New York, and Chicago, as cities that rose to prominence by connecting to a rapidly 
expanding commercial aviation industry. As my study shows, the passenger plane 
was especially important to Las Vegas because the town heavily depended on 
tourism as its primary source of revenue, and passenger planes provided the 
vehicles gamblers and tourists needed to get to the resort city in the desert. From 
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this, a symbiotic partnership developed between the airlines, airport, casino-resorts, 
and government that steadily grew with the latter three developing a dependence on 
the former for business. But, the airlines could not accomplish this alone.   
Government funding enabled the airline industry to proliferate. Without Uncle 
Sam‟s financial assistance, the airline industry was too expensive for private 
financiers to sustain, and would have resulted in imminent collapse. This especially 
was the case during the infant and adolescent years of the airline industry (the 
1920s-1950s), and in later years when the airlines continued depending on the 
federal government for subsidization in the form of loans for airplane leases, daily 
flight operations, and transporting mail. Las Vegas, itself a town that had depended 
on federal government funding for economic survival, eagerly embraced this new 
form of transportation that would bring in business. Additionally, the city had the 
good fortune to be in close proximity to heavily populated southern California, the 
birthplace and center of the nation‟s giant aerospace and aircraft industries where air 
travel in the West originated, and from which, a hefty flow of tourists over eight 
decades came to the southern Nevada desert. But advancement in aircraft 
technology and changes to government regulatory policy of the airline industry 
brought substantial change to the country and Las Vegas during deregulation when 
airlines set their own fares and routes, and the air travel and tourism industry 
boomed. 
 Despite airlines struggling with deep debt, poor management, labor issues, 
and high fuel costs, they continued to be part of the growing air travel, gambling, and 
tourism industries in Las Vegas. Even though US Airways and Allegiant Airlines 
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reduced their number of flights to Las Vegas, McCarran Airport still remained the 
seventh busiest domestic airport, and fifteenth busiest international airport in the 
world handling more than 1,100 flights per day, and over 40 million passengers per 
year. Those numbers were higher than they have been in previous decades. For 
years, casino-resort executives, airport officials, and city officials have understood 
how essential the airlines have become to Las Vegas‟s sustenance and future 
growth, and thus, have made the airlines and McCarran Airport an intrinsic part of 
future urban planning and development.  
The twenty-first century however, is bringing new and important challenges to 
the airline industry through major airline mergers, reducing service to various 
locations, which not only means fewer flights, but limited time schedules, and 
increased fees for baggage, seats, and in-flight services. The airlines continue to 
leave a bad carbon footprint of contamination of the skies, continuing dependence 
on fossil fuels, and invasive noise pollution at heavily congested airports. There still 
is much work to be done towards a global open skies agreement allowing the world‟s 
airlines to fly through each other‟s airspace, and do business with each other‟s 
markets. These problems raise questions that only the airlines, airport, and city of 
Las Vegas can resolve. 
My study can be used by other aviation scholars as a template to investigate 
the political, economic, and cultural impact commercial air travel had on other 
western cities. Scholars will find the relevance of my themes, and discover there are 
many more questions to be asked, among them: why did other western cities benefit 
less from airline deregulation? What spatial and financial challenges did airport and 
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urban planning officials in other western cities have to take into consideration with 
expansion projects resulting from explosive passenger volume growth, airline 
deregulation, and urban sprawl during and after the Cold War? Where did they get 
the funding? Why are other western cities also relying on more international airlines 
and air travelers for economic sustenance and growth? Given the overseas 
restricted airspace, and limited number of bilateral agreements, how does Las 
Vegas get more international airlines to fly there than Phoenix or Denver? While my 
study sheds some light on these questions, they merit deeper examination, 
especially in a broader study of commercial air travel influence on the American 
West.
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